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This dissertation demonstrates the Victorian novel’s preoccupation with what it 
understands as liberal society’s disavowed reliance on arbitrary and often violent decisions as 
a means of overcoming political and moral incommensurability, or, in other words, what 
Carl Schmitt has rather infamously called the “exception.”  Precisely opposed to Schmitt’s 
concept of the sovereign decision is the position of procedural liberalism, in which abstract 
and objective concepts of right arrived at through deliberative procedures are understood to 
motivate legal processes that induce justice.  Because the absolutist commitment to the 
sovereign decision is precisely antithetical to liberal ideals, the decision must either be 
deferred—only to begin a chain of deferrals—or, once implemented, its use must be 
disavowed.  Novels from Thackeray to Conrad all recognize, I argue, the existence of what I 
call the “crypto-decisionism” obscured by the rhetoric and operations of procedural 
liberalism.   
Victorian demands of propriety and public morality, I argue, require the collective 
disavowal of whatever is antithetical to publicity.  My focus then is on the way that the 
Victorian novel self-consciously reproduces the relationship between violence and disavowal 
that it portrays as essential to social harmony within the liberal context.  The novels I 
consider in this dissertation present worlds in which the essential role of violence to 
preserving community stability is known but not acknowledged precisely because any open 
acknowledgement of the role of violence in maintaining social equanimity at the same time 
threatens to destroy the equanimity it secures.  Ultimately the contradiction between 
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deliberative procedures meant to produce consensual action on the one hand, and the 
violent decision on the other hand, creates a tension, I argue, that shapes the narrative 
structures of the novel in its image.  In the novels I examine narrative conflict takes the form 
of incongruities or disturbances against which the novel must marshal exceptional means—a 
sort of internal, aesthetic decisionism—in order to secure aesthetic coherence or closure.  In 
this way the novel form, I contend, mimetically reproduces Victorian anxieties regarding 
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This dissertation examines the interdependence of violence and liberal forms of 
individual and community self-understanding as presented in nineteenth-century narrative.  I 
focus chiefly on three major writers of the latter half of the century: George Eliot, Thomas 
Hardy, and Joseph Conrad.  I argue that the novels of these writers (among others) self-
consciously expose liberal society’s reliance on what Carl Schmitt described as the 
“exception” (Political Theology 5-15).  In other words, procedural liberalism depends finally on 
an arbitrary and often violent decision in an effort to resolve the conflicts inherent to 
political community, or what George Eliot referred to as the “antagonism of valid claims” 
(Critical Writings 246).  The use of arbitrary violence to forcibly resolve conflict represents an 
essential contradiction of liberal process because, at least since John Locke, liberalism has 
been fundamentally committed to the triumph of right over might.  In fact, one might argue 
that the need to overcome a politics of the exception provides liberalism with its very reason 
for being.1  That an abstract and objective concept of right arrived at through deliberative 
procedures can motivate legal processes, and in so doing induce justice, is a central tenet of 
liberal democratic ideals, and opposes precisely the absolutist commitment to the sovereign 
decision.  For this reason the decision must either be deferred—only to begin a chain of 
deferrals, a common critique of parliamentary operations—or, once implemented, must be 
disavowed both in theory and in practice.  In the same way that Pierre Bourdieu describes a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It is not difficult to see that Schmitt’s vision of the political, in which “the state suspends 
the law in the exception on the basis of its right of self-preservation,” is precisely antithetical 
to procedural liberalism (Political Theology 12). 
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“disavowal of the usual forms of interest” as that which enables certain synergies and 
relationships to flourish within the field of cultural production (“The Production of Belief” 
265), one could say that in the case of procedural liberalism it is similalry the disavowal of 
the usual forms of resolution—in other words, the arbitrary decision—that allows for the 
continued operation of procedures of legitimation. The contradiction between deliberative 
procedures meant to produce consensual action on the one hand, and the violent decision 
on the other hand, creates a tension immanent to the novels I consider in this dissertation, 
and which tends to shape the narrative structures of these novels in its image. 
That the realist novel is generally allied with liberal aspirations of objectivity and that 
the formal operations of the realist novel reproduce procedures of consensus formation has 
become accepted from a number of divergent, and even opposed critical perspectives.  Thus 
it comes as no surprise that recent work in Victorian Studies has turned specifically to the 
Victorian novel in an effort to recuperate ideals of liberalism and cosmopolitanism for the 
twenty first century.  Committed to a Habermasian critique of poststructuralism, the work of 
these scholars revaluates Victorian literature in the wake of the very influential tradition of 
criticism inspired by Foucault and Althusser, which understands nineteenth-century narrative 
as a disciplinary force engaged in various ways in the formation of the liberal subject.  My 
work wends a way between these two dominant discourses.  I engage on the one hand with 
the violent discontinuities of the Victorian novel, which I feel the newer, neoliberal forms of 
criticism tend to ignore, and on the other hand show that texts often understood to 
unconsciously participate in disciplinary procedures are instead well aware of the troubling 
techniques they depict.  In short, I argue that texts envisioned—for various reasons—as 
exemplary of an idealized Victorian liberal discourse, instead expose the violence these 
books understand as sustaining liberal ideals.   
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I am aware that the meaning of the term liberalism (like so many “-isms”) is difficult 
to pin down, so I wish at the outset to clarify my use of the term.  By liberalism I do not 
intend any specifically partisan description of political systems or ideologies (either as the 
term pertains to the nineteenth century or to our current political discourse), but unless 
otherwise noted, allude instead to those forms of parliamentary or democratic political 
culture that have dominated political organization in the West since the nineteenth century.  
Yet liberalism as an idea is ambiguous not only because divergent and often vague usages of 
the term have over time cultivated discrepancies in meaning (they certainly have).  The 
meaning of the term is equivocal because as a modality of both individual and collective self-
understanding liberalism itself enfolds conflicting and ambiguous intellectual and agential 
impulses that emerge as practical contradictions.  That said, I agree with Lauren M. E. 
Goodlad that, broadly stated, liberalism in the nineteenth century represented a social, 
political and intellectual movement in which “centralized institutions and statist 
interventions were curbed to preserve the ‘self-governing’ liberties of individuals and local 
communities” (viii).2  Still, there is a significant tension between Victorian liberalism’s 
commitment to individualism and its devotion to an ameliorative, progressive culture.  
Despite what we in hindsight consider to be the sacrosanct importance of laissez-faire to 
liberalism, there exists “a positive impulse to build character and promote social betterment 
by collective means [that] permeates [the] diverse liberal thought” of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries (Goodlad viii).  In Victorian England, one needed not profess political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Goodlad goes on to argue in Victorian Literature and the Victorian State that, while “in 
hindsight Victorian liberalism is best characterized by its pervasive tensions and paradoxes, it 
is also important to stress the remarkably durable liberal mythology—the ideals, vocabulary, 
and assumptions—to which contemporaries consciously and unconsciously subscribed” 
(viii).   
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liberalism in order to still be liberal in one’s actions and understandings.3  In this sense, the 
Victorian novel is to some extent always already a liberal novel. 
Yet, while many Victorian novels, like the populace they depict, appear committed to 
ideals that we might broadly identify as liberal, the novels of the period also demonstrate a 
distinct unease with liberalism as a practice.  The novels of Charles Dickens, for instance, are 
famous for their critique of the indecision ensconced in parliamentary bureaucracy and the 
“perennially hopeless” legal procedures of chancery (Bleak House 52).  At the same time, 
countless Victorian novels—one might think here of George Eliot’s Adam Bede (1859), 
Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities (1859), or Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1871)—are 
punctuated by scapegoating, transportations, or executions.  All are forms par excellence of the 
violent decision.  Indeed the problems of closure these novels exhibit, in other words, their 
evident need for exceptional means to force aesthetic resolution, is one apparent expression 
of the very problem I mean to explore in this work.  The late nineteenth-century novels I 
examine in this dissertation generally emphasize the relation between liberal intransigence, 
that is, the inability or undesirability of reaching a decision at both the collective and 
individual levels, and decisive acts of violence or exclusion.  Violence is required for the 
maintenance of liberal equanimity, but because that violence is antithetical to liberal self-
understanding, it must simultaneously be disavowed so as not to jeopardize that equanimity.  
Publicity and the social force of propriety are important concerns for any discussion of 
Victorian, or liberal, modes of agency and self-understanding; the all important Victorian 
concept of character is, after all, principally a public construct requiring at least the pretense 
of shared understanding.  For this reason the maintenance of propriety also required 
disavowal.  The novels I explore in the pages to follow all portray violence as an evident but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Goodlad, ix.  Also, see Stefan Collini, Public Moralists. 
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unacknowledged fact of the worlds they present. 
Victorian narrative, I argue, acknowledges the synergy between social cohesion and 
disavowed violence and thus in various ways consciously reproduces this fraught relationship 
as a component of its formal procedures.  Thus, my introductory chapter begins with a 
discussion of public privacy in the novel and argues that the Victorian novel understands 
disavowal, due to the demands of publicity and public agency, to be an essential component 
of liberal agency.  Through readings of William H. Thackeray’s Vanity Fair (1849) and 
Dickens’s David Copperfield (1850) and Little Dorrit (1855), I show how public privacy is 
expressed as an element of style in the novel and how Dickens in particular links the modern 
phenomenon of disavowal specifically to violence.  Over the course of the chapter, I attempt 
to position historically the problem of violence in nineteenth-century liberal culture as well 
as take stock of the critical stakes of my engagement with the Victorian novel.  I pay special 
attention here to the recent discourses of cultivation and detachment that have in some 
sense redirected the course of Victorian Studies over the last two decades.  I also show why 
my exploration of violence and decisionism in the Victorian novel has brought me 
necessarily to the controversial political and legal thought of Carl Schmitt, and in this chapter 
I discuss his critique of liberal democracy and his theory of sovereignty.  Over the course of 
this dissertation, I attempt to show that the Victorian authors with whom I am concerned 
here were beginning to understand the potential flaws of liberal democracy some fifty or 
sixty years before Schmitt delivered his trenchant critique of parliamentary democracy.  
However my efforts are not meant to be merely comparative; instead I attempt to 
demonstrate that the tensions between decision and indecision, violence and disavowal make 
an impact on the formal procedures of the novel.  Because these writers lacked the 
philosophical language supplied some years later by Carl Schmitt, they expressed their 
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insights in the form of narrative art, often articulating conflict through the employment of 
divergent generic idioms.  Consequently my next chapter argues that the legal processes 
Eliot depicts in Adam Bede (1859) rely on exclusionary practices that are ultimately disclaimed 
by the community in whose name they occur.  In Adam Bede Eliot emphasizes the 
deliberative character of collectivized and procedurally legitimized violence and 
demonstrates that, in the same way that the novel itself depends on the violence of 
scapegoating to reach a formal resolution, liberal procedure depends on what I call crypto-
decisionism to surmount the conflicts by which it is presented.  I go on to demonstrate that 
in her later novels, such as Middlemarch (1871) and Daniel Deronda (1876), Eliot strains 
unsuccessfully to resolve the necessity of violence by fashioning in her novels realities of 
meaningful compromise.  
My third chapter focuses on the novels of Thomas Hardy, and in particular on The 
Return of the Native (1878) and Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891).  Contrary to the progressive 
narratives of Eliot’s later novels, Hardy’s narrative strategies teach us that the liberal impulse 
functions by precisely those methods—violence and exclusion—that liberalism must 
denounce as irrational in its effort to maintain the identity of its political practices and 
human reason.  In Tess of the D’Urbervilles, for instance, I argue that the narrator’s urgent 
repudiation of Tess’s fear of the violent world she inhabits corresponds to liberalism’s 
rationalizing strategy of disavowal.  Hardy’s novels suggest that the impulse towards 
universalism disturbs the progressive sequence it hopes to secure; rather than achieving a 
universal right, the cosmopolitan impulse only broadens the field of divergent interests.  
Instead of inducing affiliation, then, liberal cosmopolitanism thins, so to speak, human 
connection and identity and tends to proliferate domains of struggle and conflict.  Hardy’s 
novels demonstrate that as society becomes what Schmitt calls “depoliticized,” violence and 
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conflict become endemic to social relations: “in the new [depoliticized] domain, at first 
considered neutral, the antitheses of men and interests unfold with a new intensity and 
become increasingly sharper” (Concept of the Political 90).  So on both the cognitive and 
physical levels, for Hardy, the impulse toward universalization leads not to inclusion, but to 
the breakdown of affiliations and consequently the generalization of violence in liberal 
society.   
The next chapter examines Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent (1907), which, set in late 
Victorian London, I argue intentionally conjures the aesthetic of Victorian narrative in an 
effort to explore the violence of a degraded culture in which human agency depends on 
secrecy and disavowal or, in the words of Winnie Verloc, an approach that “consists of not 
taking notice of the inside of facts (The Secret Agent 109).  Like Hardy before him, Conrad 
presents the democratic and cosmopolitan impulses as leading to regimes of individual and 
collective self-understanding that are characterized by mistrust, secret calculation, and above 
all, indecision.  The Secret Agent—a novel about various forms of anarchy—ultimately 
conflates liberal democracy and anarchy, and in this way reproduces in precise terms 
Schmitt’s critique of liberal society.  At the same time, through the twinned plots of foreign 
ambassador Mr. Vladimir and the anarchist Professor, Conrad parodies the concept of the 
violent exception, which each of these characters wants to use to create a state of emergency 
and induce reciprocal violence—and limitations on individual liberties—from society at 
large.  Ultimately Conrad’s novel critiques the theological underpinnings of the various 
political orientations it portrays and finally shows that instrumental violence inheres in the 
politically neutralized concept of humanity.  We find, however, that Conrad’s democratically 
applied irony is finally incommensurate with Winnie’s violently decisive response to her 
world, an action that in many ways reprises Hardy’s representation of Tess’s final, atavistic 
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violence against Alec D’Urberville.  In this way The Secret Agent, like Tess, exposes the 
intensely violent core that it understands as the disavowed truth of liberal culture.  A brief 
conclusion consists of a more global reflection on how disavowal and (in)decision effect the 
form of the novel and attempts to take stock of the ways in which the relationship between 
violence and disavowal remains pertinent to the novel, and liberal culture, long after the 
historical period on which this dissertation had focused. 
This dissertation would never have been completed without the professional and 
intellectual guidance of many members of the University of Utah Department of English, to 
whom I owe a debt of gratitude.  Chief among these stewards have been Vincent P. Pecora 
and Anne Jamison, who in their very different ways have for nearly a decade now generously 
provided intellectual counsel as well as moral support.  Thank you, Vince, for finding 
enough promise in my work—even when I could not—to keep me moving ever onward.  
And thanks to you, Anne, for balancing so effortlessly the roles of mentor and friend—and 
for always being the right one at always just the right time.  I am grateful to Matthew 
Potolsky for generous and thoughtful discussions, for his professional insights, and for his 
always dependable honesty.  Also, many thanks to Stacey Margolis, who, never afraid to get 
right to the heart of the matter, has been a great help to me throughout the course of my 
studies.  Your discerning reading has been instrumental to my writing, and your willingness 
to take the time to share your professional experience with me has also been immensely 
important to my understanding of the academic profession.  I would also like to extend my 
gratitude to Joesph Metz, not only for fulfilling his role on my committee in such a rigorous, 
thoughtful, and congenial way, but also for so clearly being precisely the kind of professional 
intellectual and teacher that I could only aspire to be.  I also want to thank Scott Black, Andy 
Franta, and Barry Weller for their various forms of assistance along the way.  And especially 
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to Howard Horwitz go my deep appreciation and even deeper regard.  Finally, I would never 
have finished were it not for Gerri Mackey telling me again, and yet again, what to do next.  
Thanks, Gerri.  
 Gratitude, esteem, and unending love only begins to express my feelings toward my 
parents, Jim and Daphine Carroll, not only for their support of my academic endeavors 
(which has been immense), but also for their absolutely unconditional love and support 
throughout the course of my life.  There could be no better parents.  I would like also to 
thank my other parents, Ron, Carol, and Bonnie, who represent just some of the windfalls of 
my marriage, for their care and assistance in more instances than I could hope to enumerate.  
My love and thanks to Auntie, Michele Wilson, without whom we simply would never have 
made it.  We miss you everyday.   
Of course the greatest thanks must go to my wife, Michelle, and my two daughters, 
Olivia, and Willa, to all of whom I owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude.  All I can say to 
you, Michelle, is thank you for putting up with me for the past seven years, and for not 
resorting to exceptional means when they were surely warranted.  My love, I will try to make 
it all worthwhile.  To my girls, who could never know the joy they bring to my existence: you 









“That I suffered in secret, and that I suffered exquisitely, no 
one ever knew but I.  How I suffered it is, I have said already, 




About a third of the way through Charles Dickens’s David Copperfield (1850), David, 
now a young man, encounters his old school mate Steerforth, who insists that David travel 
with him to his family home.  After becoming acquainted with Mrs. Steerforth, an “elderly,” 
female version of Steerforth himself, and in a somewhat protracted manner also with the 
furnishings of the “genteel old-fashioned house,” we suddenly discover there to be a 
“second lady in the dining-room” (300-301).  Though the woman “was not agreeable to look 
at,” due to some peculiarities, she nonetheless “attracted [David’s] attention” (301).  This 
unwonted attraction, David speculates, is due to “something really remarkable in her”: 
It was an old scar—I should rather call it seam, for it was not discolored, and had 
healed years ago—which had cut through her mouth, downward towards the chin, 
but was now barely visible across the table, except above and on her upper lip, the 
shape of which it had altered. (301) 
 
This woman is of course Rosa Dartle, the spurned past exploit of James Steerforth.  The scar 
that so transfixes David, we find, is the trace of Steerforth’s past violence:  
  ‘What a remarkable scar that is upon her lip’ [David] said.  Steerforth’s face fell, and 
he paused for a moment. 
  ‘Why, the fact is,’ he returned, ‘—I did that.’ 
  ‘By an unfortunate accident!’ 
  ‘No.  I was a young boy, and she exasperated me, and I threw a hammer at her.  A 
promising young angel I must have been!’  […] 





Rosa Dartle’s scar is remarkable, as David points out, and not least due to the manner in 
which the mark across Rosa’s lips powerfully syncretizes violence, sexuality, and writing, and 
in this way proleptically charges the remainder of David Copperfield.  Given David’s position 
as narrator and author of a narrative that is itself recanted (the original subtitle to the novel 
described itself parenthetically as a Personal History its author Never Meant to be Published On 
Any Account), it is perhaps odd that, for much of this chapter, David takes the role of proxy 
reader.  Nonetheless, “like old writing on the wall,” Rosa’s scar divulges the history of 
Steerforth’s violence, and in doing so provokes a “painful interest” in David (302).  
Curiously, however, once David discovers the disclaimed truth of Steerforth’s past violent 
actions, he obscures their unsettling significance (reproducing a narrative strategy with which 
the reader has by now become familiar) by twice offering alternative and ameliorative 
readings of the narrative Steerforth reveals in response to his query.1 
David is initiated covertly (as if he needed any coaching) into a kind of silent 
covenant: all present—including, now, David—know well the truth of Rosa’s disfigurement, 
and thus the truth of Steerforth’s character, yet choose corporately not to acknowledge these 
truths.  Once remarked upon, and the history of Rosa’s scar divulged, the mark becomes 
literally un-remarkable, which is to say, discursively off-limits.  Rosa’s scar represents what is 
well known, present for all to see, but as if by silent accord, that which cannot be 
acknowledged.  Rosa’s scar is a precise figure of disavowal, a public form of privacy that not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I’m thinking here of those moments of narrative reticence and cagy silence that mark as 
well as mask, for example, the early school relations of David and Steerforth, David’s time at 
the bottle washing factory, and then his repression of the violence he experiences at the 
hands of Mr. Murdstone.  These foundational moments—both to David’s life as well as to 
the form of his narrative—disavowed as they are, nonetheless exert an intense pressure on 
the remainder of the narrative, and are crucial, I think, to the argument that Dickens’s book 
is making about the role that disavowed violence plays in liberal society and in the formation 




only characterizes the narrative operations of David Copperfield, but that I will argue in this 
dissertation also describes a more general tendency in Victorian narrative.  The novel shows 
that Victorian demands of propriety and public morality require the collective disavowal of 
whatever is antithetical to publicity.  My specific focus will be the ways that the Victorian 
novel is preoccupied with, and thus knowingly reproduces the relationship between violence 
and disavowal that it recognizes as essential in the liberal context.  It is not so much that the 
individual hides certain private impulses or that the individual is prone to violent actions, but 
rather that violence is at once essential and antithetical to the liberal democratic society that 
must repudiate it.  Violence is thus both public, because apparent, and private because open 
acknowledgement of the role of violence in maintaining social equanimity threatens to 
destroy that equanimity.  In a recent book on the subject, Michael Taussig describes “public 
secrecy,” or in other words “knowing what not to know,” as the “most important [type] of social 
knowledge (1-2 Taussig’s emphasis). Intriguingly, Taussig explicitly connects the phenomena 
of the public secret to “defacement”: 
When the human body, a nation’s flag, money, or a public statue is defaced, a strange 
surplus of negative energy is likely to be aroused from within the defaced thing itself.  
It is now in a state of desecration, the closest many of us are going to get to the sacred 
in the modern world.  [Any effort toward the] characterization of defacement can 
never confront its object head-on, if only because defacement catches us unawares 
and can only be known unexpectedly, complicit with the violence of daily life.  The 
shortest way between two points, between violence and its analysis, is the long way 
around, tracing the edge sideways like the crab scuttling. (Taussig 1-2) 
 
Installing the undeniable symbol of a woman’s violently “cut” genitalia on her face, for all to 
see, as it were, may not be what most of us think of as taking “the long way around” the 
subject at hand, yet this is in fact exactly what Dickens does in David Copperfield.  He 
confronts the reader precisely, violently, with what cannot be confronted.  This 
confrontation induces the reader, through the play of presence and absence, to contend with 




Dickens exposes the reader to the fact of Rosa’s violation, so more generally do his and 
other novels of the period challenge the reader by divulging another secret, that of 
liberalism’s desecration by its own internalized violence.  Liberalism’s sacred tenet is that 
through openness and deliberation right will triumph over might, and that because 
formalized procedures are able to arrive at consensual action, society no longer requires the 
arbitrary decision, or coercive violence, in order to resolve the conflicts deriving from 
ideological incommensurability. Yet as I will show in the pages that follow, the Victorian 
novel regularly shows these sacred ideals to be disfigured by an essential violence that is 
known, but not acknowledged. 
 Taussig never explicitly links with irony the “surplus of negative energy” he says 
emanates from the defaced object or thing; he says, however, that “defacement works on 
objects the way jokes work on language, bringing out their inherent magic nowhere more so 
than when those objects have become routinized and social” (Taussig 5).  Yet certainly the 
“magic” of negative energy describes the function of irony, of bringing into being what is 
there but not there, of defacing stable meanings and writings with doubts and doubleness, 
and doing so in an effort to release from them “surplus” significations.  For if Rosa’s scar 
suggests the function of disavowal in Victorian narrative, then Rosa’s speech in David 
Copperfield represents Dickens’s recognition of the discursive processes for which this figure 
is associated in the novel: Rosa “never said anything she wanted to say, outright; but hinted 
it, and made a great deal more of it by this practice” (301).    
For example, when Mrs. Steerforth observed, more in jest than in earnest, that she 
feared her son led but a wild life at college, Miss Dartle put in thus: 
  ‘Oh, really? You know how ignorant I am, and that I only ask for information, but 
isn’t it always so? I thought that kind of life was on all hands understood to be—eh?’ 
  ‘It is education for a very grave profession, if you mean that, Rosa,’ Mrs. Steerforth 
answered with some coldness. 
  ‘Oh!  Yes!  That’s very true,’ returned Miss Dartle.  ‘But isn’t it, though?—I want to 




  ‘Really what?’ said Mrs. Steerforth. 
  ‘Oh!  You mean it’s not!’ returned Miss Dartle.  ‘Well, I’m very glad to hear it!  Now, 
I know what to do.  That’s the advantage of asking.  I shall never allow people to talk 
before me about wastefulness and profligacy, and so forth, in connexion with that 
life, anymore.’ (301) 
 
Like her scar, Rosa’s speech is also remarkable; it invokes precisely what it negates.  Her 
mode of discourse, like the symbol of past violence written across her face, provokes an 
ambivalent fascination not only in David, but the reader as well (304).  The significance of 
Rosa’s irony eludes no one, yet neither is its meaning acknowledged: it is not to Rosa’s 
intended meaning, but instead to the avowed frame of Rosa’s speech that Mrs. Steerforth 
peremptorily replies, “and you shall be right” (302).  This is irony of a particular sort; 
meaning is produced at the expense of the characters that surround Rosa, not because they 
are unable to share in the “joke” due to some limitation (for example, a lack of 
sophistication) but because public propriety will not allow them to acknowledge Rosa’s 
meaning.  Rosa’s rhetoric reproduces, and thus draws silent attention to the social processes 
to which she is herself subject.  Rosa’s exclamatory negation, “You mean it’s not!” leaves a 
trace that conjures precisely the never-spoken subject of the interchange (Steerforth’s 
dissipations).  By doing so the interchange brings to light not only something of Steerforth’s 
character, but more importantly, points out the function of disavowal as both a social and 
cognitive process by which what is antithetical to social equanimity is publicly elided.  
However, Rosa’s strident negations and pregnant ellipses serve most effectively to bring into 
relief precisely that which is left unspoken.  As elsewhere in the novel, such silences are 
voluble.  “Like a mark in invisible ink brought to the fire,” Rosa Dartle’s scar persists 
doggedly in its signification (304).   
Rosa’s circumambulatory locution conjures mentally the fact of violence, even as it 




methods of Dickens’s narrative itself.  The scar and its function suggests something of what 
Cedric Watts has called the novel’s “covert plots,” that is, the novel’s tendency to produce 
dialectically “moral implications that work against, and substantially contradict, the moral 
implications of the main plot” (The Deceptive Text 34).2  For David Copperfield self-consciously 
elides the suffering that exceeds the bounds of liberal propriety, even as the novel 
demonstrates emphatically that suffering is instrumental to the constitution of liberal 
subjectivity.  The narrative’s elisions consistently draw attention to themselves and their 
function, always stressing the presence of precisely what cannot be spoken, or written: “That 
I suffered in secret,” Davy tells us, “and that I suffered exquisitely, no one ever knew but I.  
How I suffered it is, I have said already, beyond my power to tell” (172).  By drawing 
attention to his repeated omissions, David only emphasizes the violence and suffering his 
narrative redacts.  D. A. Miller was certainly correct when he wrote in The Novel and the Police, 
“the story of David’s liberation runs parallel to the story of his submission” (216).  Yet the 
chiasmic “pattern” that Miller’s reading so capably elicits, he argues, “can hardly be 
broadcast in the novel, which requires the functioning of the difference to structure its own 
plot” (220).  For David Copperfield does in fact “broadcast,” albeit silently or elliptically, the 
disavowed discipline and suffering that Dickens’s shows to be indissolubly a part of liberal 
subject formation.   
Miller’s influential book, of which his final chapter on David Copperfield in many ways 
comprises the tour de force, quietly omits (particularly in this last chapter) direct commentary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Janus-faced structure of the novel, according to Cedric Watts, allows the novel to 
accommodate the opposed plots that “explain those elements of the text which at first may 
have seemed odd or anomalous, obscure or redundant” (30).  Though I find Watts insights 
valuable, I do not share his evident desire to rationalize what is anomalous or obscure in a 
text, and certainly not to the point that what is strange or inconsistent in a text is made to 
“cohere logically as a sequence,” even if that new totality is itself positioned as a sort of 




on the novelist’s control of those disciplinary “patterns” that Miller asserts are intrinsic to 
the nineteenth-century novel.  Miller’s book, as well as a huge amount of the criticism 
written in its image, tends not to afford the author any reflexive understanding of art’s 
potential role in maintaining and reproducing public morality, but rather positions the novel 
as unreflectively engaged in a micropolitics of the subject.  Surely one must be wary of 
installing the author as autonomous subject, free of the social and linguistic forces of which 
she is at once the agent and the creator.  That said, it is at best contrived, and at worst 
disingenuous, to so readily characterize the nineteenth-century novel, and its authors, as 
uncritically allied with those formal social laws that enlightened critics denigrate as the 
intrinsically “carceral” conditions imposed by bourgeois morality.  The criticism of the novel 
inspired by Foucault and/or Althusser depends on a vision of the author as unable to reflect 
beyond the system in which she is enmeshed (and from which, not unproblematically, the 
critic is somehow free).  From this point of view, Victorian narrative, by narrating plots of 
resistance and individual development, only tightens the grasp of power: “As it forwards a 
story of social discipline,” writes Miller of George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1871), “the novel also 
advances the novel’s omniscient world.  It is frequently hard to distinguish the omniscience 
from the social control is parallels” (27-28).  It is always unclear if Miller sees the author as 
complicit in, or simply ignorant of, the “disciplinary” function of her narrative, but what is 
certain is that Miller conflates “social control” with the aspiration to forms of shared 
understanding generally understood to be both a standard element of the nineteenth-century 
novel and essential to conceptions of liberal agency.  The various political and ethical 
commitments of the novelists I consider in this study are neither uncritical of those 
commitments, nor unaware of the potential for art to become an instrument of those 




A novel like David Copperfield, which has much to say about writing and authorship, 
repeatedly shows itself to be concerned with artistic representation’s inclination to conceal 
what is most important for it to expose.  By making a show of its practices of concealment, 
the novel only emphasizes the importance of what it hides.  The same chapter I have been 
discussing above in David Copperfield ends with a brief vignette that seems to comment on 
precisely the narrative procedures to which I wish to direct attention.  Having withdrawn to 
his room after the evening’s pleasantries, David settles in, only to again be surprised by Rosa, 
but this time by a painted “likeness of Miss Dartle looking eagerly at me from above the 
chimney-piece” 
It was a startling likeness, and necessarily had a startling look.  The painter hadn’t 
made the scar, but I made it; and there it was, coming and going: now confined to 
the upper lip as I had seen it at dinner, and now showing the whole extent of the 
wound inflicted by the hammer, as I had seen it when she was passionate. (306) 
 
Having made the case for the double function of disavowal in the previous pages, Dickens 
here explicitly connects disavowal and artistic representation.  Because David knows the 
secret, the artist’s concealment of Rosa’s defacement only exacerbates the power of that 
mark as a signifying force: the act of negation only makes the scar more pronounced, 
precisely by its absence.  Moreover, a portrait that would have certainly been innocuous 
otherwise (like the woman herself), is made captivating by what it is known to conceal: as 
Taussig muses while meditating over a vandalized statue, “with defacement, the statue 
moves from an excess of invisibility to an excess of visibility” (52).   
David, as the subject viewer, is once again in the position of subject reader, 
confronted again by the “invisible ink,” as it were, of disavowal.  Here David is faced by a 
figure of his own authorship.  Like the head of King Charles I, which persists in its 
intrusions into Mr. Dick’s personal histories, Rosa’s scar, and Davy’s history of abuse, will 




agency had pushed the scar, and its powers of signification, neatly beneath the surface of 
representation, David’s knowledge insists on placing it back on the painted face, along with 
all the violence it represents, “showing the whole extent of the wound inflicted by the 
hammer.”  Just so for the reader; as Rosa’s verbal negations had invoked precisely what was 
actively being suppressed and could do so only because that suppression was a corporate 
activity—a product of shared knowledge and understanding—the painting is exemplary of 
the way in which the traces of violence and suffering in David Copperfield, and in the Victorian 
novel more generally, inevitably “start forth like old writing on the wall.” 
 
Disavowal in the Victorian Novel 
By avowing the ideals it also wishes to interrogate, the Victorian novel leaves itself 
open to critique that either ignores or does not understand the novel’s propensity to express 
both the aspirations and the contradictions of the world it struggles to present.  Yet 
ironically, those critical efforts that wish to understand every potentially subversive or 
unaccountable aspect of the novel as always already normative and disciplinary, find it 
necessary to disavow their own implied but unstated commitment to noncarceral 
individualism, and thus to an undamaged subjectivity that they are unable or unwilling to 
articulate.3  Indeed much critical hay has been made of poststructuralism’s disavowed 
normative commitment, its so-called “crypto-normativism,” by the recent brand of liberal 
critique that turns to the nineteenth century and its literature in an effort to counter generally 
this hermeneutics of suspicion and, more specifically, to recuperate Victorian liberalism for 
the twenty first century.  On the one hand, the Victorian novel has been read as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Habermas, The Philisophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence, (Boston: 
MIT, 1987), 337; also, Amanda Anderson, “Cryptonormativism and the Double Gesture,” 




unconsciously reproducing processes of discipline and violence in a fashion that naturalizes 
these processes for the subject as reader while in the process reshaping the reader as liberal 
subject.  Exemplary here is D. A. Miller as I have shown, but also Nancy Armstrong’s more 
recent How the Novel Thinks, in which she claims that “by pathologizing and criminalizing 
[certain] women, Victorian fiction justified [their] beating, drowning, burning, hanging or 
exiling” (80).  These rather sensational approaches are countered, at the other extreme, by 
more recent forms of criticism that attempt to articulate the value of Victorian liberal 
idealism for our own time.  David S. Malachuk has turned to the work of John Stuart Mill 
and Matthew Arnold in an effort to renovate “a perfectionist liberalism committed to the 
universal realization of objective moral goods that are nevertheless not metaphysical” 
(Perfection 7).  Following Jürgen Habermas’s critique of poststructuralism, scholars like 
Amanda Anderson and David Wayne Thomas have attempted to rethink our critical 
understanding of Victorian literary and political approaches to objectivity and in so doing to 
renovate and reimagine the possibility for normative consensus and its relation to liberal 
agency.  Utilizing and revising Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality in the 
process, these scholars have rediscovered in Victorian thought what Thomas calls, 
borrowing from Mill, a discourse of “individual ‘many-sided-ness,’” that is exemplary of the 
“the liberal aspiration to critical self-consciousness” that he finds modeled in aesthetic 
experience (14-44).  This liberal aspiration is founded on a cultivated openness to self-
reflective awareness very similar to what Amanda Anderson has called the “power of 
cultivated detachment” (Powers of Distance 4-6). 
More recently Anderson, informed by the work of John Rawls as well as Habermas, 
has forwarded a procedural ideal of legitimation that, “animated by a moral point of view 




she sees as “a normative model for the justification of specific political practices and 
institutions” (The Way We Argue 161).  Generally speaking, this scholarly impulse wants to 
demonstrate that Victorian theorizations of a distanced, reflexive, and self-critical agency 
allow us to recuperate those conceptions of moral judgment and rational cooperation upon 
which the tradition of liberalism is based.  Yet this scholarship all too often excludes any 
consideration of the violence so prevalent in the nineteenth-century novel and by doing so 
tends to reproduce in the service of its arguments the very processes of exclusion and 
disavowal that the Victorians were explicitly cautioning against.  By contrast, I suggest here 
that texts often envisioned on the one hand as promulgating a disciplinary discourse, and on 
the other hand as exemplary of an idealized Victorian liberal discourse, instead expose the 
violence these books understand as sustaining liberal ideals.  While liberalism’s complicated 
relationship with and ultimate disavowal of exceptional violence is a central concern of both 
the political thought and the literary representation of the nineteenth century, this has gone 
generally unrecognized by Victorian Studies.   
The novels I consider in this dissertation are acutely aware that although liberalism is 
predicated fundamentally on the triumph of right over might—and thus on the 
parliamentary or deliberative procedures as opposed to the power of absolute decree—the 
force of the arbitrary decision, what Carl Schmitt calls the exception, nonetheless remains 
the means by which conflict is resolved within the liberal context.  That forms of political 
and social incommensurability demand the decision is the disavowed truth of liberal 
procedure.  My dissertation examines the different ways in which the Victorian novel 
accommodates the paradoxes of disavowal as components of its form and envisions a sort 
of chiasmic relationship between violence and disavowal.  In the worlds conjured by these 




consensual political procedure and human reason that subtends the liberal enterprise.  Yet 
much as Rosa Dartle’s scar provokes an undesired and “painful interest” for the eponymous 
protagonist of David Copperfield, disavowed violence haunts the narrative procedures of the 
Victorian novel, frustrating its aesthetic procedures of containment and closure.  Thus we 
can read in the aesthetic dramas of Victorian narrative the mimetic expression of similar 
tensions in Victorian culture.   
All of the texts I consider in this study are preoccupied by a sense that within the 
liberal context formal harmony depends on the exclusion of whatever might be antithetical 
to that harmony.   This preoccupation is expressed as a prominent narrative tension 
reflecting a more general problem of liberalism: that the act of disavowal or exclusion must 
itself be disavowed, or else it threatens the formal harmony it is meant to maintain.  A novel 
like W. M. Thackeray’s Vanity Fair (1847-8), for example, shows disavowal to be vital to 
navigating the expansive and highly formalized world it represents, even as its narrative 
persona argues, tongue firmly applied to cheek, that such practices are essential to his 
aesthetic project because “the moral world” exhibits an “insuperable repugnance to hearing 
vice called by its proper name” (812).  The narrator reiterates this point even more explicitly: 
“There are things we do and know very well in Vanity Fair,” he confesses, “though we never 
speak of them” (812).  In “Vanity Fair,” one is commonly forced to act in ways 
incommensurate with public propriety; but to do so transparently is to risk violence.  To act 
openly forces the public recognition of actions that are best repudiated and is thus to show 
one’s lack of cultivation.  The unfortunate Betsy Horrocks, who, just like everyone else in 
the novel, works to fleece Sir Pitt Crawley, is not “genteel” enough to do it covertly, and 
therefore threatened with imprisonment, transportation, and even hanging, before she is 




cultivated “categories of perception,” as Bourdieu puts it, which “structure perception” and 
agency in the particular field of production to which she desires admission and thus becomes 
a candidate for reprisal and expulsion (“The Production of Belief” 278-279).  Yet, Betsy risks 
reprisal not because she has committed a crime by attempting to steal from the baronet, but 
because she has threatened to reveal the operations of the game, that is, the systems of 
disavowal subtending what Bourdieu would call the “consecrated” regimes of cultivated 
society. 
What is demanded of liberal propriety, as of the “decorous” narrator of Vanity Fair, 
is to present all “to the public in a perfectly genteel and inoffensive manner” (812).  
Nonetheless “those who like may peep down under the waves that are pretty transparent,” 
and see there “the hideous monster’s tail” “writhing and twirling, diabolically hideous and 
slimy, flapping amongst bones, or curling around corpses” (Thackeray 812).  Vanity Fair is 
finally a book about the performance of propriety, and this concern is ironically reproduced 
in the novel’s style: “above the water line,” the apologist narrator mockingly asks the reader, 
“has not everything been proper, agreeable and decorous?” (812).  But more than merely a 
critique of convention, Vanity Fair is also a commentary on the crucial synergy between the 
aesthetic and the ethical that, since the previous century, had been central to public morality.  
The rhetorical form of Thackeray’s novel, by always hovering around the “pretty 
transparent” “water line” demarking public from private and moral from immoral, calls 
attention precisely to the foundation of public privacy on which propriety depends.  By 
maintaining these divisions, disavowal holds together a world in which publicity and the 
cultivation of a public morality are critical to the accumulation of cultural capital.   
Indeed, a long list of characters such as Thackeray’s Becky Sharpe, Anthony 




the conflation of the beautiful and the good that at least since Shaftesbury in England, and 
Immanuel Kant in Germany, had been corporate in liberal notions of character and agency.  
Kant, for example, extends the concept of the aesthetic to public life, stipulating that a 
demand for transparency, or publicity, is inherent in the notion of right: “All actions that 
affect the rights of other men,” writes Kant, “are wrong if their maxim is not consistent with 
publicity” (Perpetual Peace 135).  The adjective “consistent” is particularly powerful in Kant’s 
axiomatic usage: Agency is “consistent” within a public unity when it operates without 
contradiction within the bounds of that unity.  We find a similar sense of consistency to be 
crucial to Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.  Smith’s central concept of sympathy 
depends on public propriety to create a modicum of predictability for the agent.  Fellow 
felling is simply not possible in Smith’s theory of agency if the agent cannot imagine—that 
is, cannot in some sense predict—what the other is thinking or feeling.  The fetishization of 
public agency in the liberal context, certainly by the nineteenth century, puts an excruciating 
amount of pressure on the agent.  What is more, in an expanded social context like that of 
Victorian world (which is characterized, if by nothing else, by increasing pluralism of ideas 
and ways of knowing), the demands of character and public agency produce epistemological 
aporiae for the private subject.  
In her recent book Living Liberalism (2010), Elaine Hadley argues that the mental 
attitude or mindset of the “mid-Victorian liberal subject,” is characterized by “formalist 
predilections that continually seek to harmonize the disagreements, dissensions, and general 
disarray that otherwise upset the liberal mind” (9-12).4  Hadley’s work registers the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Hadley’s excellent book examines the formal constraints of what she calls “liberal 
cognition” and the difficulties of rendering abstract, private cogitation into its material form 
as opinion, which she argues is the engine of the Victorian political transformation.  By 




epistemological challenges to these “formalizing predilections” of the liberal subject, which 
“registered as a chaotic social landscape, a heterogeneous alterity, menacingly bodily, which 
itself must be disinterestedly formalized by the judging individual,” that is, by the liberal 
subject (Living Liberalisms 85).  In a world of formal propriety, the “chaotic social landscape,” 
as Hadley calls it, of a burgeoning mass culture poses a distinct challenge to the types of 
homogeneous social consensus on which the liberal agent found himself dependent.  For 
Hadley liberalism describes a mode of agency and cognition as much as it designates a brand 
of formal political procedures.  Similarly, Irene Tucker defines liberalism in her A Probable 
State (2000) as “a condition of subjectivity in which one’s capacity to know and predict the 
contingent particularities of the material world—including the particularities of other people 
in specific social, political and economic relations to one—becomes the ground of one’s 
operation as an agent” (25).5  For Tucker, the historical “moment” when the subject’s 
knowledge is no longer commensurate with the demands of her agency marks the 
transformation toward a new, more modern conception of liberalism.  Whereas for Lauren 
M. E. Goodlad, the demise of earlier laissez faire forms of traditional liberalism fostered a 
progressive and “positive impulse to build character and promote social betterment by 
collective means,” and indicated a renewed relationship between the individual and the State 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
embodiment,” that is, the materialization of formalized liberal cogitation—for example the 
signed opinion pieces of the Fortnightly Review and the emergence of the secret ballot—
Hadley exposes the deep ambivalences of liberal cognition while at the same time providing 
examples of how “the two modalities of abstraction that constituted liberal subjectivity, that 
distance between the private realm of cognition (a place of impersonality) and the public 
realm of abstract politics (a place of nation, citizenship, empire) could be elegantly and 
effectively bridged” (15). 
5 In the context of this important book Tucker conceives of liberalism “as a theory of the 
relation between knowledge and agency” (25).  For Tucker, the historical “moment” when 
the subject’s knowledge is no longer commensurate with the demands of her agency marks 
not only a new, more modern conception of liberalism but also the “decline” of the realist 
novel, which Tucker argues is exemplified in the temporal irreconcilability of the twin 




(viii), for Tucker this same development was a response to epistemological crises for the 
individual, which mandated a new reliance on the state, and required from the state 
“everything from new social services to new modes of legal interpretation in order to mark 
and compensate for citizens’ sudden incapacity” (26).   
Crucially for Tucker, this sea change in the private and public functioning of 
liberalism is seen as itself concomitant with the “’decline’” of the realist novel, which Tucker 
argues is exemplified in the temporal and generic irreconcilability of the twinned but 
discordant English and Jewish narratives of George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda (25; 31).6  It is as if 
the novel responds to the particular transformation Tucker describes by ceasing to produce 
for its reader certain ways of understanding (as she calls it, appropriately quoting Michael 
McKeon) and instead delivers a “new mode of fictionality” in which this “new” novel itself 
“narrates the process of its obsolescence” (Tucker 31).  As with many critics of the novel, in 
Tucker we get the developments of modernism precisely when the alignment of knowledge 
and action has been disrupted by social and epistemological heterogeneity.  Up to this point, 
so the story goes, the nineteenth-century novel has reproduced the relatively stable 
epistemological worldviews analogous with liberalism.  In its “formal techniques,” writes 
Pericles Lewis, the novels of the period, both in England and on the Continent, “reflect [a] 
conception of society” commensurate with “that of nineteenth-century liberalism” 
(Modernism, Nationalism 8-9).  The “functioning of the novelistic universe depends on the 
narrator’s role as a neutral arbiter,” Lewis asserts, and “like the state in liberal political 
thought,” the narrator “acts as guarantor of the shared, social reality” (9).  “Just as the liberal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 While I find this this specific formulation very useful, to pinpoint such a precise historical 
as well as aesthetic instance elides the general and persistent anxieties (registered in earlier 
Eliot and Dickens certainly, if not already in a novel like Tobias Smollett’s Humphry Clinker 
(1771)) regarding the relationship between agency and the epistemological adequacy of the 




state is the instrument of a neutral law and justice,” he continues, “so in the realist novel the 
narrator is the instrument of objectivity and truth in a world where the competing claims of 
individuals threaten to undermine social harmony” (Lewis 9).  The fictions of nineteenth-
century narrative, the argument goes, by modeling liberal procedures promoting shared 
understanding, resolve symbolically for their readerships the sorts of existential 
inconsistencies that seem impossible for their readers to surmount.  It is no wonder then 
that with this general conception of the nineteenth-century novel secure, a brand of 
neoliberal scholarship has recently turned to the Victorian novel and begun to use it as an 
instrument in an effort to renovate liberalism for its own time.  
 
Modernity and Incommensurability 
 
Within the liberal context, order depends at some level on reflexive decision making 
processes that enable the individual to act in accordance with some abstract, unbiased, and 
shared appraisal of what constitutes rational moral and political action.  If liberalism’s 
essential tension stems from its twin commitments to liberty and equality then, generally 
speaking, in its various forms the liberal intellectual tradition attempts to bridge this 
contradiction by relying on theorizations of human agency that are guided by an ethic of 
rational cooperation.  For Matthew Arnold, for instance, man finds the objectification of his 
own rational perfection in culture: “culture suggests the idea of the State, [the] organ of our 
collective best self, of our national right reason” (101).  Similarly an “apotheosis of reason” 
undergirds John Stuart Mill’s belief in The Subjection of Women (1869) that “we are entering 
into an order of things” in which the civilized individual acquiesces as a matter of course to 
the “virtue” of living “together as equals…claiming nothing for themselves but what they as 




deontic force of those Victorian constructions of character and community obligation that in 
his Public Moralists (1991) Stefan Collini has called the “unreflective Kantianism of Victorian 
moral commonplaces” (63).  Indeed one can detect in Mill’s worlds the same stress on 
reciprocity and public consistency that, as I will discuss in more detail below, is central to 
Kant’s notion of cosmopolitan right.  
These types of formative political visions have their rough contemporary expression 
in the work of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas.  In Rawls’s notion of “overlapping 
consensus” the political sphere (as opposed to the more broadly conceived Habermasian 
public sphere) is organized around “reasonable and comprehensive doctrines” in which all 
capable, reasoning agents can agree most fundamentally on abstract notions of what is fair, 
what is right, and what is just (Political Liberalism 44, 216-218).7  There is, Rawls suggests, “but 
one public reason,” which is determined, roughly speaking, by an appeal to the mutual 
accord of all interested constituents and that is dependent on a common idiom of legitimacy 
(220).  By reflectively abstracting herself to an “original position” unobstructed by prejudice 
and making certain that her reasons are in accord with “public reason,” the agent may thus 
ensure the legitimacy to her own actions.  Though Habermas’s notion of the “ideal discourse 
situation” and Rawls’s “original position” are by no means equatable, they are similar in 
several respects.  Most notably, they are both idealizations meant to theoretically dispense 
with what they see to be the intrinsic partiality of the subject-centered perspective by 
introducing an intersubjective reference point of ethical and rational consensus.  For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In an “overlapping consensus” constituents agree to a common set of principles, but do so 
for different reasons, or at least, with separate and distinct ends in mind.  This idea of a 
private and public self, complete with private and public interests and motivations, as we 
shall see, is a central concept for both Mill and Arnold.  What synergizes these two often 
conflicting selves is, of course, the application to and endorsement of ever more improved, 




Habermas a “model of unconstrained consensus formation in a communication community 
[engenders] communicatively structured lifeworlds that reproduce themselves via the 
palpable medium of action oriented to mutual agreement” (Philosophical Discourse 295).  
Habermas’s communicative action is oriented precisely toward overcoming the forms of 
incommensurability that mark the modern liberal context, and toward doing so without 
recourse to the avowedly arbitrary political decisionism forwarded by more modern 
proponents of Hobbesian natural law such as Carl Schmitt.  Though it is hardly a new 
political insight that force sustains social order or that “might makes right,” liberalism was 
meant to have dispensed with this need.  Thus any bald recognition of the political function 
of violence is generally deemed antithetical to liberal ideals, whose putative legitimacy derives 
inherently from laws that, since Kant, are understood to be universal, reciprocal, and public 
(Perpetual Peace 135-136). 
Yet as Hobbes wrote in Leviathan, “Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, 
and of no strength to secure a man at all” (97).  For the political realist who is inspired by 
Hobbesian natural law, the word simply requires the sword because pure abstract legalism 
does not contend well with particularity or incommensurability.  Because the word, as it 
were, is too easily made to contain a broad spectrum of possible meanings and intentions, 
proper political order requires the sovereign decision.  For thinkers like Schmitt, the decision 
is required precisely due to the incommensurability that is part and parcel of the modern, 
democratized world.8  In a disenchanted world, Max Weber writes in “Science as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For a good overview of the problem see Steven Lukes, “Making Sense of Moral Conflict,” 
in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989), 
127-142.  For Lukes incommensurability is the “nontrivial” conflict deriving from a situation 
where “there is no single currency or scale on which conflicting values can be measured, and 
that where a conflict occurs no rationally compelling appeal can be made to some value that 




Vocation,” “the ultimately possible attitudes toward life are irreconcilable, and hence their 
struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion.  Thus it is necessary to make a decisive 
choice.”9  In short, Schmitt’s concept of the political is one response to the heightened sense 
of incommensurability that he, like Weber, associated with modernity.  Habermas’s is 
another: the task of the “ideal speech situation” is to “vindicate the power of discursively 
attained rational consensus,” and to furthermore demonstrate that “practical questions admit 
of truth” (Legitimation Crisis 103, 111).  Communicative rationality, which recasts the Kantian 
argument for an autonomous moral subject in intersubjective terms, is meant not only to 
resolve the problem of incommensurability, but also to guard against the type of decisionism 
found in Schmitt.  For this reason Habermas is central to Amanda Anderson’s renewed call 
for the value of liberal proceduralism, which she understands as a “normative model for the 
justification of specific political practices and institutions.  The aim is to elaborate those 
processes, rules, and procedures that will determine legitimate or justifiable outcomes” (The 
Way We Argue 161). 
Crucial to proceduralism is “the development of a distinctive culture of public debate 
in civil society [that] provides the conditions for a new form of communicative practice in 
which the force of any given argument is given precedence over the status of the speaker” 
(The Way We Argue 165).  The ideal of disinterested cooperation evident in Anderson’s 
thinking, and so crucial to rational consensus formation, redefines the function of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 148.  Weber: Whatever choices we are 
faced with “through out all the orders of life,” “according to our ultimate standpoint, one is 
the devil the other the God.”  It is exactly this vision of modernity that provides the impetus 
for Carl Schmitt’s infamous “friend/enemy” distinction from The Concept of the Political, and 
which warrants the decisionist concept of the exception that he develops in Political Theology.  
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political.  Also, see Political Theology, 11-15.   Conversely, it is 
precisely in response to this sort of vision that Adorno heralds the importance of the 




centralized authority, such as Matthew Arnold’s conception of the State, or the Kantian ius 
cosmopoliticum.   Procedural rationality imagines a universal, if not actually transcendental or 
metaphysical moral normativity to which the individual adheres, as if naturally and 
voluntarily, as both agent and subject.  As Meredith Evans has noted, Kant’s powerful 
conceptualization of a universal right of humanity, which is meant to recognize but take 
precedence over more parochial forms of agency and affiliation, is not “dismissive” of a 
Hobbesian or Schmittian conception of the political, but “takes it as its raison d’etre” (75). 
This is clearly the case for Arnold as well.  Arnold aestheticizes the concept of rational 
consensus in his Culture and Anarchy while postulating that the sort of rational reciprocity to 
be found in culture is precisely what separates man from a state of nature: “By our everyday 
selves we are separate, at war…we find no basis for a firm authority in our ordinary selves; 
culture suggests one to us in our best self” (99 Arnold’s emphasis). 
This broaches a really central point: At some level most versions of liberalism, with 
its reliance on positive law, are an attempt to contend with incommensurability while 
overcoming the need for the arbitrary decision. To combat these measures, Carl Schmitt 
argues in his Political Theology that during the late eighteenth and then nineteenth centuries, 
liberal political and legal procedures took on the “characteristic of the natural sciences” (41). 
As a result the “state and legal order [came to be] based on the rejection of all ‘arbitrariness,’ 
and attempt[ed] to banish from the realm of the human mind every exception” (Political 
Theology 41).  For Schmitt the work of John Stuart Mill epitomizes this cognitive drive to 
exclude what is arbitrary or irrational, though surely this impulse describes the history of 
liberalism more generally.  One significant result of the processes of rationalization Max 
Weber called disenchantment is that the sovereign’s unequivocal right to use violence to 




identity of consensual political procedure and human reason.  In short, because might is no 
longer seen as commensurate with human rationality, violence in its various forms must be 
disavowed in the liberal context.  Rather than using force as a means of dealing with the 
sorts of valid but irreconcilable claims that mark a liberal plurality, and which are antithetical 
to the formal harmony sought by the liberal subject, deliberative democracy by and large 
seeks, through formal argumentation, to produce accord in the form of rational consensus.  
This reliance on procedure is a core principle of liberalism, one that we can trace back to 
Locke and the notion that “through openness and discussion alone” can the “victory of right 
over might be achieved.”10   
The nineteenth century, however, posed a real challenge to idealized conceptions of 
formal rationality.  The political and economic force that was cosmopolitan liberalism had 
produced a world of social and political pluralism that resisted the sorts of formalization 
required by liberalism.  Thus, while the nineteenth century was the period of liberalism’s 
triumph, it was also the moment of liberalism’s great confusion in the face of the 
transformation it had wrought.  Certainly one need not delve too deeply into the historical, 
literary, and periodical output of the nineteenth century before it becomes clear that the 
democratized Victorian social sphere was increasingly characterized by a mass of divergent 
political interests.  In other words, Victorian society had succumbed to the inevitable 
“identity of state and society” that Schmitt called “depoliticization” (Concept of the Political 22).  
This negation of the political, for Schmitt, inevitably leads to a “political practice of distrust” 
pervading all social relationships (Concept of the Political 70).  Jean-François Kervégan describes 
the development succinctly:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government.  Qtd. in Ellen Kennedy, “Introduction” to Carl 




for Schmitt, either the State imposes order and its rationality to a civil society 
characterized by pluralism, competition and disorder, or, as is the case in liberal 
democracy, social pluralism will empty the political entity of its meaning and bring it 
back to its other, the state of nature.11   
 
Kervégan articulates not only Schmitt’s concerns precisely, but also the concerns of many 
notable Victorian writers and thinkers.  Kervégan’s reading of Schmitt mirrors Matthew 
Arnold’s fears that under the pressure of the democratic impulse culture would degenerate 
into anarchy.  Arnold had begun his essay Democracy (1859) with a quote from Burke: 
“…since the Revolution, along with many dangerous, many useful powers of Government 
have been weakened.”12  Certainly by the time Arnold published Culture and Anarchy (1869) a 
decade later, at least one of the “useful powers of Government” Arnold eulogizes is the use 
of sovereign force to quell social unrest: in order to “not to perish miserably in anarchy and 
confusion,” Arnold argues, seemingly channeling continental thinkers like Kant and Schiller, 
modern man requires the “authority” that “culture suggests [in] the idea of the State” (99-100 
Arnold’s emphasis). 
Yet there is no need to paint Arnold as an authoritarian statist in order to see that he 
recognized the role of violent force as indispensible to the maintenance of political and 
social stability.  Arnold was writing in the aftermath of the English Reform Act of 1867, and 
portions of Culture and Anarchy, such as the chapter “Doing As One Likes,” were composed 
specifically in response to the social political unrest, such as the so-called Hyde Park Riots of 
1866, which was in many ways the hallmark of this period in England.  Similarly the plot of 
George Eliot’s Felix Holt (1866) pivots on scenes of political violence and was, like Arnold’s 
book, also a product of this unstable political climate in which the question of State authority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Qtd. in Mouffe, The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, 49.  
12 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, qtd. in “Democracy,” Matthew Arnold: 




had for some time once again loomed large.  There is in Arnold’s pragmatic sanctioning of 
the State, and state violence, a clear tension with that guarded optimism evident a decade 
earlier in J. S. Mill’s On Liberty (1859), in which Mill, firmly in the Lockean tradition, 
forecasted that Authority would no be longer required as a necessary complement to Liberty 
(7-21).  Nonetheless, though Mill is understood, in many ways correctly, to be the Victorian 
champion of individualism, Mill’s vision of the individual was hardly allied with the 
improprietous and self-interested majority itself.13  In this sense Mill’s thought was not 
essentially opposed to Arnold’s, and Mill himself understood a “social feeling” of sympathy 
and commitment to be the overwhelming requirement of moral individualism that he called 
character.   
Though Arnold lamented the ineffectuality of “our military force” because it, though 
an “overwhelming force,” “in riots never does act” (85), Dickens had parodied precisely 
such a position twelve years earlier in Little Dorrit, when the supercilious Mrs. Gowan and 
her compatriots agree that, “had Augustus Stiltstockings in a general way ordered the cavalry 
out with instructions to charge,” instead of “’conciliating the mob’” “the country would have 
been preserved” (333).  Mrs. Gowan’s referent here, given the temporal setting of the novel, 
is the Peterloo violence of the early part of the century, but Dicken’s readership would have 
recognized an allusion to the Chartist violence that was contemporaneous with the novel’s 
publication.  The point is that the literary and intellectual production of the period exhibits a 
deep preoccupation with the exception and does so precisely because of the generalized 
unrest that is characteristic of a depoliticized society.  For while the second half of the 
century was characterized by a relative absence of violence abroad, this period could hardly 
be called peaceful, but was rather a time of domestic unrest and anxiety in England over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




which the shadow of the French Revolution cast an intensifying shadow.  Not only for the 
more radical observers like Friedrich Engels did revolutionary violence seem imminent 
during this period.14  As Dickens wrote in a letter to a friend in 1855:    
I believe the discontent [of the working classes] to be so much the worse for 
smoldering instead of blazing openly, that it is extremely like the general mind of 
France before the breaking out of the first Revolution, and is in danger of being 
turned by any one of a thousand accidents—a bad harvest—the last straw too much 
of much of aristocratic insolence or incapacity—a defeat abroad—a mere chance at 
home—into such a devil of a conflagration as has never been beheld since. (Letters 
587) 
 
If “condition of England” novels such as Mary Gaskell’s Mary Barton (1848) and North and 
South (1854) and Dickens’ own Hard Times (1854) captured how such discontent was related 
directly to the working conditions of the working class in England, then Dickens’ A Tale of 
Two Cities (1859) should be read not merely as a popular rendering of a historical moment by 
which the nineteenth century was enthralled, but chiefly as a warning to English readers 
regarding the potential for such discontent to blossom into full blown revolution within the 
boundaries of their own nation.15  Nineteenth-century fiction, like nineteenth-century 
society, had to come to terms in some way with the latent violence that it understood as 
inseparable from its contemporary moment.  
 
Narrative Exceptions 
It is hardly coincidence that 1859 saw the publication of not only Adam Bede, which 
aligned its visions of internal violence with its historical scaffolding of the Napoleonic Wars, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Engels wrote that “the deep wrath of the whole working class…before too long a time 
goes by, a time almost within the power of man to predict, must break out into a Revolution 
in comparison with which the French Revolution, and the year 1794, will prove to have been 
child’s play.” Engels, Conditions of the Working Class in England, 31. 
15 See Jones, “The Redemptive Power of Violence?  Carlyle, Mark and Dickens,” History 
Workshop Journal 65.3 (2008): 1-22.  Jones reads just this sort of relationship in Carlyle’s work 




but also Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities, as well as one of the ur-texts of modern liberalism in 
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.  These works all share a sense of the immanence of conflict to 
human sociality; that in a world pregnant with violence, conflict had to be accommodated in 
some form by its artistic and intellectual representation.  Despite the various ways these 
respective works can and have been read as envisioning a progressive teleology leading out 
of, and away from, violent conflict, they all also self-consciously recognize the very real 
threat that such violence would only engender repeated conflict.  George Eliot reflects an 
anxiety about latent conflict in her essay “The Antigone and Its Moral.”  Sophocles’ play, 
writes Eliot, “appeals to perennial human nature” by pointing out the antagonisms 
immanent to sociality:    
Whenever the strength of man’s intellect, or moral sense, or affection brings him 
into opposition with the rules which society has sanctioned, there is renewed the 
conflict between Antigone and Creon; such a man must not only dare to be right, he 
must also dare to be wrong—to shake faith, to wound friendship, perhaps, to hem in 
his own powers. (Critical Writings 246)  
 
Eliot’s reading of Sophocles, which comes directly from Hegel, suggests the difficulties Eliot 
herself saw in assigning ethical values in the abstract to specific human activity.  Neither 
Creon nor Antigone can obey both of the conflicting, yet valid laws to which each is subject; 
in Hegel’s reading, as in Eliot’s, the actions of each are ultimately validated by their rational 
and universal aim.16  Thus we get a sense in both Hegel and Eliot of the incommensurability 
each saw as intrinsic to human relations, and which I have been arguing is a principal 
concern of liberal thought.  The “best moral we can draw” from Antigone, writes Eliot, is that 
“our protest of the right should be seasoned with moderation and reverence” (246).  Yet 
Eliot seems to have little faith in the moral she derives, that is, in the motivation for man or 
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nation in her own historical moment “to hem in his own powers” in the fashion that 
liberalism requires.  Instead, the sorts of incommensurability that Eliot described as the 
“antagonism of valid claims” can ultimately only be resolved through potentially violent 
conflict.    
 The way in which, from the French revolution onward, the making of history had 
thrust itself, violently, onto the nineteenth-century consciousness in many respects gives 
realism its traction during the period: the age was preoccupied, above all else, with the image 
of the history it felt itself to be making, even if the image reflected back at itself was at times 
monstrous.  With the publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of the Species, also in 1859, 
this image became more monstrous still, particularly as the vision of human development 
Darwin theorized appeared to be realized in the generalized competition and self-interested 
individualism of English culture under the sway of capitalism and the series of English 
reform laws in 1832, 1867, and again in 1884-85.  This all ran counter to that progressive 
liberal discourse based on notions of character and public morality.  Epitomizing the adage 
that the myths that fall victim to enlightenment are themselves the product of 
enlightenment, the idea of the autonomous moral individual, and the progressive culture that 
grows up around him or her, were suddenly put in jeopardy by the unsettling and divergent 
epistemologies in the latter half of the century.  Yet rather than effecting its disintegration, 
the public moralism of Victorian society only redoubled its efforts at overcoming the 
potentially monstrous connotations of man’s involvement with (rather than domination of) 
the natural world and sought to do so precisely through the ordering of intention and agency 
in those all familiar Victorian concepts of character and will.17  This required a Platonic 
separation of mind and body in an effort to overcome the separation between public and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




private forms of agency, as this quotation from Mill indicates: “In an improving state of the 
human mind, the influences are constantly on the increase which tend to generate in each 
individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which feeling, if perfect, would make him never 
think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in the benefits of which they are not 
included.”18  His use of the conditional shows that Mill was well aware that these words in 
no way described his contemporary milieu; that is, that the conditions of this “unity” had not 
yet arrived.  Nonetheless, the passage emphasizes the distinct, even exaggerated opposition 
of public and private thought and actions that Victorian idealizations sought to resolve 
through consensus (Collini 69). 
This dialectic between public and private constitutes a central structural motif of the 
nineteenth-century novel.  The novel is deeply romantic in the sense that it is driven by the 
inevitable dissatisfactions that arise inwardly for the subject when faced with the 
incommensurability of “a conceptual system which can never completely capture life and a 
life complex which can never attain completeness.”19  The Victorian novel self-consciously 
duplicates in its form and theme the containment strategies aligned with public propriety 
while simultaneously showing these strategies to be always troubled by the private repudiated 
other for which these strategies are intended.  In other words, the narrative procedures of 
the novel that seek coherence and closure are haunted and frustrated by the corresponding 
strain of disavowal that the novel itself struggles to contain.  In the same way, liberal 
proceduralism cannot adequately contend with those forces that subtend its own existence, 
that is, power and in the absence of power, violence.  Like the novels that are the subject of 
this study, proceduralism must also exclude and suppress the violence and coercion that are 
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antithetical to the legitimization process, even as it employs those means to forcibly achieve 
resolution.  In this way the exception organizes from without.  For ultimately proceduralism 
cannot itself escape the need for decision and exclusion but instead projects this need into 
the putatively democratic realm of process, and subjects it to the ultimate authority of a 
discourse model of legitimacy.  Proceduralism, argues Anderson, provides the opportunity 
for “argument as ethos [to] always trump identity as ethos” (The Way We Argue 182).  
Evident in Anderson’s statement, which reiterates her argument forwarding cosmopolitan 
detachment as a deliberative cognitive model, is proceduralism’s essential movement toward 
exclusion: pluralism necessitates that the troublesome category of identity be effaced in favor 
of the power of discourse ethics, of cosmopolitan detachment, and of universalism.  
Because such processes are themselves exclusionary, and never truly consensual, they 
too require the latent power of the violent exception, however disavowed, in order to 
function.  As Chantal Mouffe has argued, procedures of consensus formation cannot 
operate without the logic of inclusion-exclusion: “consensus in a liberal-democratic society 
is—and always will be—the expression of a hegemony and the crystallization of power 
relations.  The frontier it establishes between what is and what is not legitimate is a political 
one, and for that reason it should remain contestable” (Challenge 46).  That this frontier does 
not remain contestable, but is always fixed by the “force of the best argument,” as Anderson 
would have it, is the political reality of proceduralism (The Way We Argue 182). The 
Habermasian arguments against poststructuralism tend to pivot on the intrinsic crypto-
normativism of poststructuralism, that is, the perceived disjunction between 
poststructuralism’s radical politics and its normative ethics.  However, “the linguistically 
conceived paradigm of mutual understanding” that Habermasian proceduralism believes 




disavowal, or what we might call procedural liberalism’s crypto-decisionism.   Habermasian 
proceduralism exhibits a central problem of liberalism as its own internal contradiction.  The 
nineteenth-century novel is attuned to these sorts of discrepancies and reflects them in its 
narrative procedures. 
Charles Dickens’s novels draw the reader’s attention to the means by which what is 
incompatible with a formal, bourgeois morality is excluded from and submerged beneath the 
realm of open and public discourse.  As Mrs. General instructs Amy Dorrit in Little Dorrit 
(1857), “nothing disagreeable should ever be looked at [for] it hardly seems compatible with 
refinement of mind.  A truly refined mind will seem to be ignorant of the existence of 
anything that is not perfectly proper, placid and pleasant” (501). Mrs. General, certainly an 
ironic figure in Little Dorrit, nonetheless illuminates for Dickens’s reader the means 
supporting the ends of bourgeois refinement.  Dickens, like other nineteenth-century 
novelists working in the comic style, was well aware of the middle-class sensibilities of his 
readership; for Dickens, Trollope, and Thackeray, the success of the ironic mode often 
depended on an established normativity shared by both reader and writer.20  The sustained, 
even labored comic approach of those chapters in Little Dorrit devoted to the bureaucracy of 
the Circumlocution Office is exemplary of why Dickens is often seen as typical of the 
consensus producing effects of the nineteenth-century novel.21  However, working against an 
ironic mode vested with consensus making powers is a darker, more disruptive form of 
comedy in Dickens.  For example, the comedic but violently abusive relationship of Jeremiah 
Flintwinch and Miss Affrey in Little Dorrit depends on explicit violence or practices of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 While perhaps generally accurate, this sort of claim elides the complexity of the problem in 
nineteenth-century narrative, as I hope to show, even as it ignores the ironic mode’s similar 
dependence on shared norms in much modernist narrative, for example, in the narrative 
procedures of James Joyce’s The Dead. 




exclusion for its punch lines, repeatedly transforming spite or violence into laughter. 
Flintwinch’s abuse of Affery is in each instance presented metaphorically, through processes 
of comedic obfuscation—“You want another dose? You shall have it my woman, you shall 
have a good one! Oh!  You shall have a sneezer, you shall have a teaser!” (719).  Because the 
metaphor operates by catachresis—Flintwinch’s offered “dose” is hardly medicinal—this 
rhetoric immediately puts its own processes of signification under increased pressure.  The 
ironized metaphor functions negatively, rather than working by substitution and similarity.  
This absurd rhetoric follows Affrey and Flintwich through the novel, negating the necessity 
of calling violence by its proper name, but calling attention to the means by which violence 
is publicly suppressed, and made collectively private.  
Like Affrey’s “dreaming,” Dickensian narrative has a tendency to expose troubling 
facts, but in the process of doing so also make a play of obscuring precisely what it exposes.  
Dickens performs for the reader the sort of slight of hand that maintains “the graceful 
equanimity of surface,” in the parlance of Mrs. General while remaining fully cognizant of 
precisely that which threatens both social and aesthetic equanimity.  In the overt and clumsy 
process of seeming “ignorant of anything not proper, placid and pleasant,” Dickens brings 
such peculiarities rather to the forefront of his narratives.  Like the Clennam house itself, 
Dicken’s novels are “full of mysteries and secrets; full of whisperings and counsels; full of 
noises,” which, as Affrey attests, “you’d feel that they was so worth speaking of, that you’d 
feel you nigh bursting, through not being allowed to speak of ‘em” (720).  In the same way 
that the Clennam house strains to contain what goes on, unacknowledged and unspoken, 
within its confines, there is a certain pregnancy to Dickens’s narrative, deriving from its 
inability to fully contend with the dissonances that form a necessary component of its 




structural integrity of his narrative and menace the narrative’s will to resolution and closure.  
This is true of any number of Victorian novels; a novel like Vanity Fair, for example, 
expresses doubts and indecisions regarding the possibility of its ending—and about just what 
to do with Becky Sharp—through at least the final hundred pages of the book.  Though 
certainly to some extent Thackeray’s indecisiveness can be attributed to the demands of 
serial authorship, nonetheless, the protracted and repeatedly deferred conclusion of the 
novel is finally effected though the exceptional circumstances of a (not too) suspicious death, 
and a public secret: “there were reasons,” we are assured, “why all should remain silent 
regarding [Becky Sharp]” (Thackeray 873).  The novel goes silent with that secret intact, and 
with its (lack of) resolution harried by a negative tension, for everyone—the reader 
included—is pretty certain that Clytemnestra has again triumphed through fatal means.   
Something, it seems, always has to give.  In Little Dorrit, the Clennam house itself 
implodes, killing the scourge that is Rigaud and with him the knowledge that threatens the 
novel’s conventional Victorian resolution (finally achieved through the marriage of Arthur 
and Amy).  With Rigaud’s timely and unnatural death, and with Mrs. Clennam suddenly 
relieved of the capacity for speech, epistemological harmony is restored through the 
“miraculous” removal of what is antipathetic to it; literally, the bad forms of knowledge are 
extirpated from the scene under extraordinary circumstances.  In a similar way, at the end of 
George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss (1860), a flood sweeps away whatever moral or aesthetic 
problems block the novel’s will to resolution.  Again, what is hostile to the dominant 
modality of self-understanding, namely Maggie Tulliver, must be destroyed in order for a 
kind of harmony to be restored to prototypically Protestant St. Oggs.  The exceptional 
means by which these novels are concluded, in other words, through events that transgress 




which order is returned to the narrative as well as to a self-consciously reflexive operation 
for which these novels, and these novelists are seldom credited.  The violent endings of 
novels like Adam Bede and Tess of the D’Urbervilles are only different in degree, so to speak, in 
that the violence through which these novels achieve resolution is procedural.   
When Carl Schmitt wrote, “the exception is like the miracle in theology,” he likely 
did not have in mind the god-like author as the executor of miracles, but the analogy 
between the absolute powers of the writer and those of the sovereign is, I think, particularly 
apt.  The Victorian novel, like the social world that is its subject, can never reconcile the 
divergent interests that comprise it without recourse to the exception.  Without violence, the 
novel struggles to contain and organize what is opposed to its aesthetic harmony, but 
inevitably fails and in doing so exposes the impasses, discrepancies, and conflicts intrinsic to 
the social environment with which it contends.  In this way, the Victorian novel emerges as a 
uniquely appropriate medium in which to examine the problems of violence, exclusion, and 
disavowal that prove so essential to nineteenth-century British culture.  In one way or 
another, all of the novels I consider in the pages to come find violence or other exceptional 
means necessary to prompt their closure.  In short, though in its will to consensus formation 
the operations of the realist novel are often seen as “parliamentary, rather than absolutist,” 
we find that, just like the liberal society it is understood to depict, the often protracted 
procedures of the nineteenth-century novel requires the decision to realize aesthetic 
harmony (Lewis 9). 
As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, George Eliot’s Adam Bede self-consciously 
interrogates the theological and as such exceptional character of legal violence.  Eliot’s first 
novel demonstrates how the sacred character of the legal institution is created by the 




its very nature temporarily suspends and functions outside of the community norms it 
sustains.  Adam Bede does not simply reproduce the scapegoat mechanism, nor does the 
novel seek merely to demystify its social processes.  Rather, in Adam Bede Eliot emphasizes 
the deliberative character of collectivized and procedurally legitimized violence.  In Adam 
Bede George Eliot shows the reader that arbitrary violence, rather than deliberative forms of 
procedure, is the means by which conflict and crisis are resolved.  Though ultimately 
disavowed by the community, the violent decision is finally the singular legitimizing 
component of the “deliberate” processes by which Hayslope condemns Hetty to death and 
thereby restores order to the community.  I will try to show in the pages that follow that in 
Adam Bede George Eliot ultimately exposes the crypto-decisionism that is the disavowed 














In George Eliot’s Adam Bede, the reader last sees Hetty Sorrel being led toward the 
gallows, accompanied by the Methodist enthusiast Dinah Morris, to be hanged for the crime 
of infanticide.     
It was a sight that some people remembered better even than their own sorrows—
the sight in that grey clear morning, when the fatal cart with the two young women 
in it was descried by the waiting watching multitude, cleaving its way towards the 
hideous symbol of a deliberately-inflicted sudden death. (502) 
 
The subject of the predicate in the passage’s final clause is ambiguous and made even more 
so by the contranymous participle “cleaving”: Is the “waiting watching multitude,” 
compelled toward the gallows, “cleaving its way toward the hideous symbol,” or is “the fatal 
cart” and “the two young women” forcing a way through the throng of the multitude?  It is 
difficult to know, but the ambiguity here only adds to the richness of the passage, redoubling 
the grotesque importance of the “multitude” while also emphasizing the seemingly magnetic 
power of the object to which Eliot wants to draw the reader’s attention: the “hideous symbol 
of a deliberately inflicted death.”  The final sentence of the passage introduces yet another 
ambiguity: Eliot stresses that Hetty’s death will be “deliberately inflicted.”  The death 
sentence has been delivered with measured intent, as would be, we can assume, the violent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 George Eliot, Adam Bede, 589.  
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act of execution itself.2  Yet “deliberately” also underscores that the verdict against Hetty, 
“to be hanged by the neck till you be dead,” has been arrived at by a jury’s deliberation, a 
hallmark of procedural democracy (474-5).   
Amanda Anderson argues that “proceduralism is a normative model for the 
justification of specific political practices and institutions…the aim is to elaborate those 
processes, rules and procedures that will determine legitimate or justifiable outcomes” (The 
Way We Argue 161).  Yet if procedural rationality is indeed a means of inducing “legitimate” 
outcomes, Adam Bede demonstrates that proceduralism arrives at what is legitimate only by 
excluding what is deemed illegitimate.  Legitimacy in such a case is merely the product of an 
arbitrary, and in some cases violent, decision.  Questions of legitimacy arise and require that 
a decision be made because abstract moral or legal norms do not contend well with 
particulars, and the instances of circumstantial, moral, or political incommensurability that 
regularly give rise to conflict within the polity do not lend themselves to resolution or 
“legitimate outcomes” very easily (hence the staggeringly complex and inefficient legal 
apparatuses of most modern democracies).  The putative power of procedure to resolve 
such conflict derives from what Anderson describes as the impersonal “enlargement of 
perspective,” which empties the specific contingencies of any one case of their power to 
affect the treatment of that case from an impartial “moral point of view” (The Way We Argue 
Now 161).  But in Adam Bede Eliot establishes the legitimacy of the particular itself and in the 
process demonstrates that it is precisely from the moral point of view that particularities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Hetty’s death sentence is commuted at “The Last Moment” (Adam Bede 502-3).  Hetty is 
only “saved” so that she may be transported and, upon the expiration of the term of her 
sentence, die aboard a ship while trying to return to England.  I will argue that the details of 
Hetty’s protracted demise, which exist at a vestigial remove in the final book of Eliot’s 




matter.  Furthermore Eliot’s novel illustrates that violent exclusion, and not deliberative 
procedure, is the means by which conflict and crisis are resolved within the liberal context.  
Though ultimately disavowed by the community, the violent decision is shown in Adam Bede 
to be the singular legitimizing component of the “deliberate” processes by which Hayslope 
condemns Hetty to death and thereby restores order to the community.   
This chapter reads the verdict against Hetty, and her ultimate scapegoating by the 
community of Hayslope, as an instance of what Carl Schmitt describes as the violent 
exception.  Schmitt contends that the “homogeneous medium” in which normative forms of 
legal and political activity flourish requires the exclusion or excision of what is 
incommensurate with the norm, and as such threatens the stability of the polity (Political 
Theology 13).  The absolute priority of homogeneity to political stability underwrites Schmitt’s 
infamous friend/enemy distinction, which for Schmitt is the criterion “to which all political 
actions and motives can be reduced” (Concept of the Political 26).  I argue that George Eliot 
understands the arbitrary decision as the always unavoidable means of conflict resolution 
within the liberal context.  Moreover, in Adam Bede Eliot seeks to draw attention to the 
cognitive processes by which both the individual and the community disavows the violence 
that is essential to community stability.  Because George Eliot has become a touchstone for 
the recent trend in nineteenth-century literary scholarship that looks to the Victorian period 
to renovate liberal ideals for the twenty first century, it is crucial that we not overlook the 
significance of violence in her novels.  To do so is only to reproduce the very processes of 
exclusion and disavowal that Victorians like George Eliot were explicitly cautioning against.  
For Eliot’s novels interrogate the very ideals to which they are committed and as such 
exhibit an anxious preoccupation regarding the important but largely unacknowledged role 
violence plays in preserving community norms and stability.  Adam Bede ultimately questions 
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why the violent decision persists in procedures and operations whose raison de’être derives 
putatively from the liberal triumph of right over might, and in doing so the novel explores a 
central impasse of liberalism.  This particular concern, I argue, has generally not been 
acknowledged or addressed by the new turn in Victorian Studies that attempts to recuperate 
Victorian conceptions of objectivity and proceduralism in the name of deliberative 
democracy. 
Adam Bede critiques the processes of consensus formation that today are generally 
understood to characterize the function of realist narrative and to sustain the legitimizing 
aspirations of liberal proceduralism.  However, as I will show in the pages that follow, the 
novel demonstrates that in each case consensus requires violence.  For George Eliot punitive 
violence functions as a sort of political stopgap, a measure meant to quell Victorian anxieties 
regarding those forms of shared understanding that underwrite liberal notions of deliberative 
agency.  Violence channels Victorian insecurities about deliberative action through the 
cathartic drama of sacrifice.  Adam Bede characterizes Hetty Sorrel’s trial, narrowly averted 
execution, and finally her transportation as sacrificial and in doing so exposes the theological 
character of legal and political violence.  In the end Eliot shows how the sacred and 
therefore legitimizing character of the legal institution depends on consensual rationality 
secured through the use of violence.  Adam Bede demonstrates that, as in a state of 
emergency, the procedural violence by which Hetty is threatened temporarily suspends and 
functions outside of the community norms it sustains.  Adam Bede’s ultimate ambivalence 
regarding Hetty Sorrel’s fate, and the community of Hayslope’s role in Hetty’s expulsion, I 
argue, is indicative of Eliot’s anxieties regarding what she saw as violence’s fundamental role 
in maintaining the liberal state.  Adam Bede does not simply reproduce the scapegoat 
mechanism, nor does the novel seek merely to demystify its social processes.  Rather, in 
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Adam Bede Eliot emphasizes the “deliberate” and deliberative character of collectivized and 
procedurally legitimized violence.3  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Thus my argument opposes that of a seminal work on scapegoating and the nineteenth-
century novel, Michiel Heyns’s Expulsion and the Nineteenth-Century Novel: The Scapegoat in 
English Realist Fiction, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994).  Heyns builds his argument, which he 
extends to works from Austen to Conrad, upon the distinction made by René Girard 
between texts that unselfconsciously depend on the scapegoat mechanism to achieve closure 
and those texts that “thematize” the scapegoat mechanism, and therefore “reveal the truth of 
persecution” See René Girard, The Scapegoat, trans. Yvone Freccero (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1986), 12-23.  For Heyns, the modernist or protomodernist works of James 
and Conrad exemplify the latter category, while the novels of George Eliot, which Heyns 
argues unconsciously reproduce and depend on the scapegoat mechanism as a means of 
narrative resolution, are persecution texts par excellence.  My argument has more in common 
with Jan-Melissa Schramm’s erudite Atonement and Self-Sacrifice in Nineteenth-Century Narrative, 
which also rests on the Girardian distinction so important to Heyns (31-32).  Schramm 
considers the Victorian novel in terms of its reflexive acknowledgment of persecution and 
the troubling processes of substitution that inhere in practices of sacrifice and self-sacrifice: 
“the affect which moves the reader toward the crucial task of moral renewal is often 
generated by the spectacle of unmerited or excessive suffering” (31).  Looking at a wide 
variety of Victorian texts, including Eliot’s novels, Schramm explores the tensions between 
archaic or vestigial modalities of blood-atonement that coexist with a new, self-fashioning 
Victorian legal ethics. Schramm sees Eliot’s sacrificial dramas as “attempting to treat with 
justice both the contending impulses of rebellion and conformity” while avoiding “an 
enormous investment in the conservative status quo” (220).  Jan-Melissa Schramm, 
Atonement and Self-Sacrifice in Nineteenth-Century Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012). 
Also of importance is Ilana M. Blumberg, “’Love Yourself as Your Neighbor’: The Limits of 
Altruism and the Ethics of Personal Benefit in Adam Bede,” Victorian Literature and Culture 37: 
(2009) 543-560.  Similarly to Schramm (who in fact quotes Blumberg to support her own 
conclusions), Blumberg argues that Eliot attempts to strike a balance between the elemental 
needs of the many and those of the individual while at the same time rejecting the 
Benthamite claim that the good of the whole excuses the suffering of the one (545). 
Blumberg contends that Eliot’s “ethical realism” compelled the novelist to countenance not 
only the fact that suffering and happiness must coexist in the world, but also the possibility 
that the joy of some depends precisely on the suffering of others (543-544).  Her very smart 
reading of Adam Bede goes against the grain of much Eliot criticism by showing that the 
“limits” of Eliot’s embrace of altruism allow for the emergence of a moral individualism in 
which “the separation of human lots…must suffice to explain or justify the inequality of the 
lots of those who benefit,” as Adam Bede does in Blumberg’s reading, “perhaps guiltily, but 
not undeservingly” (556).  The “separation of human lots” to which Blumberg points allows 
precisely for the types of disavowal that I’m arguing are part and parcel of the liberal 
subjectivity’s propensity to order its environment, and which are perhaps not distinguishable 
from those cognitive processes that Eliot herself calls the individual’s “apologetic ingenuity” 
(Adam Bede 342).  
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Heterogeneity and Incommensurability in Adam Bede 
 
Adam Bede’s georgic pastoral, centered in the community of Hayslope, enfolds 
formalized values of impersonality and individual self-sufficiency.  Much like the St. Oggs of 
Eliot’s nearly contemporaneous The Mill on the Floss (1860), Hayslope’s conventions have 
their roots in a secularized protestant ethic.4  Adam’s failure is “that he had too little fellow-
feeling with the weakness that errs in spite of foreseen consequences” (228).  Likewise 
Hayslope “had little pity for want or rags,” which it saw as “a mark of idleness and vice” 
rather than the “cruel inevitable fate such as they sometimes seem in cities” (412).  Here 
Eliot opposes the pastoral to the degraded life of the city in an effort to describe the 
exclusionary psychology of Hayslope’s constituency.  But she simultaneously gestures toward 
the transformation of liberal ideology that, toward the end of the nineteenth century, will 
depart from laissez-faire economic principles and a sacrosanct individualism and become 
more accepting of a public morality based in notions of altruism and a collective, social 
welfare.5  The retrospective world of Hayslope, then, represents a mythic conception of 
liberalism that (if it ever existed at all) had disappeared by the time Eliot penned Adam Bede 
in 1859, and that for Irene Tucker, “name[s] a condition of subjectivity in which one’s 
capacity to know and predict the contingent particularities of the material world—including 
the particularities of other people in specific social, political and economic relations to one—
becomes the ground of one’s operation as an agent” (Probable State 25). 
Insofar as the operations of “liberal subjectivity” depend on predictability, those 
operations also rely on relative epistemological homogeneity—that is, a general acquiescence 
to formalized and shared methodologies oriented toward producing ethical, political, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The go to source on George Eliot and the protestant ethic is Alan Mintz, George Eliot and 
The Novel as Vocation (Boston: Harvard UP, 1978). 
5 See my comments above regarding liberalism’s internal contradictions, pp. ix-x. 
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economic understanding (which is not to say a shared understanding per se) and that would 
have a referential quality for the community.  Yet in the more or less heterogeneous social 
environment of the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth 
century, as Max Weber observed, one can no longer depend on these formalized practices: 
“the ultimately possible attitudes toward life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can 
never be brought to a final conclusion” (Essays 148).  Weber’s vision of modernity is 
fundamentally incompatible with the liberal subjectivity of which Adam Bede’s Hayslope is 
emblematic.  Hayslope’s pastoral stability depends on the ease of identity making 
procedures, which recall, for example, Adam Smith’s words regarding the importance of 
shared “sentiment”: “The great pleasure of conversation and society arises from a certain 
harmony of minds, which like so many musical instruments coincide and keep time with one 
another” (Theory 398).  Once Hayslope’s putative synchronicity is threatened by what it can 
not easily identify, the community must either, through forced processes of compromise, 
subsume the other, or it must exclude the nonsubsumable.  These opposed tracks are 
epitomized in Adam Bede by the twinned stories of Dinah Morris and Hetty Sorrel. 
Hayslope cannot tolerate the forms of heterogeneity that threaten the harmony of its 
“pleasant land” (22).  The instabilities that increasingly disrupt life in Hayslope mark the 
problem posed by the irreconcilability of conflicting epistemologies.  As Hadley points out, 
the cognitive attitude that she calls “liberal cognition” is in conflict with the “unpredictable” 
character of modern democratic society, which, in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
was perceived as becoming ever more volatile (9-12).6  To combat this “general disarray,” the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The reasons for such volatility, historically speaking, are manifold. The repeal of the Corn 
Laws (which fueled economic and thus political crisis), the consecutive Reform Bills, and the 
antagonisms surrounding the populist Chartist movement (to name the major sources of 
unrest), all contributed to the political volatility of the period. The general anxiety produced 
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liberal mind seeks an insular, homogenous social and political environment produced 
through formalized and deliberative cognitive procedures.  In other words, the liberal mind 
so understood requires the regularity that springs from repeated practices, that is, from 
similarity and formality.  The apparent disappearance of this sort of homogeneous social 
medium by the latter half of the nineteenth century marked a “moment,” again in the words 
of Tucker, “when the liberal subject’s capacity to know became no longer adequate to the 
task of allowing the subject to act freely” (25).  Tucker argues that the upshot of this 
“sudden incapacity” was an expanded statist intervention, and eventually, the individual’s 
increased dependence on the state (25-6).  I would add that the increasingly irreconcilable 
nature of disparate human interests that produced what Carl Schmitt calls the 
depoliticization of society (by which, again, he in fact means the mass politicization of society), 
and that was at least in part responsible for the change Tucker points to, also resulted in the 
state’s increased dependence on the now disavowed use of exceptional violence.  Avowed 
violence, such as “war” writes Schmitt, “is condemned, but executions, sanctions, punitive 
expeditions, and [other] measures to ensure peace remain.  The adversary is thus no longer 
called an enemy but a disturber of the peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of 
humanity” (Concept of the Political 79).7     
Meanwhile, these developments are contemporaneous with revised theorizations of 
liberalism, such as John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, published in the same year as Adam Bede, 
which postulated the power of a cultivated deliberative rationality to dissolve the age old 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
by this sustained turbulence is evident throughout the literature of the nineteenth century, is 
extremely important to all of Eliot’s novels, and is crystallized by Matthew Arnold’s Culture 
and Anarchy, a book the title of which might better be rephrased as a hypothetical imperative: 
If not culture, then anarchy.  These instabilities are all symptomatic of the mass politicization 
of the public sphere that Schmitt sees as precisely antithetical to his “concept of the 
political.” 
7 See also pp. 60-73. 
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synergy between “Liberty and Authority.”8  However, as Weber suggested, in the face of the 
modern “struggles” that arise due the irreconcilability of antagonistic but valid world-views, 
ultimately “it is necessary to make a decisive choice” (148).  This is the conception of the 
world that influences Schmitt’s notorious friend/enemy distinction and that warrants the 
decisionist concept of the exception.9  My contention is that once faced with the 
heterogeneity and unpredictability of the full-blown liberal democracy of the late nineteenth 
century, and once faced with the ultimate erosion of the liberal ideal, the fact of the 
exception came to exist—however disavowed—as the failsafe of liberal practices.  Yet 
paradoxically the goal of proceduralism is precisely to resolve problems of irreconcilability 
and produce consensus while avoiding at all costs the necessity of arbitrary decisionism and 
the exclusion it entails.  But Adam Bede shows us that consensus has a tendency to ossify and 
become tradition and subsequently require exclusionary violence for its maintenance.  Once 
consensus is threatened by the erosion of those validity claims to which the community had 
previously cohered all that remains for tradition is to assert itself repressively, and violently.  
 
The Force of “Established Claims” 
 
Adam Bede’s “far-reaching visions of the past” light upon Hayslope, “as it appeared 
on the eighteenth of June, in the year of our Lord 1799” (9).  This is mere months prior to 
the infamous 18 Brumaire, the day Napoleon launched his coup against the French Directory 
and proclaimed himself Emperor of France.  Eliot published the novel in 1859, some four 
years after a second Napoleonic uprising in France, this time by Napoleon’s nephew, Louis, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For an excellent discussion of Eliot, Arnold, and the importance of Mill’s “many-
sidedness” to conceptions of liberalism and rational agency for all three, see Thomas, 
Cultivating Victorians 26-48.  
9 The Concept of the Political 27-37.  See also Carl Schmitt, Political Theology 11-15.  
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and little more than a decade after the transcontinental revolutions of 1848.  As early as in 
Burke and as late as in Arnold it is clear that the English were deeply concerned through this 
extended period of unrest that the violence and social instabilities would spread from the 
continent to the British Isles.  The Napoleonic Wars that create the historical scaffolding for 
Eliot’s novel function as a sort of retrospective surrogate for this threatened consciousness, 
but also work as a focal point for a cohesive localized national sentiment: “Th’ war’s a fine 
thing for the country” not only because it keeps the prices of corn high, and as such 
Hayslope prosperous, but because the antagonism with the mythically “wicked” and 
effeminate French affords a concrete sense of English identity to the people of Hayslope 
(569).  
Nonetheless, Adam Bede’s historical background expresses Eliot’s own sensitivity to 
the unrest of the time, as well as its origin in putatively democratic struggles.  In one of the 
novel’s odd and ambiguous anachronisms, Eliot compares the formal cognitive processes of 
the individual to that of her contemporary Europe; retrospective furnishes both with an 
“apologetic ingenuity”: “Europe adjusts itself to a fait accompli, and so does the individual 
character—until the placid adjustment is disturbed by a convulsive retribution” (342).  The 
passage again shows the superimposed temporalities of Eliot’s narrative, but also signals that 
her own retrospective will supply no such apology for the world it depicts.  Eliot’s historical 
analogy makes an important point that is applicable not only to her individual characters in 
Adam Bede, but Hayslope as well.  Like Hayslope, the individual’s desire for harmony 
excludes from consciousness “any bad consequence that [are] not demonstrably inevitable” 
(342).  Once again Eliot calls our attention to the liberal propensity to harmonize cognitive 
disjunction through processes of sublimation or disavowal.  Yet such forms of self-
deception or repudiation carry with them, as the events of Adam Bede will demonstrate, what 
	  	  
45	  
is for Eliot an inevitable backlash, a “convulsive retribution,” from which no party is entirely 
safe.    
At the beginning of Adam Bede, however, no such convulsions are evident.  Through 
the early pages of the novel leading up to “The Preaching” chapter, we share the view of “a 
traveller” who provides a sweeping and picturesque vision of Hayslope and its surroundings 
(18).  In contrast to the “grim outskirt of Stonyshire,” the growing industrial community on 
the margins of Hayslope, a sort of working pastoral is preserved in the still agriculturally 
“rich, undulating district of Loamshire,” with the patrician emblem of the Donnithorne 
Arms standing “at the entrance of the village” (20; 18).10  Also preserved is Adam’s 
naturalized “instinctive reverence” for Arthur Donnithorne.  As if reflected by the landscape 
itself, the hierarchies that necessarily organize the social world of Hayslope are for the 
moment secure: “Adam had the blood of peasants in his veins, and that since he was in his 
prime half a century ago, you must expect some of his characteristics to be obsolete”: 
Adam, I confess, was very susceptible to the influence of rank, and quite ready to 
give an extra amount of respect to everyone who had more advantages than himself, 
not being a philosopher, or a proletaire with democratic ideas, but simply a stout 
limbed clever carpenter with a large fund of reverence in his nature, which inclined 
him to admit to all established claims unless he saw clear grounds for questioning 
them. (179) 
 
The reverence of “established claims” stands out here, as so often in Eliot, as a crucial 
component of social stability as well as of its preservation.  Adam in many ways embodies 
for Eliot that interpenetration of reverence and ameliorative change that she sees (along with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 On the function of landscape in Adam Bede see Sarah Gates, “‘The Sound of the Scythe 
Being Whetted’: Gender, Genre, and Realism in Adam Bede,” Studies in the Novel 30.1 (1998): 
20-34.  Also Mary Jean Corbett, “Representing the Rural: The Critique of Loamshire in 
Adam Bede,” Studies in the Novel 20.3 (1988): 288-301. Perhaps most important is David 
Carroll, “Adam Bede: Pastoral Theodicies,” George Eliot and the Conflict of Interpretations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992). 
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a Georgic sense of vocation) as the necessary qualities of the presumptive middle class.11  
Although Adam’s at times rigid insularity is his principal failing, that Eliot admires the 
practicality with which she has imbued Adam becomes clearer as the passage continues, and 
Eliot reiterates through the filter of Adam’s consciousness the potentially deleterious social 
effects of the “proletaire with democratic ideas.”  The narrative allegorizes through Adam’s 
ventriloquized idiom democracy’s potential threat to Bildung: “he had no theories about 
setting the world to rights, but he saw there was a great deal of damage to be done by 
building with ill-seasoned timber—by ignorant men in fine clothes making plans for 
outhouses and workshops and the like, without knowing the bearing of things” (179).  Eliot 
makes a similar point in a oft-quoted essay written just a few years before Adam Bede: “What 
has grown up historically can only die out historically”; any too rapid change that too 
drastically “severs” the individual from the “process of development” can do a “great deal of 
damage” because the “development” of the individual, as well as his “medium,” can “take 
place only through the consentaneous development of both.”12    
 Enter Arthur Donnithorne and Hetty Sorrel: the latter knows nothing of reverence, 
while the weak-willed Arthur cannot act with moderation.  The two represent social and 
economic antipodes, yet will mingle, and by doing so initiate a crisis.  “While Arthur gazed 
into Hetty’s dark beseeching eyes, it made no difference what sort of English she spoke, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 On middle-class ideals in Eliot, see Daniel Cottom, Social Figures: George Eliot, Social History, 
and Literary Representation (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
12 See George Eliot,  “The Natural History of German Life,” George Eliot: Selected Critical 
Writings. 260-295. Eliot’s novels surely express an anxiety about just what type of ethics is 
available to the individual in the increasingly expansive modern world, and whether or not 
moral action, or morality of any sort, is possible outside of the insular and circumscribed 
world of rapidly disappearing tradition.  However, my argument here is that embedded in 
Eliot’s putative nostalgia is a deep skepticism regarding the limits of self-reflexivity and the 
individual’s ability to access the formalized intellectual practices that critics such as Anderson 




even if hoops and powder had been in fashion, he would very likely not have been sensible 
just then that Hetty wanted those signs of high breeding” (144).  The world of romance—
both sexual and generic—that lies hidden in the Fir-Tree Grove effaces within the romantic 
dyad all of those class markers still apparent to the reader.  The narrator’s sexual metaphors 
emphasize the lovers’ putative similitude: they are like “two velvet peaches”; they “mingle as 
easily as two brooklets that ask for nothing but to entwine themselves” (144).  Arthur, as his 
namesake implies, is here playing his generic—and historical—role as knight/seducer.  In 
Adam Bede romance obscures Hetty and Arthur’s actual relations.   
The pastoral has a similar function in the novel, but with a much wider compass.  
Adam Bede does not recreate nostalgically a historically concrete past, but rather reflects back 
at its readers an idealized time that exists only mythically.  Adam Bede’s narrative mediates the 
always-present interplay of separate but corollary periods.  The novel’s idealized setting at 
the turn of the nineteenth century is never entirely distinct from the social and political 
realities of 1859, and least so precisely when the narrative calls our attention to the temporal 
gap opened by retrospect, as it often does: “Adam was in his prime half a century ago,” but 
nonetheless represents the values of an emergent middle class individualism (179).  By 
projecting contemporary values into the past, and allowing the past to reflect those 
contemporary values back at the present, Eliot turns the pastoral inside out and shows 
nostalgia to be something altogether less benign than mere wish fulfillment.  Thus in my 
view George Eliot’s “fictions of the recent past” do not, as Elaine Hadley suggests, gesture 
“nostalgically toward a social consensus” in which forms of sympathetic judgment are aided 
by the more stable identity making procedures available to the subject in a homogenous 
social setting (86).  Nor does Adam Bede uncritically “endorse a vision of a sturdy traditional 
British nation, subject only to the gradual and consensual changes that will be brought about 
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by the insights derived from education and experience.”13  Rather, Eliot shows the reader 
that Adam Bede’s generic idealizations, what David Carroll has called the novel’s “pastoral 
theodicies,” enfold conventional mores of individual self-sufficiency such as those Weber 
associated with the certitudo salutis.14  Hayslope’s secularized faith in its effectual calling is 
expressed as a hardness and impersonality that short-circuits reflexive understanding.  
Exhibiting a “strange deadness to the word,” Hayslope rejects the interloper Dinah’s 
disconcertingly enthusiastic preaching, even as it will doom the natural and alarmingly 
sensuous Hetty (101).   
 At the moment when Adam spies Arthur and Hetty together in the Fir-Tree Grove, 
Arthur emerges from the wood still imagining himself in an asymmetrical relation to Adam.  
A few pages earlier at “The Dance,” after Hetty drops the locket secretly given her by 
Arthur, Adam instantly becomes jealous.  Not knowing who had given her the locket, he is 
confounded, “lost in the utter impossibility of finding any person for his fears to light on” 
(313).  He tries to imagine a rival, but cannot conceive of that rival being Arthur because the 
Donnithorne heir’s relation to Hetty and Adam’s social sphere renders him ineligible in 
Adam’s mind.  Once Adam discovers the lovers, Arthur immediately senses in Adam’s 
“change of tone” that the metaphorical distance between the two has vanished, even as the 
physical distance is closed in violent conflict (325).  In Girardian fashion, the moment of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Josephine McDonagh, Child Murder & British Culture 1720-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2003) 152.  McDonagh argues (more or less in a vein with Raymond Williams (see 17-20 
below) and Michiel Heyns (see n. 9 above)) that this recuperative vision of the nation is 
achieved in Adam Bede by a type of formal scapegoating, that is, “through the compulsory 
forgetting of moments of violent opposition and challenge to national authority” (Child 
Murder 152). 
14 See David Carroll, George Eliot and the Conflict of Interpretations 73-105.  On the importance of 
certitudo salutis to protestant individualism, and the individual’s need for worldly “objective 
results” to shore up the individual’s anxiety regarding his “effectual calling,” see Max Weber, 




detection emphasizes the triangular structure of their relations, while Hetty’s sudden 
disappearance “through the gate” reorganizes the scene to underscore the primacy not of the 
object of desire, but the desire of the rivals.15  In the run-up to actually trading blows, the 
two exchange barbs and insults in a reciprocal and intensifying manner.  The moment 
emphasizes the contagious and potentially violent instabilities that arise from this sudden 
and exaggerated democratization.  Coming as it does precisely in the middle of the novel, in 
a chapter aptly entitled “A Crisis,” it is this conflict on which the plot turns.  Thus begins the 
growing crisis that the remainder of Adam Bede works to suppress, but that will finally only 
be resolved by transferring blame to Hetty. 
 
Violence, Incomplete Rationality, and Narrative 
 
By foregrounding the disjunctions between the thought and language of its narrator, 
the novel’s characters and, by extension, the community of Hayslope itself, the narrative of 
Adam Bede brings into relief Hayslope’s inability to reflexively or objectively understand the 
function of violence in sustaining social stability.  Eliot attempts to stimulate her reader’s 
own reflective capabilities so that he or she might identify, if not complete, so to speak, the 
“incomplete rationality” of Hayslope and its constituency.16  Broadly construed, the ideal of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure.  Trans. Yvonne 
Freccero. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1965) 1-52. Adam and Arthur are paradigmatic 
mimetic doubles.  Though Girard considers rivalry to be a recursive structure in literatures of 
all ages, he makes a distinction regarding the function of the rival in modern, putatively 
egalitarian societies.  Girard: “If the modern emotions flourish, it is not because ‘envious 
natures’ and ‘jealous temperaments’ have unfortunately and mysteriously increased in 
number, but because internal mediation triumphs in a universe where the differences between 
men are gradually erased” (14).  
16 I borrow this formulation from Yirimiyu Yovel’s enlightened reading of Spinoza (who 
Eliot translated in the early stages of her career, and whose thought was clearly formative for 
Eliot).  Yovel focuses on an important passage from Part 4 of Ethica where Spinoza asserts 
that “we must enumerate and often imagine the common dangers of life, and how they can 
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rationality refers to the identity of an agent’s thoughts, beliefs, and/or actions with the 
agent’s reasons supporting those thoughts belief and/or actions.  But if reason is not to be 
considered pure, or a priori, but rather dialogic and intersubjective, then rationality is always 
in part shaped by the very need to conform to a body of reasons or norms that have a social 
origin beyond the agent.  Because the agent cannot know (and really, cannot be) the origin of 
the reasons supporting her actions, the identity between thought and action is always in 
jeopardy and inadequate to the demands of agency.   
Incomplete rationality describes the common lot in Eliot.  Ideally, the agent calls 
upon the intersubjective impressions and normative patterns of her world to inform her 
actions and direct them toward a “right way of living.”  Yet, as wee see in Adam Bede, this is 
more easily said than done.  While Hetty, who “can’t find a shape for her expectations,” is 
perhaps the most severe case, we see that she is hardly alone in her inability to reflexively 
understand the origins of her reasons or actions (148).  Eliot shows her reader that, contrary 
to Anderson and Habermas, speech is not “immanently oriented toward reaching 
understanding.”17  “Examine your words well,” we are told, “and you will find that even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
best be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and fortitude”; “the best we can do…is 
to conceive a right way of living, i.e. fixed rules of life that are certain…so that our 
imagination is widely affected by them and they are always at hand.” Baruch de Spinoza, 
Ethics, ed. and trans. G. H. R. Parkinson (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000) 296.  This “incomplete 
rationality,” as Yovel dubs it, is a process by which the “imagination [is] re-configured as an 
imitation of reason.” Y. Yovel, “Incomplete Rationality in Spinoza’s Ethics,” Spinoza on Reason 
and the “Free Man,” eds. Yirmiyahu Yovel and Gideon Segal (New York: Little Room Press, 
2004) 15-35.  Spinoza, and Yovel, describes formalized processes of reflexive and 
intersubjective (the “common dangers of life”) cognition that are not at all foreign to liberal 
notions of agency.  Eliot’s ambivalence concerning these formalized processes, I am arguing, 
stems from her concerns regarding the efficacy of these methods once they become fixed 
and formulaic and particularly once faced with the increasing plurality of valid but conflicting 
points of view.  
17 Anderson, The Way We Argue Now 168.  Anderson quotes at length from Habermas’s Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action in an effort to underwrite her claim that “speech 
implicitly makes validity claims.” 
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when you have no motive to be false, it is very hard to say the exact truth” (Adam Bede 195).  
And indeed, we see that seemingly innocuous communicative impasses between, first, Dinah 
and Hetty (Ch. 15) and then between Arthur and Irwine (Ch. 16) in many ways engender the 
worst tragedies of the novel.  Understanding, for Eliot, must be honed “as we learn the art 
of vision, by a good deal of hard experience, often with bruises and gashes incurred in taking 
things up by the wrong end, and fancying our space wider than it is” (175).  In other words, 
our methods of knowing are often not adequate to the task of responsible agency, and 
suffering is the result.  For all of the purported stability associated with the realist aesthetic 
and Eliot’s own assertion that she wishes to tell her “simple story,” “dreading nothing, 
indeed, but falsity,” she acknowledges that she can hardly avoid providing an “arbitrary 
picture” (Adam Bede 194).  As I will show in the next sections, Adam Bede seeks to shake our 
faith in the unavoidably arbitrary normative patterns that, while at times providing much 
needed guidance for her characters, also finally sways the town Hayslope to believe that its 
punitive treatment of Hetty Sorrel is justice, and not revenge (194-5).  
Adam Bede is ambivalent enough regarding Hetty Sorrel’s fate so as to be opaque in 
its appraisal of it, to the extent that, I think, the reader should be cautious in assigning to the 
text a definite judgment.  However, many critics have done just that.  Raymond Williams’s 
influential reading of Adam Bede remains indicative of those critics who read Eliot’s harsh 
treatment of Hetty as a sort of political or ethical failure.  Williams writes that Hetty remains 
“a subject to that last moment on the road before she abandons her baby; but after that 
moment she is an object of confession and conversion” (The Country and the City 173).  Eliot 
“abandons” Hetty, according to Williams, “in a moral action more decisive than Hetty’s own 
confused and desperate leaving of her child” (173).  For Williams, Adam Bede’s scapegoating 
of Hetty placates the “external interests,” that result from what he sees as Eliot’s “uneasy 
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contract” with the interests and sensibilities of a “particular kind of reader” (172-3).  
Williams is perhaps right that the ethics of Eliot’s narrator are often in step with those of a 
particular kind of implied reader, but he is wrong to consider this formulation uncritically.  
We would be wrong, I think, to equate the ethics of Eliot’s narration with Eliot’s own or 
ascribe them to her putative need to placate a “particular kind of reader.”   
Rather, we should distinguish between a nebulous concept of a Victorian reader 
whom we identify by potentially misconceived notions of class or morality and the intra-
textual reader to whom Eliot so often refers explicitly in the text (and whom she so often 
specifically identifies by linguistic markers of class, gender, or morality).  Neither Eliot’s 
narrative, nor its narrative voices are stable entities; likewise her implied reader is a protean 
figure.  “God preserve you and me from being the beginners of such misery!” exclaims our 
narrator gravely at the end of Hetty’s “Journey in Despair” (Adam Bede 423).  The words 
prompt the reader to ask: to whom do the pronouns refer?  The answer can only be gleaned 
from the speech characteristics of the speaker, whose explicitly male voice is directed to an 
explicitly male implied reader; only a man, such as Arthur, and evidently our narrator, could 
be a “beginner” of the type of misery Hetty experiences.18  Yet, what about Hetty?  
Immediately prior to the narrator’s exclamatory address to the reader, Hetty is described as 
“clinging to life only as the hunted wounded brute clings to it” (423).  The proximity of the 
two utterances creates a disjunction that broaches concerns about agency and responsibility: 
the narrator seems chiefly concerned with avoiding the imputation of responsibility, rather 
than with Hetty’s misery, or what unnamed force compels her to cower and hide like a 
“hunted and wounded” animal.  His character and sense of propriety recoils from any social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Gillian Beer’s important discussion of how Eliot genders her narrators in Gillian Beer, 
“Putting on Man’s Apparel: The Early Fiction” in George Eliot (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
1986), 59-81.   
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association or involvement with Hetty’s “despair,” rather than from Hetty’s despair as such. 
Elaine Hadley has cogently summed up the all-important Victorian category of “character”: 
“A midcentury liberal individual is a man of character, and a man of character is a 
midcentury liberal individual” (6-7).  It is precisely this fetishized category of character that 
Eliot puts under pressure here and at various other points in the novel.  Instead of merely 
reproducing and prioritizing the “frank sensibility of the isolated moral observer,” as 
Raymond Williams argues, here Eliot critiques the narrator’s incomplete moral sensibility 
(180).  These narrative ambivalences work to dilate the reflective capacity of her reader such 
that the reader’s understanding might encompass the contradictions embedded in the errant 
forms of rationality that motivate feeling and action in Adam Bede. 
The narrator, while often displaying omniscient powers as well as a putative 
detachment from the situations and characters he assesses, is shown in these passages as 
never free from the common prejudices that narrow human perception and understanding.  
This is a crucial point for Eliot: meaning exists only in social interaction, and meaning is 
necessarily conditioned by the inherent distortions that inflect understanding between 
individuals.  Even “the strongest effort to avoid any arbitrary picture, and to give a faithful 
account of men and things,” Eliot allows, “is doubtless defective; the outlines will sometimes 
be disturbed, the reflection faint or confused” (193).  Eliot asserts the unavailability of the 
abstract, impartial moral perspective on which forms of Kantian liberal procedure depend 
for judgment.  Ironically, Eliot’s critique of impartiality strikes at the heart of what is 
generally seen as the realist novel’s locus of consensus building objectivity—the narrator.  In 
a recent work, Pericles Lewis has rehearsed precisely the vision of the novel Eliot seeks to 
undermine: “The functioning of the novelistic universe depends on the narrator’s role as 
neutral arbiter.  He stands aloof from the characters and disentangles their competing claims 
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and perceptions.  Like the state in liberal political thought, he acts as the guarantor of the 
shared social reality” (9).  But as Eliot shows in Adam Bede, there is no escaping the 
prejudices that jaundice perspective and as a result skew judgment.  For this reason the 
utterances internal to the novel should not be taken for the authoritative word of George 
Eliot, nor should they be read as the voice of a single law-giving narrator.  Rather these 
discourses should be evaluated critically, for such linguistic relationships invariably model 
potentially “confused” or “defective” points of view, which Eliot sets before the reader in an 
effort to spur reflexive understanding.  Eliot’s sacrificial theme is meant to question precisely 
the moral obtuseness of Williams’s “particular kind of reader,” who would countenance and, 
by doing so, passively sanction the ethical contradictions made apparent by Hetty’s fate at 
the hands of her community.   
Consequently Adam Bede’s “punitive ending” is not, I think, to be associated with the 
author’s effort to reflect and conform to Victorian values embedded in a rural retrospect.  
Neither does Hetty’s scapegoating represent the uncritical implementation by George Eliot 
of a means of aesthetic and moral resolution.  Yet this is precisely the stance of Michiel 
Heyns’s Expulsion and the Nineteenth-Century Novel, perhaps the most influential work on 
scapegoating in the Victorian novel.  Heyns’s argument derives from René Girard’s 
distinction between texts that unselfconsciously depend on the scapegoat mechanism to 
achieve closure and those texts that “thematize” the scapegoat mechanism and therefore 
“reveal the truth of persecution.”19  For Heyns, the modernist or protomodernist works of 
James and Conrad exemplify the latter category, while he argues that the earlier nineteenth-
century novels uncritically reproduce the scapegoat mechanism as a means of narrative 
resolution and thus epitomize the former.  As for Raymond Williams before him, Heyns 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




understands Hetty Sorrel to be unreflectively “reduced to a pathetic victim of Eliot’s moral 
purpose” (Expulsion 31).  This is so, according to Heyns, because “in Eliot the pressure 
toward scapegoating is stronger than the counterpressure” against its use as a means of both 
aesthetic and moral resolution (39).  Hetty’s fate is as such paradigmatic of what Heyns sees 
as Eliot’s principal artistic conundrum: her inability to resolve in her fiction that “inherent 
contradiction between the realist claim to be rendering an external reality, and its concern 
with an ethical dispensation of the universe” (39).  Here Heyns recasts the epistemological 
dilemma of liberalism that, as we saw earlier, Pericles Lewis had promoted as a problem of 
shared understanding and that he had argued is resolved through the consensus building 
procedures of the realist novel.  Heyns is right to point to the scapegoating process as 
another means of both novelistic and political closure and is also correct that in Adam Bede 
violence and expulsion provide the impetus for resolution and consensus formation in the 
fictional community of Hayslope.  However, he is mistaken, I feel, that George Eliot 
presents this process unreflectively.  Instead, as I have been arguing, the novel reproduces 
what George Eliot sees as a seminal contradiction of liberalism: that liberal procedure 
depends on what might be called a crypto-decisionism.  As Eliot made clear in her Antigone 
and its Moral, “the antagonism of valid claims” that she had identified as the “exquisite art of 
Sophocles[’s]” play, persists in the social and political arrangements of every age (Critical 
Writings 245-246).  Because of the conflict intrinsic to political incommensurability, it is 
impossible to “attain a great right without also doing a wrong” (Critical Writings 246).  This is 
so, because ultimately it is impossible to avoid some sort of arbitrary decision in order to 
induce resolution.  It is a pointed sense of this contradiction that George Eliot extends to 
her critique of liberal consensus formation and liberal procedure in Adam Bede.   Because the 
decision is precisely antithetical to the raison d’être of liberal procedure, proceduralism must 
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disavow its reliance on forms of arbitrary violence.  Eliot’s novel does not accuse; it 
implicates, not only itself and its own generic needs, but also its readers, both implied and 
“actual.”  By “abandoning” Hetty, Eliot’s narrative formally replicates her intense isolation 
from Hayslope.  This allows Hetty’s story to be assembled by the very people—her 
community members—who demand her sacrifice for and, so to speak, in the presence of the 
reader.  The narrative argues its case against Hetty and builds the moral consensus required 
for punitive action.  Hetty’s confession, as we will see, will then undercut the narrative that 
Eliot has allowed to play out over the course of the chapters leading up to Hetty’s climactic 
scene with Dinah in order to emphasize the community’s role as persecutor. 
 
The Sacred and the Profane 
 
As Mr. Poyser’s orphaned “penniless niece,” Hetty Sorrel is from the start an 
outsider to Hayslope.  Yet at the same time, included as she is within the respected and 
hardworking Poyser family, she is also of the community.  A number of critics rightly 
associate Hetty with the pastoral: David Carroll writes, “she is the natural, instinctively self-
seeking in its own pleasure, the quintessence of the pastoral, nature in all ‘its self engrossed 
loveliness’” (76).  Sarah Gates goes so far as to say “Hetty is the landscape” (24). Yet like 
Adam, Hetty’s character instantiates the values of putatively conflicting periods.  Hetty’s 
unearned ambition and her blatant disregard for those human relations that Eliot sees as the 
foundations of community and culture associate her with the negative forms of detachment 
Eliot depicts as symptomatic of a retrograde modernity: Hetty has “hardly any roots” (169).  
Though simplistic and naturally unreflective, in her insatiable vanity and ambition Hetty 
carries within her the germ of her albeit more calculating relations Rosamond Vincy and 
Gwendolen Harleth.  As George Levine pointed out in a now venerable essay, the “egoisms” 
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that in Eliot lead to an exaggerated individualism “isolate man from his natural ties” 
(“Determinism” 272). And there is perhaps no character in all of Eliot who is, finally, more 
completely severed from her “natural ties” than Hetty Sorrel.  Like the dogs and children to 
which she is so often compared, Hetty is domesticated, able to live within the family and 
community, yet unable to access the full and reciprocal value of human relations or 
understand the significance of those relations, which Eliot called the “vital elements” of 
culture, “which bind men together and give a higher worthiness to their existence” (Letters 
471-472). 
When she recognizes she is pregnant, Hetty’s narcissism rapidly changes to fear, a 
fear that Eliot’s narrative lingers over expressly to emphasize the social character of her 
dread: “She must hide herself where no familiar eyes could detect her” (397).       
She could never endure that shame before her uncle and aunt, before Mary Burge, 
and the servants at the Chase, and the people of Broxton, and everybody who knew 
her.  They should never know what happened to her.  She shrank from that idea…as 
she might have shrunk from scorching metal.  Where should she go?  What could she 
do?  (413) 
 
This is a precise inversion of an earlier passage: 
They are but dim ill-defined pictures that her narrow bit of an imagination can make 
of the future; but of every picture she is the central figure in fine clothes; Captain 
Donnithorne is very close to her, putting his arm around her, perhaps kissing her, 
and everybody else is admiring and envying her—especially Mary Burge, whose new 
print dress looks very contemptible by the side of Hetty’s resplendent toilette. (168)  
 
Rather than gazing on in admiration, once Hetty knows she is pregnant, the eyes of “Hetty’s 
World” now stare with a persecutorial intent.  Hetty recoils from her community as from 
“scorching fire” (414).  As what must now be considered absolutely incommensurate with 
the pastoral Hayslope, Hetty recognizes the suffering that waits for her on the immediate 
horizon.  The “swift-advancing shame,” driven upon Hetty is the intersubjective weight of 
moral consensus, forcing her expulsion from Hayslope even prior to the community’s 
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knowledge of her “Hidden Dread.”  The comparison of Hetty to a “foolish lost lamb” 
underscores her association with the sacrificial, even as the image of Hetty “wandering 
farther and farther in the nightfall on the lonely heath” marks her as scapegoat (395).   
 The “Hidden Dread” chapter specifically initiates Hetty’s importance to the 
scapegoat theme, which will begin in earnest with Hetty’s journey into a “new wilderness” 
(411).  However, the motif of sacrifice is broached forcefully very early on in the novel.   As 
Dinah preaches on the Green of Hayslope, trying to bring “home to the people their guilt,” 
she reenacts Christ’s passion story.  Her sermon excoriates the village folk’s evident 
indifference to Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross:  
See the print of the nails on his dear hands and feet.  It is your sins that made them!  
Ah! How pale and worn he looks!  He has gone through all the great agony…They 
spat upon him and buffeted him, they scourged him, they mocked him, they laid the 
heavy cross on his bruised shoulders.  They nailed him up.  Ah! what pain!...with 
those lips he prays for them, ‘Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.’  
Then a horror of great darkness fell on him and he felt what sinners feel when they 
are forever shut out from God.  That was the last drop in the cup of bitterness…All 
this he bore for you!  For you… (35) 
 
Dinah’s exegesis of the Passion story underscores emphatically Adam Bede’s thematization of 
sacrifice and forecasts proleptically the community’s role in the sacrificial drama with which 
Hetty’s narrative will culminate: “’Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.”  
However Dinah’s preaching has little effect on the “village mind,” which “does not easily 
take fire,” and she later complains to the conspicuously secular Rector Irwine that “there’s a 
strange deadness to the Word” in Hayslope (101).  The town cleaves to an ideology of 
individual and domestic self-sufficiency, of rational responsibility, which Eliot associates 
with its sense of pastoral and economic ease (again epitomized by Irwine).  But this ease 
depends on a surface composure that belies a deep concern with public propriety.  For this 
reason, much in the same way that the community is disconcerted by Hetty’s natural beauty, 
Hayslope is also deeply troubled by Dinah’s religious enthusiasm. 
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Hayslope cleaves to an ideology of individual and domestic self-sufficiency, of 
rational responsibility, which Eliot associates with its sense of pastoral and economic ease.  
But even as the imagined social impact of Hetty’s actions precipitates her flight from 
Hayslope, the actual knowledge of her transgression begins to produce apparent instabilities 
in Hayslope.  News of Hetty’s arrest creates an immediate sense of isolation for the Poyser 
family—one that, as for Hetty, is also expressed as a desire to avoid community scorn.  
Meanwhile, as the truth of Hetty’s flight is gradually revealed to Adam, the rivalry between 
Adam and Arthur grows in intensity.  As “The Trial” approaches and as Arthur becomes 
proximally nearer to the community (having been called home by the Squire’s pending 
death), Adam’s aggression, his desire for revenge, becomes increasingly fierce.  Irwine sees 
the danger of Adam’s intensifying desire for retribution: 
evil spreads as necessarily as a disease.  An act of vengeance on your part against 
Arthur would simply be another evil added to those we are suffering under: as long 
as you do not see that to fix on Arthur’s punishment is revenge, and not justice, you 
are in danger of being led on to the commission of some great wrong. (461)   
 
Irwine’s brief slip into the plural pronoun indicates the community aspect of the “evil” 
under which “we are suffering.”  Even if he is able to view the immediate rivalry of Adam 
and Arthur with some objectivity, Irwine is incapable of recognizing his own complicity with 
the greater population’s desire for vengeance.  Though many have assumed Irwine to be a 
moral paragon, even the voice of Eliot, we see in these passages, as with the narrator’s voice 
earlier, that Irwine’s reflective powers are incomplete.  He poses the proper questions, but 
does not possess the expansive critical understanding necessary to arrive at the most 
adequate answers.  To improve upon Irwine’s reflective capacity is left by Eliot to the reader.  
For Irwine’s words broach in precise terms the contradiction inherent to the drama of 
sacrifice, that is, the inevitable conflation of justice and vengeance: if each is violent, and 
both function through violence, what then is the distinction between a legal or holy violence 
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and an illegitimate or unholy violence that the former is used to oppose?  At least in this 
case, how is justice not revenge?   
As both clergyman and magistrate Irwine should be in a unique position to 
understand and respond to this contradiction, but instead he embodies the contradiction 
itself, or rather, he instantiates the symbiotic relationship of violence and the sacred.  
Irwine’s shortcomings reveal the power of the exception even as they illuminate the 
processes by which it is communally disavowed.  Irwine warns Adam: “It is not for men to 
apportion the shares of moral guilt and retribution” (460).  He then continues, “the evil 
consequences that may lie folded in a single act of selfish indulgence, is a thought so awful 
that it ought surely to awaken some feeling less presumptuous than a rash desire to punish” 
(460).   The passage’s structural irony foregrounds Irwine’s incomplete rationality, but more 
importantly emphasizes the contradiction immanent to the procedural legitimation of 
violence.  What is absolutely proscribed to the person is sacrosanct for the polity.  The 
normative stability that ultimately creates the conditions for procedural rationality, Eliot 
shows the reader, finally depends upon the power of the exception not only to safeguard 
that stability, but to secure it in the first place.  This is the same paradox that inheres in 
Schmitt’s brutal dictum from Political Theology, which states the “Sovereign is he who decides 
the exception” (5).  The rule of law, or the order that law is meant to preserve, hinges 
fundamentally on a decisive act that ultimately exists beyond the rule of law.  For despite the 
jury’s deliberations, in the case of Hetty’s death sentence, and the jury’s exceeding arbitrary 
choice to not recommend mercy, Eliot emphasizes that these deliberations end only in a 
“moment of decision,” when the jury “comes to their decision” (473-4).     
In an effort to ward off the spread of violence, emblematized in Adam Bede by 
Adam’s increasing desire for vengeance, men institutionalize their need to “apportion 
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retribution,” whether in a religious or juridical form, precisely in order to mitigate the “rash 
desire to punish” from spreading like a contagion through the community that the institution 
is intended to protect. The inherent contradiction between justice and revenge, then, is 
resolved only through what Émile Durkheim calls the “absolute” and incorruptible character 
of the distinction between “the sacred and the profane” (53).  This distinction is evident in 
the strange consensus that subtends the transcendental nature of the putatively secularized 
legal institution.  The institution’s sacred character both creates and is simultaneously created 
by this consensus, which, as we see with Irwine, simply discerns the “absolute” difference 
between vengeance and justice—as Durkheim says, “the mind irresistibly refuses to allow 
the two corresponding things to be confounded” (55).20  Much the way Durkheim describes 
the absolute incommensurability of the sacred, for Schmitt, “the exception is that which 
cannot be subsumed” (Political Theology 13).21  
“Only by opting for a sanctified, legitimate form of violence and preventing it from 
becoming the object of disputes and recriminations,” writes René Girard, “can the system 
save itself from the vicious circle of revenge” (Violence and the Sacred 24).  The sanctification 
of violence only occurs due to “the transcendental quality of the system, acknowledged by 
all” (Violence and the Sacred 24).  The self-sustaining, but also self-perpetuating character of the 
relationship between institution and community is apparent—there is on the one hand no 
difference at all between the two, while on the other hand the sacrilization of the one makes 
their distinction absolutely polar.  Yet the sacred cannot come into being without the violent 
exception.  The covenant between the sacred institution and the community does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Durkheim continues, “the sacred principle is nothing more nor less than society 
transfigured and personified.” 
21 On the absolute and incommensurable character of the sacred, see Durkheim, The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life 37-41. 
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function, does not exist, in the absence of the victim; indeed, the sacrificial ritual produces 
the sacred.  Moreover, the victim represents the distinction between the profane and the 
sacred by being both simultaneously: Hetty Sorrel exemplifies this paradox par excellence.  
 
 
Crypto-decisionism in Adam Bede 
 
As the novel progresses, it becomes increasingly clear that Hetty is not punished 
solely, or even primarily, for murdering her child.22  Hetty is punished for the growing ills of 
the community “crisis,” of which her act is merely the most terrible symptom.  By gesturing 
toward an ambiguous “evil which we are suffering under,” Irwine alludes to a much broader 
cognitive disturbance among the community.  Though it may be difficult for the modern 
reader of Adam Bede to judge, relative to the idyllic norms of Hayslope, the town is rather 
shattered by the fallout from Arthur and Hetty’s tryst.  Early in the novel, the pastoral world 
of Hayslope is static, picturesque:  
against the horizon huge conical masses of hill; not distant enough to be clothed in 
purple mystery, but with somber greenish sides visibly specked with sheep, whose 
motion was only revealed by memory, not detected by sight; wooed from day to day 
by the changing hours, but responding with no change in themselves. (22)  
    
The events of the novel, however, compromise the pastoral constancy of Hayslope.  
Hayslope’s relative convulsions are perhaps best measured by the sudden and increased 
mobility around the community of Hayslope.  The Poysers respond to shame in the same 
way as Hetty, and the narrator’s use of the same metaphors used to describe Hetty’s earlier 
perceptions indicate that we should understand them in similar terms.  “Ah, there’s no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I have no room here to contend with the important historical (not to mention mythical or 
religious) significance of acts of infanticide to Adam Bede.  However, excellent accounts exist.  
Among these is the aforementioned Josephine McDonagh, Child Murder and British culture 
1720-1900.  Also, see Christine L. Krueger, “Literary Defenses and Medical Prosecutions: 




staying i’ this country for us now,” says Mr. Poyser, in response to a “scorching sense of 
disgrace” for which they blame Hetty unequivocally: “She’s made our bread bitter to us, for 
all our lives to come” (449-50).  
However, Poyser blames Arthur, not Hetty, for “poisoning [Adam’s] life,” and 
resigns himself to the fact that Adam too must leave Hayslope: “as it’s much if he can stay i’ 
this country any more nor we can” (450).  Poyser is in a sense correct; Adam is poisoned by 
his desire for revenge, a desire that, as Irwine recognizes, has the potential for poisoning 
others.  Indeed, in “The Dance” chapter, Adam’s discovery that he has a rival precipitates 
the envy and jealousy that “poisoned for ever” that day that had been so full of “promise to 
him” (313).  In the very next chapter, just before he and Arthur come to blows, Adam 
condemns Arthur for “poisoning” Hetty’s life (327).  Hetty’s “short poisonous delights” 
with Arthur had “spoiled forever” her ability to enjoy the simple offerings of Haylsope 
(365).  Similarly the “web of folly” that Hetty “spins” with Arthur is compared to “a 
rancorous poisoned garment” (274).  That Adam’s potentially contagious “passion” for 
revenge is capable of “spreading as a disease,” is perhaps most indicative of the community’s 
need to dispel the source of the contagion.  However, though Adam Bede clearly associates 
Arthur, not Hetty, as the root cause of the contagion, it will nonetheless be Hetty who bears 
the burden: Hetty represents Hayslope’s sickness, and its cure.23  Again Hetty takes on a 
double character: She is at once the sacred and profane, the cure and the poison, the savior 
and the criminal.   
Schmitt writes that the exception “is analogous to the miracle in theology (Political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See René Girard, Violence and the Sacred 95.  Girard points out that the Greek concept of 
the pharmakoi, the word describing the ritual of scapegoating itself, means both “poison and 
the antidote for poison, both sickness and cure.”   
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Theology 3).24  Though this arbitrary and thus irrational aspect of the exception is antithetical 
to the secular, deliberative nature of procedural rationality, Eliot nonetheless emphasizes the 
theological character of the proceedings throughout the prison, trial, and verdict chapters.  
The trial is held during the “Lent assizes,” a time of penitence and sacrifice in preparation 
for the commemoration of Christ’s crucifixion and subsequent Resurrection.  On “The Eve 
of the Trial,” Irwine meets with Adam and Bartle Massey in “an upper room,” meant to 
invoke the events of the Last Supper (457).  Eliot has the actual trial and verdict scenes 
conducted in the ruins of a Gothic hall, “variegated with the tints of old painted glass” (468).  
Before reading the verdict, the “judge puts on his black cap,” signifying the severity of the 
sentence, as simultaneously the “chaplain in his canonicals was observed behind him” (474).  
Here Eliot illuminates the syncretization of violence and legal procedure that can only occur 
under the auspices of the sacred. 
In the crucial “The Verdict” chapter the reaction of the crowd as it awaits Hetty 
Sorrel’s judgment again underscores the sacred character of the proceedings.  Stilled instantly 
by an ominous “knock” that “fell as a signal for silence on every ear,” the narrator observes, 
“it is sublime—that sudden pause of a great multitude, which tells that one soul moves in 
them all” (474-5).  There is a moment of palpable indecision prior to the decisive judgment; 
the “sudden pause” registers the deferral that is often seen as the hallmark of proceduralism, 
even as the sense of suspension the “pause” communicates works as an index of the sacred.  
“The counsel and attorneys talking with an air of cool business” ought to be foreign to the 
proceedings, given Eliot’s theological characterization of the events, but instead we see that 
the secular rationality they emblematize is in fact entirely commensurate with the ritual to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Schmitt argues that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are 
secularized theological concepts,” and that the theological underpinnings of the modern 
State have been disavowed by the “rationalism” of Post-Enlightenment political thinking.   
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which they ostensibly stand opposed (473).  Eliot exposes “the great multitude[’s]” 
dependence on a collective resistance to reflection and reflexive understanding that occludes 
the ethical contradictions of the scapegoating process.  And by describing the crowd’s 
consensual actions and emotions as “sublime,” Eliot broaches the concept’s association, in 
the Kantian tradition, with the cathartic force that inheres in the recognition of our power 
over what is fearful to us.25  Feeling the “negative pleasure” that Kant describes as the 
aesthetic sense of the sublime, we find that Adam himself experiences a “shuddering horror” 
in the moments just prior to the decision (473).26   
There is a deep connection between the cathartic function of the Kantian sublime 
and the exclusionary procedures of liberal subjectivity.  Faced with what is fearful, unformed, 
or that which is generally beyond the subject’s rational capacity of understanding, the mind 
first recoils, but then finds a thrilling harmony in its own “ideas of reason.”27  And inherent 
in the subjective experience of the sublime for Kant is a claim for universal validity of moral 
feeling.  In the experience of the sublime, subjective feeling is abstracted from the 
particularities of self and is thus impartial in a moral sense: “the Sublime prepares us to 
esteem something highly, even in opposition to our own (sensible) interest.”28  The feeling of 
the sublime for Kant is bound to a normative moral claim that has nothing to do with the 
object and everything to do with the judgment itself, which, uninhibited in any way by 
anything external to the mind, can make a claim to moral universality.  But for Eliot, the 
crowd’s “sublime” response exemplifies the consensus making powers of ritual violence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and 
Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000) 129.   
26 Ibid 129.   
27 Ibid 128. 




Here the function of the sublime reveals the drive to domination and self-preservation 
inherent in reason.29  In this way the “sublime pause” exposes the violent nonidentity of 
reason and rational thought that Theodor Adorno tracks back to Kant’s moral philosophy 
(but that one could certainly trace to Spinoza’s notion of conatus): “on the one hand, reason 
cannot be separated from the interest in preserving one’s own life because reason is really 
the identity of the self-preserving subject, while on the other hand, reason should be able to 
oppose the interests of self-preservation” (Problems of Moral Philosophy 94). 
Nonidentity characterizes the contradiction between justice and exclusionary 
violence in Adam Bede.  According to Schmitt, “the state suspends the law in the exception 
on the basis of its right of self-preservation” (Political Theology 12).  Kant attempts to resolve 
the contradiction of the decision by universalizing the conative drive and thereby negating 
incommensurability: the moral agent must act as if his or her actions conformed to a 
universal law.  The same is true of the state.  Procedural rationality, too, wants to ground 
action in universal law, but tries to dispense with the merely formal nature of those laws by 
establishing their authority in putatively intersubjective consensus making procedures.  But 
communicative reason, which Anderson describes as the “foundation of democratic 
proceduralism,”30 does not curtail the force of Adorno’s critique: self-preservation is not 
negated, but only amplified by a consensual rationality that functions as a hypostatized force 
set over against whatever it deems hostile to itself, as is the case in Adam Bede.  Procedure as 
a collective and intersubjective effort to bridge the impasse between the particular and the 
universal, even in the form of a “regulative ideal” rather than an “empirical reality,” 31 can 
only do so by expelling the interests of the particular, the personal, or the parochial.  So 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid 145.  
30 Amanda Anderson, The Way We Argue Now 168.   
31 Ibid 186, 178. 
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rather than acting from a moral standpoint, procedural law is involved in what Carl Schmitt 
called a “huge cloak and dagger drama,” meant to obscure its reliance on the arbitrary 
decision (Political Theology 38).  In an effort to obviate any external dependence on the 
decision, liberal forms of procedure finally only internalize and disavow this dependence on 
what we can understand as a sort of crytpto-decisionism.  In Adam Bede, George Eliot 
discloses to the reader what Habermas himself has called the “exclusionary mechanism” that, 
though disavowed, nonetheless haunts the procedural rationality critical to sustaining the 
liberal state.32   
 
The Word and the Sword 
 
“The Hidden Dread” chapter initiates Hetty into Adam Bede’s exclusionary plot, but 
also presents one of several interpolations in the novel in which the narrator materializes as a 
spatially embodied commentator, rather than the omniscient “narrator as nobody” that 
Elizabeth Ermarth suggests secures “the genial consensus of realist narration” (65).  For 
Ermarth the omniscient narrator is an aesthetic and moral response to the insecurities 
associated with humanist values in the nineteenth century (67).  Though Ermarth does not 
overtly politicize what she sees as the realism’s aspirations toward shared understanding, a 
number of critics have done just that, and it has now become rather standard to envision the 
realist novel as reflecting a conception of society commensurate with nineteenth-century 
liberalism. 33  Adam Bede, in my view, troubles this conception of the novel.  At several points 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Habermas, “Concluding Remarks,” Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun 
(Cambridge: MIT, 1992) 475-476. When asked pointedly about the “necessity of implicit 
violence against those who don’t accept consensus,” Habermas remarks “every public sphere 
I know of still depends on violence” (475).  
33 Generally speaking this sort of politicization travels in two opposite directions.  The first 
tack would be that of more recent neoliberal scholarship in which the dialogisms of the 
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the novel presents the narrator as individualized in both time and space and also shows the 
narrator’s understanding to be limited by common and identifiable prejudices.  Similar to the 
novel’s presentation of Irwine, Adam Bede demonstrates the narrator’s incomplete rationality.  
By doing so Eliot works to undermine the ideals of abstract impartiality and detachment on 
which liberal procedures are based.       
While the narrator’s fireside chat with an older Adam Bede in Chapter 17 is perhaps 
the most notable example of his propensity to materialize within the diegetic frame of the 
novel, “The Hidden Dread” chapter also offers an interesting instance in the novel, which is 
associated specifically with Hetty’s exclusion from Hayslope.  As Hetty sets off for 
Treddlestone, the pastoral beauty of the landscape through which she travels apparently 
overcomes the narrator, provoking an anomalous meditation on its picturesque beauty.  The 
reverie, which is crucially opposed in tone to the narrative’s initiation of Hetty’s journey in 
despair, is suddenly interrupted by a seemingly unwonted memory:   
What a glad world this looks like, as one drives or rides along the valleys and over 
the hills! I have often thought so when, in foreign countries, where the fields and 
woods have looked to me like our English Loamshire—the rich land tilled with just 
as much care, the woods rolling down the gentle slopes to the green meadows—I 
have come on something by the roadside which has reminded me that I am not in 
Loamshire: an image of a great agony—the agony of the Cross. (394-5) 
 
In Adam Bede the pastoral throws a veil over the relations that create human suffering.  For 
this reason one must be ever vigilant, because 
hidden among the sunny fields and behind the blossoming orchards...the sound of 
the gurgling brook, if you came close to one small spot behind a bush, would be 
mingled for your ear with a despairing human sob. (395) 
 
“Hidden” as it is, Hetty’s “despairing human sob” reveals man’s own need to render 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
novel function by narrative means to imagine the workings of communicative rationality.  
For an example, see Amanda Anderson’s excellent, The Powers of Distance.  The opposite tack 
would be that taken by earlier scholars inspired by Althusser and Foucault, such as I have 
discussed in my introduction. 
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unintelligible what is antipathetic to his harmony of mind.  And although Hetty’s pregnancy 
is undoubtedly her “Hidden Dread,” certainly the title of the chapter also references Hetty 
herself, who is “hidden behind the apple-blossoms” as she fearfully seeks to evade the 
inevitable persecution that approaches with her “swift-advancing shame.”  Though “such 
things” as human agony “are sometimes hidden among the sunny fields and blossoming 
orchards,” the “agony of the cross” is a “reminder” not merely that there is suffering in the 
world but, as Dinah has pointed out to the community in her reprisal of the Passion story, 
that “we” are the authors of that suffering (395).  The cross stands as a not very subtle 
reminder of the redemptive power with which theological narratives imbue sacrifice and 
suffering.  However, the cross is not merely a symbol of man’s primordial guilt, but also 
stands as a rebuke of the doctrine of sole fide that forms the core of the unreflective, 
secularized Protestant individualism that informs the public morality of Adam Bede.  For the 
Cross is not to be found on the roadside in “our English Loamshire,” but rather will only be 
encountered in “foreign countries.”  As a particularized, material reminder of human 
suffering, the cross shakes the narrator’s faith in his own harmonious construction of the 
world and disturbs the equanimity secured by the disavowal of human suffering on which—
as the Cross reminds us—that equanimity depends.  
Eliot’s novel will finally not brook the proclivity for disavowal that the novel 
presents as a principal mode of liberal cognition, and that the novel repeatedly associates 
with the pastoral.  As I have tried to show, in Adam Bede violence transfers responsibility to 
the one, even as punitive action absolves the community both of its complicity in the initial 
transgression, as well as the final act of scapegoating.  The question, in Adam Bede, is not one 
of guilt, for there is little question that Hetty committed a crime.  The problem Eliot poses is 
one of responsibility and, as such, of agency: Could Hetty have done otherwise?  Surely, but 
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would she have known what she was doing and why she was doing it anymore than when 
she abandoned her child?  The answer is finally unclear, but what is clear, I think, is that 
Hetty’s outward determination is hardly, as George Levine asserted, “ethically irrelevant” 
(“Determinism and Responsibility” 273).  Hetty’s crime ultimately is a product of that 
“transcendental homelessness” that Georg Lukács equates with the individual’s plight in 
modernity: “the homelessness of an action in the human order of social relations, the 
homelessness of a soul in the ideal order of a supra-personal system of values” (Theory 62).  
Hetty represents an extreme case of incomplete rationality.  She is woefully 
unreflective, and “quite uneducated” (110).  After all, “Hetty had never read a novel; if she 
had even ever seen one, the words…would have been too hard for her; how then could she 
find a shape for her expectations?” (148).  Hetty’s inability to shape her expectations, most 
notably in a fashion that would conform to the specifics of her determination, is indeed the 
problem.  Theories of rational agency generally assume the existence of a common grammar 
by which constituents intersubjectively mold the terms of their social relations.  This type of 
consensus is the only means by which person and polity can adjudicate the reasons that 
support the appropriateness of certain actions.  Moreover, the agent must have the capacity 
to deliberate reflectively among the reasons affecting any choice of action.  Clearly, Hetty 
meets none of these criteria: How then is Hetty to have equal access to community and its 
laws, as she is given privileged access to its vengeance?   
The answer is that she cannot.  For this reason, perhaps despite ourselves, we feel 
sympathy for Hetty.  Far more egregiously than Maggie Tulliver, Hetty is unprepared with 
“knowledge of the irreversible laws within and without her which, governing the habits, 
becomes morality” (The Mill on the Floss 300).  There is no place in Hayslope for Hetty, as is 
there is none in St. Oggs for Maggie.  Contrary to these earlier examples of her fiction, 
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Eliot’s later novels will attempt to fashion a reality of meaningful compromise.  In the 
“Finale” of Middlemarch (1871) for example, Eliot hesitantly accepts this new medium, as well 
as the specific forms of heroism that are to be found in the active engagement with that 
“involuntary, palpitating life” of which she is a constituent (788).  Dorothea is “absorbed 
into the life” of Will Ladislaw, even as her actions are diffused “for the growing good of the 
world” (Middlemarch 836, 838).  What cannot be ignored, however, is that whatever benefit 
Dorothea’s diffused agency might bring to posterity, that benefit comes only at a premium, 
the price for advancement being that the “strength” of Dorothea’s “full nature” must be 
“broken” in the process.  Thus compromise also depends on a sort of violence.  
Middlemarch’s dialectical vision of social and individual development is indicative of Eliot’s 
Hegelian vision of consensus evinced in her “Notes on Form in Art” (1868), an essay 
written almost ten years after Adam Bede, and during the time in which she composed 
Middlemarch.  “’Consensus,’” suggests Eliot, “expresses that fact in a complex organism by 
which no part can suffer increase or diminution without a participation of all other parts in 
the effect produced and a consequent modification of the organism as a whole” (Critical 
Writings 358).34  Yet in the earlier novels, such as The Mill on the Floss or Adam Bede, no such 
“consequent modification” is made by the social whole in order to accommodate what it 
deems as extraneous “parts.”  
On the penultimate page of the novel Adam tells his brother Seth, “there’s no rule so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 For an informative discussion of the import of consensus in Eliot, and also the relation of 
Eliot’s vision to Comte, Spencer, and Mill, see Susan Graver, George Eliot and Community 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1984) 150-155.  However, Graver conspicuously omits 
the importance of Hegel (and Spinoza) to Eliot’s thinking on consensus.  On another note, it 
is significant that the brilliantly sketchy “Notes on Form in Art” appeared roughly ten years 
after Adam Bede was published in 1859, and a mere three years prior to the publication of 




wise but what it’s a pity for somebody or other” (589).  Adam’s doubts here articulate the 
novel’s ambivalences, not only as these pertain to Hetty’s fate, but also more generally 
regarding the ethics of profiting by another’s suffering. 35  Still, Eliot chooses to express these 
ambivalences via a legal idiom, and indeed the novel is troubled to its very end by its 
treatment of Hetty.  For Hetty is only “saved” in the “The Last Moment” so that she may be 
transported and, upon the expiration of the eight-year term of her sentence, die aboard a 
ship while trying to return to England.  Thus Hetty’s presence hangs over, so to speak, the 
hundred or so pages between her transportation and the novel’s “Epilogue,” when Dinah 
tells us “the death of the poor wanderer, when she was coming back to us, has been sorrow 
upon sorrow” (589).  These pages, and the considerable time that has elapsed within the 
frame of the novel, work toward achieving the novel’s conventional ending.  But as Hayden 
White argues, “where there is ambiguity or ambivalence regarding the status of the legal 
system, the ground on which any closure of a story one might wish to tell [either] fictional or 
factual is lacking” (Content of the Form 14).  And the details of Hetty’s protracted demise haunt 
Adam Bede’s efforts at closure from a vestigial remove, suggesting Eliot’s deep irresolution 
about the conventions—social, political, and aesthetic—that have demanded Hetty’s 
expulsion.   
For if the events of Hetty’s trial and sentencing reveal that liberal legal procedure 
ultimately depends on an arbitrary and violent decision of the type that Carl Schmitt 
compares to “a miracle in theology,” then no event communicates the arbitrary nature of the 
“deliberate” decision against Hetty more than the equally arbitrary, in fact miraculous, 
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between the elemental needs of the many and those of the individual, and that she rejects the 




retraction of this death sentence at “The Last Moment.”  For many readers of the novel, 
Eliot’s punishment of Hetty is imposed on the text as a means of negating the threat to 
community norms; her expulsion spirits away moral contradiction, as it were, through 
generic convention and the sovereign intervention of the author.  What these critics are 
responding to is the decision itself, which is inscribed within the generic language of the 
novel.  But if we change our perspective and look at this function of the novel in precisely 
the opposite manner, we discover that this generic inscription mimics the legal procedures 
that I have been arguing Eliot wishes to critique in the novel.  For as brilliant and 
philosophically fluent as George Eliot undoubtedly was, she was a novelist first and 
foremost, and thus narrative was the tool she brought to bear on the philosophical problems 
of her world.  For this reason we see that it is through those idioms specific to the novel that 
Eliot exposes the contradictions apparent in the social systems by which she was confronted.   
Thus in The Mill on the Floss, we see that Maggie Tulliver must be wiped from the face 
of the earth by an “awful visitation from God” so that order might be restored to the 
Protestant community of St. Oggs (538).  Like Eliot’s treatment of Hetty in Adam Bede, 
Eliot’s intervention against Maggie in the form of a Biblical flood is an aesthetic and 
specifically generic expression of the miraculous and inevitable character of the exception, a 
concept for which she lacked a precise philosophical idiom, but for which she did not lack a 
religious language.  In a similar manner, George Eliot emphasizes the theological aspect of 
the legal operations she depicts in Adam Bede in her effort to describe the exceptional 
character of the state powers brought to bear against Hetty Sorrel.  And finally, Eliot gives 
us Arthur Donnithorne, the mutilated Romantic hero, miraculously riding into Stoniton to 
rescue Hetty, carrying not a sword, but “a hard won release from death” (503).  This much 
criticized deux ex machina of Eliot’s novel emphasizes just how capricious was the sentence 
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leveled against Hetty and demonstrates not only the famous indecisiveness of liberal 
practices but that such indecisiveness necessitates arbitrary decisions to produce resolution.  
For on the document in Arthur’s hand is written yet another decision, just one more 
arbitrary decree.  Thomas Hobbes, a progenitor of the modern concept of natural law that 
so deeply influenced Carl Schmitt, famously wrote in his Leviathan, “Covenants, without the 
Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.”  Here Arthur carries the 
word and not the sword, but in the symbolic economy of Eliot’s novel, I think, this is 
precisely the point.  George Eliot understands that the violence of the sword is always 





THE NEUTRALIZATION OF AFFILIATION IN THOMAS HARDY’S NOVELS 
 
 
Late in Thomas Hardy’s The Return of the Native (1878), the rustic matron Susan 
Nunsuch, in an effort to “counteract the malign spell which she imagine[s]” is directed 
against her son by Eustacia Vye, engages in “a ghastly invention of superstition,” “calculated 
to bring powerlessness, atrophy and annihilation on any human against who it was 
directed.”1  Despite the dismissive manner in which the narrator initially describes the 
irrational impetus for Susan’s “ghastly” labor, the narrative nonetheless proceeds, now in a 
more objective mode, to describe meticulously the process by which Susan Nunsuch 
fastidiously fashions, tortures, and then immolates the “human form,” in “effigy,” of 
Eustacia Vye (347, 349).  Susan’s painstaking labors are presented as deeply ambivalent: the 
love for her son and the hatred of her perceived enemy synergize to fuel the intensity of the 
efforts directed against that “evil influence,” which the cottager believes is “exercised by 
Eustacia’s propinquity” (347).  She is both methodical and savage.  The most primal form of 
human connection, Hardy demonstrates, energizes a visceral act against one not similarly 
affiliated and whose sudden proximity provokes a violently protective response.  
As one not native to the heath, the Egdon locals view Eustacia Vye as a “queer 
mortal,” likely responsible for the “bewitching of Susan’s children” (32, 176).  Susan’s 
defensive act, “calculated,” as it is, “to bring powerlessness” to the enemy, is a compensatory 
adaptation.  Her fetishism reduces the threat to a “shape which tolerably well resembled a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hardy, The Return of the Native 347.  All subsequent quotations are cited parenthetically in 
the text.   
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woman [that] stood about six inches high,” condensing the unknown into a manageable 
form so that it might be banished from the known world on which it intrudes (347).  Like 
the skimmity-ride from the later The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886) or the observance of Bonfire 
Night that plays such an important role in The Return of the Native, Susan’s superstitious 
actions are fundamentally an attempt to restore order to an existence perceived to have been 
thrown out of balance by the threat of an outsider, in this case “Eustacia’s influence as a 
witch” (314).   
Hardy stipulates that Susan’s embrace of magic is not an anomaly on Egdon Heath.  
Rather her “ghastly invention” was “a practice well known on Egdon at that date” (347).  In 
the 1895 Preface to the novel Hardy sets “that date” as somewhere “between 1840 and 
1850.”2  Thus Hardy stresses that the types of primitive cognitive procedures epitomized by 
the actions of Susan Nunsuch persist into the rationalized mid-Victorian world.  The survival 
of antique epistemologies produces the conditions for an often comparative energy in 
Hardy’s narratives, and thus we see Hardy’s narrator frequently evince an objectively 
anthropological attitude toward the subjects it depicts.  Certainly this is the case with Susan.  
Susan’s superstitious fatalism orders her world by consigning what it does not understand to 
magical powers or a mythical provenance.  Here ritualized exclusion sustains cognitive and 
community stability by producing a strange synergy of antipathy and loyalty.  Though Hardy 
understands such procedures to be primitive, he nonetheless sees modern rationalizing 
techniques as employing similar epistemological methods—methods often reproduced by his 
narrative voices—in an effort to create and maintain order.  
Thus the brief passage with which I began is exemplary of a seminal theme not only 
of The Return of the Native, but also of Hardy’s novels more generally.  In often complex ways, 	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Hardy’s novels demonstrate the importance of exclusion to individual cognition and agency, 
as well as to the maintenance of the community as a political entity.  As for George Eliot, 
Thomas Hardy is concerned that exclusion is intrinsic to the formalizing procedures that 
characterize liberalism and modern liberal subjectivity.  However, though Hardy understands 
exclusion to be essential to liberalism and modern liberal subjectivity, he also recognizes the 
role exclusion plays in culture to be deeply atavistic—his novels characterize such processes 
as anthropological survivals, that is, as primary sociocultural practices that remain vestigial in 
more modern community procedures.  In other words, Hardy presents exclusion and 
expulsion as being common to the long trajectory of human cultural development.  I will 
argue in this chapter that Hardy’s novels envision this trajectory as being frustrated and 
disturbed by an incipient cosmopolitan impulse, evidenced by characters like Clym 
Yeobright and Angel Clare, which disrupts what he presents as the actually arbitrary but 
apparently “natural” processes that concretize human affiliation.  Hardy ultimately depicts 
Clym Yeobright’s Comtean cosmopolitanism as “an attempt to disturb a sequence to which 
man has long been accustomed” (172).  Rather than inducing the creation of broad or 
universal forms of affiliation, for Hardy cosmopolitanism ultimately effaces those most 
immediate and concrete types of human connection.  As these forms of affiliation and 
identity are neutralized in the fluid, putatively egalitarian world of liberal democracy, they are 
replaced by proliferating domains of struggle and conflict.  
Hardy’s novels are anxious that as concrete and localized affiliations disappeared in 
the wake of liberal cosmopolitanism’s universalizing impulse, social relations would cede to 
an inchoate violence.  In this sense, Hardy shared Carl Schmitt’s concerns regarding the 
universalizing tendencies of liberal cosmopolitanism.  For Schmitt, a universalized “concept 
of humanity excludes the concept of the enemy” (Concept of the Political 54).  However, this in 
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no way signifies the end of enmity or violence.  In fact, rather the opposite is true.  Such a 
broad reconfiguration of politics is responsible for what Carl Schmitt referred to as the 
neutralization of previously politicized domains.  Akin to what Marx decried as the merely 
“political” emancipation of man in a liberal democracy, for Schmitt each neutralized space, 
so to speak, becomes inevitably a new field of struggle, shot through with divergent 
interests.3  If universalism’s goal is the neutralization of humanity itself as a political concept, 
then for Schmitt, and I want to argue, Hardy as well, universalism necessarily denotes a 
social milieu characterized by autonomous, atomized individual relations, rather than the 
collectivized relations between political groups or political identities.  In Schmitt’s view, as 
the neutralized space is inevitably reenergized by divergent interests, new fields of struggle 
are created, which effectively render the social space a war of all against all.  Thus processes 
of neutralization proliferate areas of struggle and conflict: “in the new domain, at first 
considered neutral, the antitheses of men and interests unfold with a new intensity and 
become increasingly sharper” (Concept of the Political 90).   
This is the vision of human relations that the novels of Thomas Hardy reflexively 
acknowledge as always present beneath that “sense of order” that gives structure to the 
cultivated world of late Victorian England.  Hardy’s novels demonstrate that by the 
nineteenth century, liberal cosmopolitanism has disturbed sequences to which man has long 
been accustomed.  To put the problem very simply, this disturbance produces what is for 
Hardy’s major characters an inability to tell friend from enemy.  The result is a debilitating 
confusion and at the cognitive level an inward turn, which is evident in the violent solipsism 
of characters like William Boldwood, Eustacia Vye, and Tess Durbeyfield.  This confusion is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




symptomatic of the general atmosphere of skepticism and distrust that pervades the worlds 
of so many of Hardy’s novels, in which the division and divergence of interests is only one 
symptom of a more general epistemological crisis.  One need only reference an early novel 
like Far From the Madding Crowd (1874) and witness discord and confusion caused by the 
identity-shifting Sergeant Troy to understand that this difficulty is general in Hardy.  As 
Boldwood’s murderous response to this confusion indicates, the instabilities that Hardy 
characterizes as emanating from this inability to discern friend from foe are apt to erupt into 
acute scenes of violence.   
In Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891), the motif of friend and enemy, particularly when 
associated with Alec D’Urberville, takes on a chiasmic structure, where one pole of the 
dichotomy is presented only to be immediately reversed by the intrusion of the other: Alec is 
“an Enemy in the shape of a Friend”; “though I have been your enemy,” Alec assures Tess, 
“I am your friend”; Alec has been granted access to Tess at Flintcomb-Ash because he 
comes, “she knew” “as a friend, or enemy” (288, 280, 263).  Yet, Alec is merely the 
overdetermined exemplar of these Mephistophelean dangers.  Tess’s repeated use by her 
family as a currency not merely for social advancement, but indeed as an instrument used for 
basic survival, indicates that even the most essential forms of human affiliation are 
compromised in a world where values have been instrumentalized by an exchange economy 
and a new social paradigm ruled by individualism.  The confusion regarding identity and 
affiliation in Tess is representative of deeper epistemological instability wrought by this new 
moral economy and to which Alec’s murder at Tess’s hands is the final, fraught response.  
Focusing mainly on The Return of the Native and Tess of the D’Urbervilles, in this essay I will 
argue that Hardy’s novels demonstrate what he felt to be the broad generalization of 
antipathy in society and that Hardy depicts this proliferation of violence as resulting from 
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the neutralization of concrete human affiliation under the pressures of liberal 
cosmopolitanism.  When sequences are disturbed, that is, when those forms of connection 
that lend stability to the world are broken, the cultural forms that obscure and work to curb 
“the defects of natural laws” cease to function adequately (167).  Thus man sees—or 
perhaps more accurately feels—quite clearly, “the quandary that [he] is put in by the 
operation” of those natural laws (RN 167).  Certainly this is the case with Tess of the 
D’Urbervilles (1891), a novel pregnant with latent violence and in which Tess discovers that 
beneath the vain façade of human intercourse “all is injustice, punishment, exaction, death” 
(218).  Thomas Hardy’s novels ultimately ask the question that, as we have seen, Eliot’s later 
novels in particular struggle to answer affirmatively: Is moral action, or morality of any sort, 




Perhaps none of Hardy’s modern characters embody the cosmopolitan impulse as 
well as The Return of the Native’s Clym Yeobright.  “Yeobright loved his kind” (171).  “He was 
a John the Baptist who took ennoblement rather than repentance as his text” (172).  Having 
recently returned to the Heath from the continent, Clym brought with him the intellectual 
“development he owed to his studious life in Paris, where he had become acquainted with 
ethical systems popular at the time” (172).  The “ethical systems” Yeobright embraces, 
generally understood to be those of Auguste Comte, produce in Clym “a conviction that the 
want of most men was a knowledge of the sort which brings wisdom rather than affluence” 
(131).  Clym’s idealistic repudiation of the material and his notion that man can move “from 
the bucolic to the intellectual life” without moving through the developmental “stages” of 
“worldly advance” emphasizes both his naïveté and his hypocrisy (172).  Clym stresses 
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abstractions over concrete particularities: he “wished to raise the class at the expense of 
individuals rather than individuals at the expense of the class” (131).  Hardy’s ironic 
treatment of Clym’s “advanced position” critiques the ideal of cultivation, which Hardy 
understands to be—much like Cym himself—largely vapid: “to argue upon the possibility of 
culture before luxury to the bucolic world may be to argue truly, but it is an attempt to 
disturb a sequence to which man has long been accustomed” (172).  This seemingly benign 
criticism, however, has a darker undercurrent, for Hardy reminds us at the same moment 
that the impetus of civilization is not to be found in “advanced positions,” but rather in 
violence: “Had Phillip’s warlike son been intellectually so far ahead as to have attempted 
civilization without bloodshed, he would have been twice the godlike here that he seemed to 
be, but nobody would have heard of an Alexander” (172).  As if enunciating a central 
thematic of his novelistic corpus, Hardy underscores the violent element repudiated by 
nineteenth-century perfectionist idealism and orients his readers to the reality that any 
“attempt [at] civilization without bloodshed” is a counterfactual ideal. 
Whether or not Hardy truly had Comte in mind specifically when he developed the 
character of Clym Yeobright, the passages above provide well enough a passing description 
of concepts central to the French positivist’s thinking.  Clym’s increasing asceticism 
demonstrates a putative embrace of altruism and the general repudiation of self-
interestedness in the name of not only community, but of humanity.  Hardy’s reference to 
Yeobright as a “John the Baptist,” that is, as an itinerant preacher concerned with the 
“ennoblement” of man, while a significant bit of prolepsis in the book, also invokes the 
Comtean notion of a secularized religion of humanity.4  Moreover, this section of the novel’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Though Comte has fallen into some disrepute in our contemporary times, it is worth noting 
that his thought in many ways remains prominent because of the attention given to writers 
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repeated references to “stages,” “sequences,” “transitional phases,” and of course 
“sequences,” (if not simply a gesture to the general notion of man’s progressivism that was 
so important to Victorian thought) likely points to Comte’s perfectionist vision of 
cosmopolitan universalism, which rested on a philosophy of history emphasizing the 
advance of man in distinct stages.  Cosmopolitanism, largely understood in the Victorian age 
as stage in the general improvement of (at least European) man, is deeply allied with 
modalities of human self-understanding predicated on man’s intellectual and cultural 
progressiveness.     
Cosmopolitanism, as much a mode of thinking and understanding as acting, 
generally espouses the renunciation of local and national affiliation in favor of universal 
interdependencies.  Here the distinctions between particulars and universals, individuals and 
affiliated wholes are bridged by formalized and shared epistemological procedures.  While 
the universalizing ideals of cosmopolitanism prevalent toward the latter half of the 
nineteenth century was predicated on a broad inclusiveness, this inclusiveness was based on 
the cultivation of an abstract, formalized rationality and an idealized apolitical (and at once 
highly politicized) concept of humanity.  The individual freedoms found in recognized 
modalities of mutually constituted rational, and thus moral norms, such as Kant’s concept of 
“cosmopolitan right,” were to some extent dependent on overcoming or at least taking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
deeply influenced by his thinking, such as George Eliot, Herbert Spencer, and John Stuart 
Mill, as well as Hardy.  George Eliot’s concept of consensus formation as the natural growth 
of relational interdependencies between the constituent parts of humanity, itself understood 
as an organism (Hegelian as this formulation is) likely had its principal influence in Comte 
(who was also clearly inspired by Hegel).  Thus we find in George Eliot and Thomas Hardy 
divergent views of cosmopolitanism that nonetheless likely derive from the same source. 
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precedent over divergent or parochial value systems.5  Universalism in this sense is a general 
strategy of cultivation, of “raising the class” of humanity toward its end as a species.  
For Kant, though local particularities were to be respected, abstract universal 
principles take precedence over those normative claims rising from more immediate forms 
of affiliation.  In Kant’s concept of cosmopolitan right, abstract moral claims cannot be 
arbitrary if they have their basis in a principle of “public right [that] derives from the general 
will that is given a priori” (Perpetual Peace 133).  This safeguard disappears, however, if we 
understand reason to be not “pure,” but rather the product of that merely conventional or 
“collective thought” that Durkheim, for instance, understood as identical to reason (341).  In 
this case the cosmopolitan self-consciousness is potentially, if not entirely, an invidious 
construction, constituted to some extent through its relation to an otherness deemed less 
culturally or intellectually advanced.  The dependence on perceived asymmetry epitomizes 
the aggrandized self-understanding of both Clym Yeobright and Angel Clare.  Hardy at 
moments self-consciously reproduces this sort of subjectivity constituting gaze in the 
objective ironies of his narrative voices, and particularly in those moments when the narrator 
attempts to exert a rationalizing control over the narrative.  Though I believe it is important 
to understand that Hardy recognizes here a fundamental contradiction of the universalizing 
tendency—that it requires the very asymmetries that it espouses to transcend—this is not, I 
think, his greatest concern.   
The most pressing problem for Hardy is that in its dominative drive to universalize, 
liberal cosmopolitan’s impulse disturbs, displaces, and effaces those modes of established 
affiliation that ground human cognition and agency.  In the actions of Susan Nunsuch 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Kant, Perpetual Peace 112-113.  “All men who can mutually influence one another,” writes 
Kant, “must accept some civil constitution”; that is, some publicly recognized—and thus 
moral—order of reciprocal relations (112). 
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described at the beginning of this essay, Hardy provides a functional model, however 
retrograde, of human agency tied to a specific epistemological mode.  What Hardy’s 
narrative posits as the arbitrary and purely coincidental relationship between Eustacia’s 
proximity and young Charlie Nunsuch’s illness have, conversely, a definite cause and effect 
relationship in the mind of Charlie’s mother.  By producing reasons, she excludes other 
troubling possibilities.  Having established such a relationship, Susan can then embark on a 
definite course of action to remedy what is to her mind a well-defined problem.  Despite 
obvious faults, Susan’s primitive cognitive procedures are to some extent effective, if only 
because she is able to render her actions commensurate with her beliefs and perceptions, 
however narrow or circumscribed they may be. Hardy sheds light on the specific 
relationships between knowledge and action that organize the life-world, for lack of a better 
term, of this representative native of Egdon Heath.  The cognitive order created through 
exclusion and identification contrasts the general psychological anxieties produced by the 
more reflective and expansive understanding of the nonnatives such as Clym and Eustacia.   
However, the characters that people the worlds of Thomas Hardy are not the only 
ones who struggle with the complex limits of what is knowable, and what is known.  Hardy’s 
narrative voices demonstrate this struggle in very significant ways as well.  In their responses 
to the crisis of values I have described, Hardy’s narratives often self-consciously replicate the 
very techniques that mark modern rationalizing procedures.  His narrators will mimic the 
struggles of his characters as they attempt to come to terms with a world that exceeds their 
capacity to know it.  We see this exemplified in the famous opening description of the Heath 
from the first chapter of The Return of the Native.  In fact, the entirety of the first chapter 
illustrates simultaneously the aggressive nature of aesthetic experience—the agent narrator’s 
propensity to formalize experience through appropriation—and the crisis of experience 
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stemming from the incoherence of subjective perception.  In this way the form of Hardy’s 
novel attests to the epistemological challenges manifest in what Gillian Beer has called the 
difficulty in Hardy of “finding a scale for the human” (Darwin’s Plots 236-258). 
The heaven being spread with this pallid screen, the earth with the darkest 
vegetation, their meeting-line at the horizon was clearly marked.  In such contrast the 
heath wore the appearance of an installment of night which had taken its place 
before its astronomical hour had come: darkness had to a great extent arrived 
hereon, while day stood distinct in the sky.  Looking upwards, a furze-cutter would 
have been inclined to continue work; looking down, he would have decided to finish 
his faggot and go home.  The distant rims of the world and of the firmament seemed 
to be a division in time no less than a division in matter.  The face of the heath by its 
mere complexion added half-an-hour to eve; it could in like manner retard the dawn, 
sadden noon, anticipate the frowning of storms scarcely generated, and intensify the 
opacity of a moonless midnight to a cause of shaking and dread (9). 
 
The narrator tries to conceal the apparent incoherencies of the scene through repeated 
processes of redirection and identification.  The efforts to anthropomorphize the landscape, 
to reduce or substitute, like Susan’s fetishism, are attempts to control and appropriate by 
producing identity.  Likewise, the arbitrary creation of a particular subjectivity in the “furze-
cutter” is an endeavor to induce form and coherence by limiting perspective.  So too are the 
narrator’s efforts at delimitation.  Yet the “meeting-lines” and other delineations, which the 
narrator announces as “clearly marked,” quickly dissolve, producing uncertainties for the 
viewer.  Similarly, the passage’s subjunctive mood, coupled with the imposed subjectivity’s 
indecision—the decision to work or not work, is contingent on the worker looking up or 
down, and thus dependent on an arbitrary view as to whether it is actually day or night—
undermines the attempt to impose stability and control.   
In this rationalizing mode, Hardy’s narrator evinces a distanced, anthropological 
interest in the objects it observes and narrates.  Because it so successfully resists cultivation, 
Egdon Heath exists as an anthropological potentiality for Hardy’s narrator: “There had been 
no obliteration [on the heath] because there had been no tending”; thus “in the heath’s 
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barrenness to the farmer lay its fertility to the historian” (20).  The Return of the Native presents 
the landscape of Egdon Heath itself as vestigial, uncanny—a primeval remainder: “The 
untameable, Ishmaelite thing that Egdon now was it always had been.  Civilization was its 
enemy” (12).  Precisely because the heath suggests what modern man had hoped to leave 
behind but did not, that the heath is so often discomfiting.  The Ishmaelite landscape implies 
those putatively repressed “natural laws” and their inherent violence, which have put men in 
such a predicament.  The heath is the ever-present “then” impinging on the cultivated 
“now”; the physical, uncanny projection of Hardy’s famous psychological “ache of 
modernism,” from Tess (98).  In this sense the coexistence of contrasting temporalities, and 
what they suggest, is what is so disruptive in The Return of the Native.  The disturbed 
consciousness produced by these unbridgeable contradictions, which are so troubling for 
Hardy’s moderns, is precisely what Hardy’s rustic but Promethean heathmen are able to 
drive into the catch-all world of “limbo” and “darkness” during the ritual process of Bonfire 
Night.   
Still, despite an awareness of his predicament, Clym cannot accept his limited control 
over internal and external nature in the fatalistic fashion of Hardy’s rustics.  In an early 
description of Clym Yeobright, in which the narrator once again indulges in his propensity 
to synergize the aesthetic and the anthropological, we see that Clym’s “face could be dimly 
seen the typical countenance of the future.  Should there be a classic period in art hereafter, 
its Phidias may produce such faces” (167).  While the allusion may be unintended, Hardy 
nonetheless presents here an interesting revision of Hegelian aesthetics.  For Hegel, “every 
work belongs to its age, to its nation, and to its environment, and depends upon particularly 
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historical and other ideas and aims.”6  The study of artistic production is a deeply 
anthropological enterprise for Hegel because, as none other than the sensual expression of 
man’s intellectual and cultural progression, art is intrinsically an historical metric of human 
development.  Thus there can be no “classic period in art hereafter”—for Hegel or for 
Hardy—because that epoch of perfection, epitomized for Hegel in sculptures like those of 
Phidias, expressed the immanent balance of mind and matter of (an idealized) Greek culture 
itself.  
Whereas for Hegel the intellectual development of man in modernity rendered any 
form of physical art inadequate to the expression of that development in modernity, for 
Hardy this relationship is oddly reversed.   For Hardy, man’s recognition that “the defects of 
natural laws” are in fact his own defects has put him in a “quandary.”  For this reason 
“physically beautiful men—the glory of the race when it was young—are almost an 
anachronism now” (167).   The modern mind, embodied as it is, does indeed have its sensual 
expression in the physical human form.  Yeobright is proof that “thought is a disease of the 
flesh and that ideal physical beauty is incompatible with a full sense of the coil of things” 
(137).  In viewing Clym, the “philosopher” as well as the “artist” “deplores, each from his 
point of view, the mutually destructive interdependence of spirit and flesh” (137).   The 
paradox of Hardy’s thought, and the source of Clym’s mental anguish, is that the greater 
insight gained into human nature, what he calls “modern perceptiveness,” results in a more 
acute disruption of the formal harmony he desires (167).  There is always a regressive 
element in the cultural and scientific advance of man because these advances only give 
evidence to his greatest fears—though he wishes himself apart from nature, in fact he too, 
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“red in tooth and claw,” is inescapably guided by those principles he shares with nature.7   
The recursive fact of violence in Hardy is the constant reminder of the identity of 
man and nature.  There is a portion of man that, like the heath, is essentially uncultivable—
unformalizable.  It is for this reason, Hardy explains, that “solitude seemed to look out of 
[man’s] countenance” (11).  J. Hillis Miller has called the recurrent themes of solipsism and 
isolationism in Hardy the “movement of passive withdrawal,” and describes such withdrawal 
as the psychological, physical, and sociological response to “the threat of an engulfing 
violence which will shake and twist a man’s life.  Only if he can remain self-contained, sealed 
off from everything, can he escape this violence” (Distance and Desire 6).  Miller senses here 
the repressed enmity that characterizes Hardy’s novels; the propensity for that withdrawal 
Miller illuminates in Hardy is indistinguishable from the exclusions that are the agent’s 
cognitive adaptation to her sense of a socially embedded antipathy.  Yet Miller describes only 
the late stage response to the condition, symptomatic of Hardy’s narrators, and his modern 
characters.  For broadly speaking there seem to be two options open in the face of such “an 
engulfing violence.”  One, as Miller no doubt argues correctly, is for the agent to recuse 
himself as best he can and withdraw.  Or, as I showed above, he can seek safety in numbers, 
that is, in the political aggregate; this describes Hardy’s rustics.  In the second case, the 
tendency toward solitude, clearly the product of apprehension and fear, is diffused by 
immediate and concrete forms of affiliation, and those political ties that are produced 
through the recognition of a common enemy.  I will discuss these broader forms of political 
affiliation and their ultimate dissolution in the next section of this essay. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Alfred Tennyson, In Memorium, The Major Works, (New York: Oxford UP, 2000) 236. 
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Origins and Exclusions in The Return of the Native 
 
The Return of the Native begins and ends on Guy Fawkes Night, the annual 
commemoration of the 1605 attempted regicide of Elizabeth’s successor James I.8 The novel 
unfolds over a year’s span between successive celebrations of the event, which the denizens 
of Egdon Heath observe not as Guy Fawkes Night, but as Bonfire Night.  By emphasizing 
Bonfire Night, Hardy not only dehistoricizes but also depoliticizes the occasion, choosing to 
stress the overtly primitive and ritualistic significance of the event for the Egdon natives.  
Rather than marking a specific historical event or date, as does Guy Fawkes Night, Hardy’s 
heathmen ritually observe the timeless, cyclic patterns of the natural world.  Traditionally 
tied to the change of seasons, in The Return of the Native Bonfire Night celebrates the end of 
harvest season even as the rite functions as a ceremonial recognition of the difficult winter 
months to come.  The narrator’s description emphasizes the pagan origins of the custom 
and evinces an anthropological interest not only in the event, but in the natives of Egdon 
Heath themselves: 
It was as if these men and boys had suddenly dived into past ages and fetched 
therefrom an hour and deed which had before been familiar with this spot.  The 
ashes of the original British pyre lay flat and undisturbed in the barrow beneath their 
tread.  The flames from the funeral piles long kindled there had shown down upon 
the lowlands as these were shining now.  Festival fires to Thor and Woden had 
followed on the same ground and duly had their day.  Indeed, it is pretty well known 
that such blazes as this the heathman were now enjoying are rather the lineal 
descendants from jumbled Druidical rites and Saxon ceremonies than the invention 
of popular feeling about the Gunpowder Plot. (20). 
 
Here Hardy disassociates the Egdon natives’ observance of Bonfire Night from its modern, 
political import.  The “popular” political significance of Guy Fawkes Night is not, Hardy’s 
narrator stresses, “familiar with this spot.”   The natives’ self-understanding is fixed to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For an excellent and informative reading of the importance of the Bonfire Night 
celebration in this novel, see Trish Ferguson, “Bonfire Night in Hardy’s Return of the Native,” 
Nineteenth-Century Literature 67.1 (2012): 87-107.  
	  	  
90	  
immutable Heath, which in the novel takes on a temporal significance antithetical to that of 
“civilization” and its deeply historical and narrativized orientation (12).  The passage roots 
Hardy’s rustics firmly in geologic, primordial time, shared with the Druids and Saxons of 
respectively preceding ages.  Thus Hardy emphasizes the autochthony of the heathmen, for 
whom the significance of the rite surpasses in depth and magnitude of feeling what is 
otherwise dismissed as the merely political “invention” of Guy Fawkes Night.  The 
differences Hardy is careful to cultivate between these events in The Return of the Native 
reflects contrastable ways of knowing and thus of interpreting the world.   
Still, it would be a mistake to too quickly dismiss the political significance of Hardy’s 
depiction of Bonfire Night in The Return of the Native merely on the merits of our narrator’s 
efforts to link it so strongly with a primeval significance.  Hardy’s narrative demonstrates the 
very important differences between Guy Fawkes Night and Bonfire Night in order to better 
emphasize the structural similarities shared by the two modes of traditional observance: both 
customs are fundamentally political in the sense that they present ritualized actions invested 
in the maintenance or welfare of a civic group.  Moreover, both customs are oriented, at 
least mimetically, toward community-creating procedures that have their bases in processes 
of violent exclusion.  Guy Fawkes Night commemorates the preservation of the Protestant 
British state against its political enemies and rehearses, through the ritualized burning of Guy 
Fawkes’s effigy, the creation of community identity through the violent repression of 
political and religious differences.  Hardy’s depiction of Bonfire Night expresses symbolic 
values similar to those of Guy Fawkes Night, values that are activated in the service of 
creating community cohesion: 
to light a fire is the instinctive and resistant act of man when, at the winter ingress, 
the curfew is sounded throughout Nature.  It indicates a spontaneous, Promethean 
rebelliousness against the fiat that this recurrent season shall bring foul times, cold 
darkness, misery and death.  Black chaos comes, and the fettered gods of the earth 
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say, Let there be light. (21) 
 
The heathmen rebel against the immutable antipathy of the heath itself—against the “fiat” 
imposed by an unimpeachably sovereign nature.  However, the ritual is an act of recognition 
as much as of sedition.  As a Miltonic “black chaos,” the unformed, uncultivable natural 
world is in its sheer magnitude inimical to the heathmen.  The recognition of power and 
enmity breeds a solidarity rising from a violent separation, a “spontaneous rebelliousness,” 
which proves the impetus for what the narrator depicts as a basic form of political 
communion.  This political impulse derives from the “instinctive” drive, stirred by fear and 
antipathy, to preserve oneself in the face of what is threatening.  As the fire blazes, not only 
does the “human circle” increase as “stragglers, male and female” emerge from the heath to 
join the burgeoning group, but “perhaps as many as thirty bonfires could be counted within 
the whole bounds of the district”: the rite produces solidarity through similitude—a 
similarity of sentiment and feeling that has its outward expression in the primal act of 
creating fire (19-20).   
In tribal fashion, then, cohesion and community are shown to be contingent on 
exclusion and a recognized, if arbitrary, antipathy.  Hardy again shows the political to be 
closely allied with humanity’s psychological demands for order.  The celebration of Bonfire 
Night in The Return of the Native allegorizes for Hardy what is an elemental human need, felt 
at all developmental and cultural stages, to harmonize and safeguard existence. By focusing 
primarily on the identification of an adversary, the rite of Bonfire Night effaces, at least 
momentarily, the motley aspect of the Egdon locals themselves.  Ritual solidarity renders the 
“permanent moral expression of each face impossible to discover,” in its stead producing a 
singular, “appreciable quantity of human countenance” (21).  Through a mythopoeic 
process, Hardy transforms the particularities of the Heath into an absolute otherness.  
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Allusions to Milton and Dante lend to the passage an exaggerated, overstated Manichaeism 
not unlike the narrator’s description of the heath in the first chapter of the novel:   
It was as if the bonfire-makers were standing in some radiant upper story of the 
world, detached from and independent of the dark stretches below.  The heath down 
there was now a vast abyss, and no longer a continuation of what they stood 
on…the whole black phenomenon beneath represented Limbo as viewed from the 
brink by the sublime Florentine in his vision. (20)  
 
The landscape remains preternatural.   However, once “lost in darkness,” the Heath’s sudden 
detachment from the very “world” of the heathmen putatively negates its fecund, teeming 
particularity, which Hardy elsewhere describes through Eustacia’s eyes as “the infinity of 
combined multitudes” (56).   
Through a process of exclusion, the heath is transformed into an amorphous abyss: 
singular, inscrutable, and intensely foreign.  Though Hardy emphasizes the identity 
producing effects characteristic of those processes that establish alterity, he makes as clear, 
indulging a dominant motif of the novel, that this effect is entirely dependent on the 
occluded or diminished perception of the community—their insularity is merely a 
comfortable illusion made possible by a limited vision, by an incomplete rationality: “for 
their eyes, adapted to the blaze, could see nothing of the deeps beyond its influence” (20).  
Hardy syncretizes in his description of Bonfire Night the two fundamental origination myths 
of Genesis and Prometheus; thus we see that the “instinctive act” of lighting fire, as the basic 
impetus of civilization, is recognized here as functioning precisely as processes of exclusion 
and delimitation.  Hardy metaphorizes in the community ritual those methods by which the 
individual provides order to the world by restricting it.  Like Plato’s cave dwellers, there 
exists a shared and as such indisputable reality for the natives of the heath.  As we saw with 
Susan Nunsuch, however mystified such a reality may in fact be, merely in the circumscribed 
stability of its given-ness it awards security.  Thus we can read Hardy’s presentation of the 
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ritual of Bonfire Night as both a parable of political aggregation and also a model of human 
subjectivity.  Through ritual acts of communion, we see, the denizens of Egdon Heath void 
the void, so to speak, producing shared meaning and political identity through creation of a 
delimited and thus ordered environment. 
Hardy characterizes Bonfire Night in The Return of the Native as political in a broad, 
essentially Hobbesian sense.  According to Hobbes, man seeks his own self-interest, which is 
most fundamentally served by avoiding the summum malum of a violent death.9  This 
fundamental impulse toward self-preservation, which Hobbes describes as forming the very 
core of human reason, eventually leads man to transcend the state of nature, or the 
“condition of Warre of everyone against everyone.”  This is accomplished by entering into a 
covenant with a group of relative equals, thereby securing the safety of the individual by the 
power to be found in numbers.10  Once conflict no longer characterizes individual human 
relations, tensions migrate and grow up between human confederations, or nations.  At this 
stage are created the conditions in which the political may flourish for Carl Schmitt.  I 
rehearse this familiar story because it has a specific relevance to Hardy’s treatment of ritual 
in The Return of the Native.  For while Bonfire Night differs very little in its essential, structural 
function from Guy Fawkes Night, these different iterations of the same ritual roughly 
emblematize Hobbes’s political narrative: the former is emblematic of man’s most basic and 
putatively primitive antagonism with nature, whereas the latter illustrates the moment 
beyond the point at which that antagonism has been neutralized, and the natural world 
subordinated; then the conflict migrates to become between men in their political iteration as 
groups or nations.  The latter is the precarious position from which liberalism and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Hobbes, Leviathan 69-73. See Book I, section 13. 
10 Ibid 73-74. 
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cosmopolitanism hope to liberate man.  Yet for Hardy, these are not stages of ascent in 
man’s progressive arc, but mere moments in a closed cycle. 
By including November Fifth and the Gunpowder Plot so prominently in his novel, 
Hardy conjures a time when political unity was entirely contingent on an ethics of arbitrary 
exclusion and violence.  This sort of historico-political retrospective is a recurrent feature of 
Hardy’s novels.11  For the various forms of absolutist politics that preceded the rise of 
liberalism, practices of exclusion and exceptional violence were explicitly recognized not only 
as a social and political reality, but also as a social and political necessity.  The ritualized 
burning of the Guy Fawkes effigy that is the hallmark of the State-imposed celebration 
explicitly emblematizes the procedures of exclusion and violence that are crucial to 
community preservation and the maintenance of the political.  These political acts, for 
Hardy, indicate sociological characteristics that rise as a response to elemental human needs.  
This sociocultural tendency is enunciated in Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political: 
Every religious, moral, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it 
is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and 
enemy.  The political does not reside in the battle itself…but in the mode of 
behavior [that] is determined by this possibility, by clearly evaluating the concrete 
situation and thereby being able to distinguish the real friend and the real enemy. 
(Concept of the Political 37)  
 
Hardy posits the political practices of exclusion as the physical instantiations of an essentially 
human need for cognitive order that has its agential manifestation in the “mode of behavior” 
determined by the possibility of conflict.  The political in the Schmittian sense, then, is a 
modality of self-understanding as much as a material arrangement—a principally cognitive 
state.  The political is not violent per se, but rather a product of the clear distinction between 
“us” on the one hand and “them” on the other hand that originates a tension produced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This is a persistent trait of Hardy’s novels.  For two excellent examples, see note 18 below.  
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precisely by the latency of violence, rather than the open prosecution of war.  The political, 
then, does not correspond to peace, but rather to those tensions that characterize what Kant 
described as a mere suspension of hostilities, which “tacitly reserves issues for a future war” 
(Perpetual Peace 107). 
On the one hand Hardy superimposes the historically and anthropologically laden 
semantic potentials of Bonfire Night and Guy Fawkes Night as a means of establishing 
similarity between apparently contrasting examples of human conduct and human need. This 
is not an uncommon feature of Hardy’s novels, but rather is exemplary of the comparative 
anthropology of Hardy’s narrative methods.  In this case Hardy does so in order to contrast 
those atavistic sociopolitical practices dependent on exclusion with what I have called, 
borrowing from Carl Schmitt, the neutralization of political practices, which characterize 
English society as it nears the turn of the twentieth century.  Hardy was well aware that by 
the middle of the nineteenth century the political significance of Guy Fawkes Night had 
changed.  In Hardy’s own experience, the event had become the occasion of almost 
carnivalesque political rebellion and violence. Millgate writes,  
When still a small boy [Hardy] was taken by his father to witness the burning in 
effigy of the Pope and Cardinal Wiseman in the Old Roman Amphitheater at 
Dorchester during the No-Popery Riots.  The sight to young Hardy was most lurid, 
and he never forgot it; and when the cowl of one of the monks in the ghastly 
procession blew aside and revealed the features of one of his father’s workmen his 
bewilderment was great. (26)12 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Trish Ferguson also comments on this passage in Millgate: see Ferguson, “Bonfire Night 
in Thomas Hardy’s The Return of the Native 87.  It is worth noting that Dorchester’s Roman 
Amphitheater comes to factor significantly in Hardy’s later The Mayor of Casterbridge.  The 
location’s “sinister” and “sanguinary” associations, which had accumulated over the course 
of millennia, ranged from blood sport to official state executions as well as, apparently, Guy 
Fawkes Night rituals.  But Hardy emphasizes that such activities were always the impetus for 
community congregation.  In The Mayor, for example, the narrator recounts the ghastly 
execution of a woman who had allegedly murdered her husband (based, evidently, on a true 
story that influenced not only this novel, but Tess as well), and which had taken place “in the 
presence of ten thousand spectators” (Mayor 69). 
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Certainly here the Guy Fawkes celebration maintained its traditional anti-Catholic force. 
However, oriented though it was against the Papacy’s restoration of the Catholic hierarchy, 
the Bonfire Night violence of 1850 and 1851 was primarily a protest against the British state, 
and its general liberalization of anti-Catholic laws throughout the first part of the nineteenth 
century.13  In fact, in the contemporary iteration most recognizable for Hardy’s readers, Guy 
Fawkes Night regularly exceeded its function as an anti-Catholic, pro-state holiday, 
becoming the occasion of sometimes violent political actions oriented against the state, for a 
wide range of politically volatile reasons including enclosure, the Corn Laws, and Chartism.14   
The point being, rather than a ritual celebration emblematizing community 
preservation achieved through exclusion, Guys Fawkes Night and Bonfire Night in their 
modern iterations signify instead the entropic disintegration of national cohesion 
exacerbated by increasing social heterogeneity.  In other words, the antagonisms that drive 
these sorts of communal rites had turned inward so to speak, to address perceived structural 
and societal imbalances based on much more individualized or specialized social interests, as 
opposed to the less opaque and much more broadly based forms of enmity exemplified, for 
instance, in the political tensions between Man and Nature, Catholic and Protestant, or 
French and English.  Because by the time Hardy was writing The Return of the Native, the 
commemoration of Guy Fawkes Night had come to mark, much more than the celebration 
of state preservation, the representative ambivalence toward the state and general 
fractiousness that, as I argued in my previous chapters, is typical of the mass politicization of 
late Victorian liberal democratic society. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Saho Matusoto-Best, Britain and the Papacy in the Age of Revolution: 1846-1851 (Rochester: 
Boydell Press, 2003) 146-154. 
14 See Ferguson 88. Ferguson provides a long and inclusive list of newspaper articles 
describing Guy Fawkes Night violence in the years between 1846 and 1869. 
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The political factionalism and general antagonism that characterized nineteenth-
century English society resulted from what Schmitt understood as the “negation of the 
political,” which occurs “exactly at the moment when society and state penetrate one 
another” (Concept of the Political 70, 22).  For Schmitt the “rule of morality, law and 
economics” within the liberal paradigm assumes a less “concrete political meaning” (Concept 
of the Political 70). Thus as the validity of norms come to rest on abstractions, they also 
become more susceptible to interpretation and thus more divisible, dissolving the political 
“partially into an individualistic domain of private law and morality, partially into economic 
notions” based on “the dynamic of perpetual competition” (Concept of the Political 71-72).  
Consequently the negation of the political leads necessarily to a “practice of distrust” (Concept 
of the Political 70) that pervades societal relationships.  The political disorder of late Victorian 
England, of which Guy Fawkes Night becomes symptomatic, is indicative of this process of 
neutralization.  In the absence of the political, that is, in the absence a mode of behavior 
structured by the knowledge of an essential enmity between friend and enemy, this enmity 
becomes generalized, and the social sphere assumes the shape of a war between individuals.  
As I wrote in the introduction to this essay, Hardy understands this world of general enmity 
as more and more characterizing the actual relations of human beings and that man’s 
outright reversion to a natural state of violence is barely forestalled by the formalizing 
techniques of culture.  However, Hardy’s novels want us to see that as these techniques 
become more abstract, they also become less effective because they become so general as to 
court incoherence.  Hardy’s cosmopolitan characters, I will argue in the next section, model 





Friends and Enemies in Tess of the D’Urbervilles 
 
It may seem odd, initially, to turn to the novels of Thomas Hardy for a consideration 
of the effects of cosmopolitan thought and action in late Victorian England.  One might 
object that Hardy is most concerned with the specifically urban social pressures arrayed 
against the particularities of rural existence.  Of course, this is to some extent correct, but as 
Raymond Williams has noted, the relationships—personal, political, temporal—that 
structure Hardy’s novels should not be reduced to broad dichotomizations: “the pressures to 
which Hardy’s characters are subjected are then pressures from within a system of living, 
itself now thoroughly a part of a wider system.  There is no simple case of an internal 
ruralism and an external urbanism” (Country and the City 209).  The central importance of the 
Casterbridge (Dorchester) corn exchange to novels such as Far From the Madding Crowd and 
The Mayor of Casterbridge is certainly proof of the synergy Williams is pointing out.  Particularly 
in the latter novel, the exchange, as the local terminus of a global enterprise, exerts a 
deleterious agency over Henchard as a man and Casterbridge as a community.  In The Mayor 
of Casterbridge the mechanized cadence of the market economy is shown by Hardy to be 
hopelessly out of rhythm with the immutable cycles of nature’s own mode of production, 
and the incongruence of the two competing purposive systems expresses itself fully in the 
form of that novel.  This is no less the case in Tess, in which the traditional Old Lady-Day 
migrations of “the agricultural world” no longer depended entirely on the seasonal ebb and 
flow of work, but “were on the increase” due to the new technological and economic 
pressures that were interpenetrating the rural economy (277).  Looking back on the body of 
his novels in a “1912 Preface” to Far From the Madding Crowd, Hardy acknowledged that “the 
supplanting of a class of stationary cottagers by more or less migratory laborers [had] led to a 
break of continuity in local history, more fatal than any other to the preservation of close 
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inter-social relations [as well as] eccentric individualities” (393).  This historical and thus 
cultural “break in continuity” is perhaps the dominant structuring principle of Hardy’s 
novels.  
Hence the forces that activate Hardy’s novels cannot be described completely as the 
antagonism between ideas of country and city, rural and urban, rustic and citizen.  Rather, 
the “wider system” of which these antagonisms are symptomatic should be understood as 
certainly including, but also exceeding, the concept of the metropolis or nation.  For in 
Hardy’s novels there is no turning one’s back on the increasingly evident fact that one is part 
of an ever-expanding world.  In “the south of Europe” Mrs. Charmond is oppressed by the 
“crowd of ideas and fancies thronging upon [her] continuously”; she significantly seeks out 
Grace Melbury, “somebody with whom [she is] in sympathy,” to anchor her own identity 
amidst such unsettling diversity (Woodlanders 60).  The Scottish Farfrae moves through 
Casterbridge on his way to Bristol and then America, and the “great wheat-growing districts 
of the West” (Mayor 46). Angel Clare also seeks his fortune beyond England, eventually 
eschewing the “Colonies” for South America, yet doing so not merely to secure a profitable 
vocation, but to ensure what he “valued even more than a competency—intellectual liberty” 
(Tess 92). And crucially there is Clym Yeobright, who is perhaps Hardy’s most explicit avatar 
of the crisis of values he associates with cosmopolitanism.  Recently returned to Egdon 
Heath form Paris, Clym attempts to import his Comtean inspired cosmopolitanism to a 
“world not ripe for” his intentions to “raise the class at the expense of individuals rather 
than individuals at the expense of the class.”15  Even as he mocks the already anachronistic 
aesthetic elitism of Mrs. Charmond’s brand of cosmopolitanism (she intends to write a “new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 As these examples show, for Hardy material interests are never separable from processes 
of acculturation, but are inextricably bound together in new modes of self-understanding 
and agency that we can here associate with the cosmopolitanism impulse. 
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Sentimental Journey”), in characters like Farfrae, Clare, and Yeobright, Hardy underscores the 
deeply bourgeois character of the more contemporary cosmopolitan liberal (Woodlanders 60). 
It is precisely Angel Clare’s bourgeois detachment, his undetermined “intellectual 
liberty,” that Hardy rejects in Tess, and this rejection is crystallized in Hardy’s comparison of 
the elder Clare and his son.  The distinction between Angel and his father demonstrates the 
contradictions that Georg Lukács identified as inherent in “the modern state of society,” 
which transforms “knowledge more and more into the systematic and conscious 
contemplation of purely formal connection, those “laws” that function in—objective—
reality without the intervention of the subject” (History of Class Consciousness 128).  The formalization 
of the liberal, cosmopolitan subject is indistinguishable, in Hardy, from the objectification or 
fetishization of agency within the “second nature” of modern life.  The value of actions in 
the public sphere far outweighs their internal private or moral value, or rather the latter is 
gradually adjusted so as to become virtually identical with the former.  This is a sort of 
perversion of Kant’s axiom regarding the moral significance of publicity and will be 
exploited to a great effect in the narrative procedures of writers such as Henry James and 
Joseph Conrad.  However, Hardy is himself not insensitive to the paradox of formalized 
agency, which becomes both a formal and thematic element of his novels.  Angel’s father 
seems immune to the types of corruption and confusion Hardy associates with the modern 
subject: “One thing [the elder Clare] certainly was,” Hardy tells us, is “sincere,” and of 
course this is precisely what Angel finds it impossible to be.  Hardy ties Mr. Clare’s sincerity 
explicitly to “his simplicity in life and thought”: Mr. Clare had “in his raw youth made up his 
mind once and for all on the deeper questions of existence, and admitted no further 
reasoning on them thenceforward” (123). 
The unfaltering Reverend Clare is the antithesis of the irresolute son, and Hardy is 
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careful to emphasize that father and son are culturally and epistemologically representative 
of conflicting systems: “between Angel, the child of his old age, and the father, there seemed 
to be almost a missing generation” (89).  The Good Reverend’s “geocentric view of things,” 
which consisted of “a zenithal paradise [and] a nadiral hell,” is a universal outlook, certainly, 
but one in which authority rises as if inwardly from a core of stable, fixed beliefs—
dependent on the exclusion of any “further reasoning” or “deeper questions.”  The 
epistemological stance of the elder Clare is precisely opposed to Angel’s Copernican vision, 
which, never fixed, appropriately looks without for its energy and stability.  In contrast to his 
father, Angel cleaves to the dictum recommending, “the removing of those things that are shaken, 
[so] that those things which cannot be shaken may remain” (91).  The maxim describes precisely the 
formalizing impulse of the liberal cosmopolitan impulse and the types of exclusion it too 
embraces.  Yet this epistemological mode hardly lends stability to Clare’s world, for once the 
shaking begins it seems never to stop.  Angel is consequently “nebulous, preoccupied, 
vague,” never sure in his vision of which “things” should be removed and which should 
remain (89-90).  Angel’s general skepticism and the confusion it engenders is largely 
responsible for his ethical failures as regards Tess: his predilection for formal abstraction, his 
“will to subdue the substance to the conception,” has only the effect of sundering those 
affiliations most important to him—not only with Tess, but with his father as well.  
If Daniel Deronda is in many ways exemplary of the brand of cultivated 
cosmopolitanism that some critics have valorized as a reflective ideal, then Angel Clare 
epitomizes the practical failures of such an ideal.16  Angel cultivates a “habit of neglecting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In contrast to some common critical perceptions of George Eliot’s eponymous 
protagonist in Daniel Deronda, in Hardy meaningful affiliations cannot function in the 
abstract.  Because of what Eliot saw as the deeply teleological bent of cultivation and its 
universalizing impulse, what is intrinsic to insular, concretely affiliated consciousness can be 
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particulars of the outward scene for the general impression,” and time and again this 
propensity to embrace an aesthetic abstraction leads him—and this is true of Clym 
Yeobright as well—to moral failure. Neither Clym nor Angel has the courage to trespass 
against those prescriptions they denounce; thus the actions of both men are enervated by the 
very conventions they decry.  In their desire to act in accord with universals, Clym and Angel 
invert the cognitive processes that prove so edifying for the Egdon locals.  The heathmen 
exclude the mass of otherness with which they cannot hope to comprehend —the 
“extremity” of “black chaos”—in favor of an immediate mass of known particularity and 
“eccentricities,” which they can identify with “an appreciable quantity of human 
countenance.”   Loyalty and affiliation retain for the denizens of the heath a humane quality 
that is precisely antithetical to the formalized hypocrisy of Angel and Clym, who reject “the 
near at hand because it shows up its sorriness without shade; while vague figures far off are 
honoured in that their distance makes artistic virtues of their stains” (Tess 208).  Thus 
ultimately each man abandons his wife based on misconstrued moral scruples.  Clym, like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
preserved in types of deracinated loyalty, such as what Daniel enunciates when he famously 
speaks of “separateness with communication.” It is worth providing a bit more from Eliot to 
better illustrate my point: To Joseph Kalymnos’s question as to whether or not he will claim 
his Judaism, Daniel responds, “I shall call myself a Jew.  But I will not say that I shall profess 
to believe exactly as my fathers have believed.  Our fathers themselves changed the horizon 
of their belief and learned of other races.” George Eliot, Daniel Deronda 619.  Daniel claims 
an affiliation, and bespeaks a specific loyalty, but with the explicit qualification that such 
loyalty can always be adjusted to accommodate a broader affiliation. Precisely because of 
what Hardy describes as breaks in continuity, to adjust one’s horizon of belief is always a 
deeply troubling proposition in Hardy. Landedness and ethnicity, however arbitrarily 
developed, either constrain the development of cosmopolitanisms, because they reinforce 
the concrete affiliations of their insular worlds, or they do not. Daniel S. Malachuk finds this 
syncretization of national or racial identity and universal affiliations to be a nineteenth-
century product that is well worth renovating for our contemporary age. So too does 
Amanda Anderson, who like Malachuk also looks to Eliot’s novel to underwrite her 
argument in The Powers of Distance.  Both scholars read this “dual attachment,” as Malachuk 
calls it, as a developmental moment, a transition point of equipoise on the positive historical 
trajectory of universalism (Nationalist Cosmopolitics 133).   
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Angel, is “a slave to custom and conventionality when surprised back into his early 
teachings” (Tess 208).  Clym’s asceticism and Angel’s aestheticism both compromise the 
most fundamental of human relationships, and as Hardy repeatedly emphasizes (too often to 
bear repeating with example), their gross moral failures stem from an occluded vision, rather 
than expanded and reflexive perception we might expect to be commensurate with a 
universal standpoint.  But again these confusions are always as much problems of scale and 
proportion as of vision.   
Angel and Clym are both exemplary of Hardy’s sense that the transformation of 
culture under the pressures of liberal cosmopolitanism inevitably disturbs even the 
microlevels of culture and of human consciousness.  If we look to the experiences of women 
like Eustacia Vye and Tess Durbeyfield, we see that the dissolution of worldviews rooted in 
concrete forms of affiliation and loyalty not only produce confusion, as with Clym and 
Angel, but also fear and distrust.  Hardy characterizes Eustacia’s fiercely private 
individualism as precisely antithetical to the primal political impulse felt by the natives of 
Egdon Heath.  The urge toward affiliation that produces forms of loyalty in the rural 
community is in the more expansive modern world replaced by a pressing but general 
distrust that obviates this impulse, as exemplified during the ritual lighting of bonfires.  
Eustacia’s fire, which is “directly opposite” the heathmen’s fire, burns not so anyone “may 
enjoy it or come anigh it” (32).  Nor does it burn in observance of the community ceremony.  
Instead Eustacia builds her fire out of self-interestedness, for the singular purpose of 
attracting her lover Wildeve (32).  Moreover, unconcerned with her profligacy, she burns the 
valuable wood Captain Drew has amassed over the summer, and stored to combat the hard 
winter months ahead.   
Yet despite her self-centered individualism, Eustacia’s belief that she can transcend 
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the world of suffering, her “rebellious” propensity to “believe in [her] own power,” takes on 
a moral quality in The Return of the Native, if precisely because the bright force of her own 
being tragically dooms her to fail in an “ill-conceived world” (69, 85).  Unlike for Clym, who 
renounces possibilities Eustacia can very literally only dream of, Hardy emphasizes that 
Eustacia inhabits a “world in which doing means marrying” (73).  By attempting to escape 
the limitations of Egdon (“her Hades”) by the only means available to her, she ultimately 
falls victim to the circumscription she strives to escape.  Eustacia is ultimately sorely treated 
in her quest to fulfill the requirements of domestic life, for certainly we feel that she hardly 
deserves the violent treatment she meets at the hands of her deluded husband.17  
Significantly, however, the very real physical threat Clym poses to Eustacia, not unlike her 
earlier bloodletting at the hands of Susan Nunsuch, indicates an actual violence that exists 
above and beyond what the narrator posits merely as the projection of Eustacia’s perception, 
or persecution complex.  
A deep antipathy colors Eustacia’s vision of the world and inflects the tone of the 
narrative that surrounds her with a latent but pregnant violence.  Yet in a moment that 
emphasizes the role of disavowal in maintaining liberal equanimity, just a few pages before 
her death the narrator explicitly characterizes such violence as the projection of Eustacia’s 
own psychological duress.  “It was a night,” the narrator explains, “which led the traveller’s 
thoughts instinctively to dwell on nocturnal scenes of disaster in the chronicles of the world, 
on all that is terrible and dark in history and legend” (345).  Thus there “never was harmony 
more perfect than between the chaos of [Eustacia’s] mind and the chaos of the world 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In an odd but appropriate moment of twinning, Thomasin apparently also barely escapes 
spousal abuse at the hands of Wildeve.  This is yet another instance of the repressed and 
repudiated violence that seems always latent in Hardy’s work, but which the narrative seems 
to veer away from in the very moment in which the materialization of violence seems 
imminent.     
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without” (345).   The narrator is emphatic that the synergy he describes is merely a product 
of Eustacia’s tormented consciousness experiencing what he has earlier called the heath’s 
propensity toward “reciprocity.”  The narrator continues on to compare Eustacia’s 
perceptions of the heath with those of Thomasin Yeobright, in her homespun simplicity:   
To [Thomasin] there were not, as to Eustacia, demons in the air, and malice and 
scorpions, but prosy rain; Egdon in the mass was no monster whatever, but 
impersonal open ground.  Her fears of the place were rational, her dislikes of its 
worst moods reasonable. (355) 
 
Once again, the narrator establishes comparatively the diverging sensibilities of native and 
nonnative.  Counterintuitively for the reader, here reason and rationality are characterized as 
being all on the side of the native, Thomasin.  Though she is not of their class precisely, like 
the less enlightened natives of Egdon, in Thomasin’s willingness to accept the given there is 
inherent compromise.  As George Levine has shown, the imagined worlds of Thomas 
Hardy’s chief protagonists tend to be structured precisely by their resistance to compromise 
(Realistic Imagination (230-231).  Unlike Wildeve or Eustacia, and even Clym, who are all in 
one way or another unwilling to compromise their ambitions, her conciliations spare 
Thomasin from the worst pains of existence.  Thomasin accepts her circumscription in a 
way that Eustacia cannot.  Moreover, because Thomasin’s “imagination [was] so actively 
engaged” “with the possibly disastrous events at her home,” “the night and the weather had 
no terror beyond that of their actual discomfort and difficulty” (354).  In this sense 
Thomasin is a more modern, rational version of Susan Nunsuch; as was the case for Susan, 
Thomasin’s domestic connections, under duress as they are, anchor her amidst the “chaos of 
the world.”  
These important distinctions between Thomasin and Eustacia account for the 
apparently divergent cognitive states showcased by the narrative.  They do not, however, 
explain the urgency with which the narrator consigns Eustacia’s sense of the world’s 
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imminent violence to the realm of irrationality.  Here again we detect the narrator’s familiar 
propensity to rationalize experience that we identified in the first pages of The Return of the 
Native; the narrator disavows the enmity and consequent fear that so palpably haunt Hardy’s 
narratives.  This tendency is strikingly apparent again in Tess of the D’Urbervilles, where the 
narrator’s repudiation of the novel’s latent violence is analogous to the above treatment of 
Eustacia.  In a memorable passage from “Phase Two” of the novel, shortly after Tess returns 
to Marlott, the narrator stresses that the “encompassment of [Tess’s] own characterization, 
based on shreds of convention, peopled by phantoms and voices antipathetic to her, was a 
sorry and mistaken creation of Tess’s fancy—a cloud of moral hobgoblins by which she was 
terrified without reason” (67).  Even among the denizens of the natural world, Tess “looked 
upon herself”—the language of reflection is certainly noteworthy—“as a figure of Guilt 
intruding into the haunts of innocence” (67).   
Hardy’s narrator seeks to convince us that Tess’s fear and guilt are merely 
projections of a deluded inner anxiety, a sort of méconnaissance: thus Tess “might have seen 
that what bowed her head so profoundly—the thought of the world’s concern at her 
situation, was founded on an illusion” (71).  She “might have seen” beyond her own 
mystification, though the narrator gives no indication as to just how such a penetrating 
objectivity is to made available to Tess.  Hardy’s narrative wants to direct our attention 
precisely to this impasse: the very process of Tess’s mystification—the feedback loop of 
recognition that Hardy points to in the description of Tess’s own “characterization”—
renders the process itself opaque.  No amount of reflection, Hardy wants us to see, will 
allow Tess to transcend the opacity that limits her self-perception.  The crucial point is that 
Tess’s sense of the world is correct; however much the narrator wants to deny the antipathy 
Tess feels, it clearly exists.  So Tess, whose “whimsical fancy would intensify natural 
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processes around her till they seemed a part of her own story,” is in fact not deluded or 
paranoid, for “the world,” we see, “is only a psychological phenomenon, and what they 
seemed they were” (67).  Thus, “the midnight airs and gusts, moaning amongst the tightly-
wrapped buds and bark of the winter twigs,” may as well in fact be “formulae of bitter 
reproach” (67).  Tess is damned either way: if the threat Tess intuits is merely a psychological 
phenomenon, then she is apparently at the mercy of violence she has brought on herself; if 
the threat is real, then Tess is at the mercy of the violence of the world at large. 
Yet Tess’s apprehensions are entirely warranted; the violence she feels is a physical 
property of her environment.  For despite the narrator’s rebuke of Tess, the plot bears out 
the fact that Tess surely should fear “the cloud of moral hobgoblins” that “encompass her 
characterization.”  It finally does not matter that “society” itself, and not Tess, was “out of 
harmony with the actual world,” it is to convention that she must comply, and with which, 
much like Eustacia, she is out of order.  However, our narrator continues, “by feeling herself 
in antagonism, [Tess] was quite in accord” (67).  There are many ways to read this nicely 
paradoxical offering from Hardy, but at bottom, I think, the statement is evasive: the fact 
that Tess’s desire may bring her into harmony with an abstract conception of nature only 
serves to underscore her fate, which is to be perpetually in conflict with what is, that is, the 
all encompassing second nature of her social world.  And this distinction will ultimately 
make the greatest difference in Tess.  For the absolutely impersonal character of the “world” 
does not mute its inimical aspect, nor obviate the intimately violent impact that “mankind,” 
“so terrible in the mass” finally has on Tess (66).  Here Tess’s fear, which is indivisible from 
her sense of humanity, communicates precisely the paradoxical import of Schmitt’s 
unsettling assertion that “the concept of humanity excludes the concept of the enemy.”  
Hardy’s sense of human nature—of nature itself—will not support the notion of a universal 
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morality any more that it will a purposive nature.  By excluding the concept of the enemy, 
and neutralizing the dynamics produced by concrete affiliations and loyalties, liberalism’s 
universalizing impulse also excludes the concept of the friend.   
  
Distance as Disavowal 
 
The putative impersonality of the novelistic world Hardy builds in Tess rests entirely 
on a repudiation of interestedness, on distance and detachment.  But Tess senses the 
violence disclaimed by the equivocal language of the rationalizing narrator.  Tess imagines 
“numbers of tomorrows just all in a line, the first of them biggest and clearest, the others 
getting smaller and smaller as they stand further away; but they all seem fierce and cruel and 
as if they said, ‘I’m coming! Beware of me! Beware of me!’” (97).  Tess intuits the enmity that 
appears intrinsic to her world.  Her future unfolds before her as the novel’s bleak plot, the 
natura naturans of her existence.  Seemingly like the immutable Heath of The Return of the 
Native, waiting, “unmoved, during so many centuries, through the crisis of so many things” 
(Return 10), Hardy’s plots, though specifically nonteleological, are fearfully purposive.  Gillian 
Beer described memorably the design of Hardy’s novels as “maligned and entrapping, 
because designed without the needs of the individual life in mind” (Darwin’s Plots 240).  The 
fear generated by this “entrapping” second nature, as Beer has suggested, is itself understood 
to be atavistic by Victorian sensibilities; like the processes of exclusion I have been 
discussing, fear too is an anthropological survival.  Fear and exclusion are symbiotic in 
Hardy, exclusion being at both the political and cognitive levels, a defensive, rationalizing 
response to fear.  
The narrator’s repudiation of Tess’s fears, then, should be read as indicative of the 
Victorian disavowal that Beer’s argument assumes; we might understand the narrative voice 
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as being at points the proxy of a Victorian sensibility, with its anxious need to maintain a 
certain cognitive stability and order.  However, the recurrent violence of Tess, beginning with 
Alec’s assault of Tess early in the novel, is finally incommensurate, Hardy tells us, with this 
“sense of order” (57).  “Tess’s own people,” Hardy tells us, “never tired of saying among 
each other in their fatalistic way: ‘It was to be’” (58).  Yet this primitive fatalism, Hardy 
wants to suggest, is little different from the secularized theodicies, that is, the “sense of 
order” that constitutes Victorian bourgeois self-understanding, and to which Hardy’s book is 
meant as a rebuke.  Like the superstitions and fatalisms of Hardy’s rustics, the illusion of 
man’s progressive arc is itself dependent on a perspective supported by exclusion and 
disavowal.  Finally the seminal difference may simply be one of proportion and perspective.  
In The Return of the Native, the heath dwellers ritually repudiate the “black chaos” of nature, 
with its “fiat” assuring “misery and death.”  By reducing “his daily life [to] a curious 
microscopic sort,” Clym attempts to emulate a similar epistemology of occlusion that, 
ultimately, is no longer available to him.  Conversely, modernity’s self-understanding 
attempts to render the “black chaos” of “misery and death” insignificant by altering the 
scale, that is, by substituting the immediacy of human suffering with an abstract 
conceptualization of historical amelioration.  It is only through the repudiation of nature’s 
inexorable dominance of humanity that this comforting mythology can be reinforced.   
Thus it is appropriate that Tess of the D’Urbervilles concludes with a stirring 
representation of violent exclusion and the repudiation that necessarily accompanies such 
violence in the world of the novel.  As in all of Hardy’s novels, in Tess violence both disrupts 
and maintains order.  While the violence that Hardy shows to be embedded in human 
relations is successfully repudiated through much of the novel, once this violence erupts 
materially in Tess’s murder of Alec, Tess’s world is no longer indifferent nor impersonal, but 
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persecutorial.  Tess and Angel themselves disclaim the facts of their plight, seeking in 
Bramhurst Court to attenuate existence and realize a protected space, “within [which] was 
affection, union, error forgiven” (308).  But nonetheless, “outside was the inexorable” (308).  
We soon discover that in response to Tess’s crime, “the whole country is reared” (312).   
That Tess’s transgression is principally a trespass against a rational “sense of order,” “to 
which man has long been accustomed,” rather than against one man, is apparent even in the 
gait of those men sent to capture her, who materialize as if from nature, but “walk as if 
trained” and who “close in” on Tess “with evident purpose” (312).  In their formalized 
propriety, as they wait for Tess to awaken, they conceal the violence inherent in “evident 
purpose.”  In their impersonality and distance, these men who pursue Tess, and who are 
ultimately her gravest enemies, are emblematic of her world’s disavowed violence. 
Consequently Tess’s captors, who might seem out of place among the pagan 
trilithons, are entirely commensurate with what Hardy presents as its perceived history.  As 
Tess lies on the pagan altar she asks Angel about the site’s prehistoric occupants: “Did they 
sacrifice to God here?”  Angel responds, “No”; he then qualifies, “I believe to the sun” 
(311).  Hardy is here obviously pointing to the ritualized character of Tess’s own imminent 
execution; again, we find that Hardy characterizes exclusionary violence as intrinsic to 
culture, primitive or modern.  However, the analogy begs us to provide an answer to Tess’s 
question: To whom, or what, is Tess herself to be sacrificed?  Though the anthropological 
significance of the pagan setting to the history of England and the fabric of the novel itself is 
indisputably important for Hardy, and is rich with potential interpretation, Angel Clare’s 
invocation of the sun as divinity surely alludes to Plato’s treatment of the sun in Republic, a 
work in which Plato explicitly posits exclusion as both a political and epistemological 
strategy.  As the Ur-trope of this Ur-text of the Western tradition, the Sun is at once the 
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Absolute Form of the Good and the ultimate symbol of human reason (and repression) 
through which lay the only avenue to the Absolute Good, or God.  In this sense, the sacred 
abstraction to which Tess is sacrificed is not nearly as new as it is very, very old.   Woman, 
Feeling, Nature—these metonyms of irrationality have long stood as impediments, as they 
do in Plato, to the provinces of truth, justice, and reason. 
Whatever abstraction is apotheosized by culture, be it God or Reason or Justice, its 
continuity depends both on the existence of, and thus the disavowal or exclusion of, 
whatever is incommensurate with it: this is itself a cycle, Hardy wants us to recognize, that is 
interminable.  For this reason, the novel ends not with Tess’s hanging per se, but with the 
disavowal of the fact of Tess’s killing and the initiation of a new cycle.  The entirety of the 
curt final chapter is delivered from a point of view that is distanced and pictorial; Angel and 
Liza-Lu are explicitly compared to “Giotto’s Two Apostles” as they climb “to the top of the 
great West Hill (313).  Here, again, Hardy emphasizes the importance of perspective and 
proportion.  From the “summit the prospect was almost unlimited,” providing a view of the 
city of Wintoncester and the surrounding landscape as “in an isometric drawing” (313).  So 
though distance provides a comprehensive view, the rationalized order presented, as if in an 
architectural rendering, is illusory precisely because it is dependent on a fixed and leveling 
position.  Because any situated perspective occludes even as it illuminates, from the hilltop 
we are provided a vision that otherwise, apparently, would not be possible: the prison, 
“contrasting greatly by its formalism with the quaint irregularities of the” rest of the city, 
“disguised from the road by yews and evergreen oaks,” “was visible enough” from the 
elevated perspective” (314).  
Excluded from view by the “wall of this structure,” as well as by the trees, the scene 
of Tess’s execution is well hidden, visible only at the great distance from which it cannot of 
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course be comprehended.   For though at the center of the scene, like a “blot on the city’s 
beauty” is the “ugly flat-topped octagonal tower” of the prison, the anomaly of the prison 
tower betrays none of the travesty committed within, and contained by its walls: 
Upon the cornice of the tower a tall staff was fixed. Their eyes were riveted on it.  A 
few minutes after the hour had struck something moved slowly up the staff, and 
extended itself upon the breeze.  It was a black flag.  “Justice” was done. (314) 
 
With quotation marks herding the word “Justice,” Hardy underscores his already quite clear 
ironic intent.  Hardy’s straightforward assertion that Tess’s death is something other than 
justice once again calls attention to the power of analogy.  Perhaps Hardy’s point is not 
simply that Tess’s execution should be called by another name, (for what is one to call it?).  
To assume that Hardy’s strategy demands that the absent tenor of his metaphor be the 
opposite of his vehicle is only to reinforce the rationality of the identity making process.  I 
think this is precisely the point: distinctions make all the difference in Tess.  Tess’s execution, 
endlessly obscured as it is, crystallizes the violent processes of rationalization and repudiation 
that Hardy sees as a hallmark of modernity.  With the repudiated violence of the novel’s 
conclusion, Tess again reproduces multiple processes of exclusion and deferral in an effort to 
reveal for the reader those regimes of disavowal inadequately masking the generalized 















In his indispensable The Fiction of Autobiography, Edward Said has argued for the 
presence of an essential epistemological insecurity in Joseph Conrad’s fiction, a basic 
question, according to Said, which “runs throughout his [Conrad’s] speculations”: “does the 
mind seek order or truth?” (112).  This fundamental cognitive impasse expresses itself in 
Conrad’s political ambivalences and is particularly significant to his The Secret Agent (1907), a 
novel focused, at least overtly, on anarchy of both the political and cosmic varieties.  For 
although the novel is populated by a “whole gang” of anarchists who would (could they only 
decide to) “make a clean sweep of the whole social creation,” anarchy in The Secret Agent is 
perhaps best understood as a chiefly private condition developing from a largely public 
absence of authority.2  Ironically, Conrad associates this absence of authority not only with 
the novel’s motley cast of “terrorists,” but principally with the developments of liberal 
democracy that are epitomized in the neutralized, and “denationalized” space of Conrad’s 
London (119).  By authority here I do not intend official political or juridical order, though 
certainly the power of the state does seem largely absent in the novel (when legal power does 
appear, say, in the persons of Inspector Heat or the Assistant Commissioner, that power is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Schmitt, Political Theology 13. 




privatized and thus rendered largely incoherent).  These sorts of organizing powers count for 
little when compared to the common ideational commitments that for Conrad create 
community bonds and thus produce the shared meaning that underwrites agency and 
responsibility.  Instead, missing in The Secret Agent is that authority deriving from a sense of 
affiliation, or that “national sentiment, the preservation of which,” Conrad once told 
Cunningham Graham, “is my concern” (G. Jean-Aubry 269) 
In the same letter to Graham, written not long after the publication of Heart of 
Darkness in 1899, Conrad expressed a complex vision of man’s political motivations: 
L'homme est un animal méchant. Sa mechanceté doit être organisée. La crime est 
une condition nécessaire de l'existence organisée. La société est essentiellement 
criminelle—ou elle n'existerait pas. C'est l'egoisme qui sauve tout—absolument 
tout—tout ce que nous abhorrons, tout ce que nous aimons.3 
 
Political organization is essentially “criminal,” for there would be no law, no need for 
centralization, were there no need to pen in man’s inherently “evil nature.”  “Egoism” for 
Conrad suggests the internal means by which the agent makes what is exterior to him 
conform to his beliefs, or the shared understanding of the group to which he is a partisan. 
Egoism is the principal of organization, a decisive impetus toward an idea that demands not 
mere “fraternity,” as Conrad writes in the same letter, but “abnegation” (G. Jean-Aubry 269). 
“Self-sacrifice means something,” for Conrad precisely because self-sacrifice creates meaning 
(G. Jean-Aubry 269).  As opposed to liberal cosmopolitanism’s sacralization of self-assertive 
individualism, for Conrad the cultivation of a national belief, and the commitment to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid 269. “Man is a wicked animal. His evil nature must be organized. Crime is a necessary 
condition of that organized existence.  Society is essentially criminal—otherwise it would not 
exist.  It is egoism that salvages everything—absolutely everything—all that we abhor as well 
as all that we love.” The translation is mine.  Lewis (and others) translate “suave” as 
“preserve”; I think “salvage” is more true to Conrad’s intent not only because salvage 
connotes rescue, but also because this translation captures the sense of futurity that the use 
of preserve does not, which has a more conservative and static connotation.   
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national idea in a sort of Burkean sense, mitigates the epistemological indeterminacy that he 
associated with liberal democracy, and which is expressed in every aspect of The Secret Agent.  
As Pericles Lewis has recently suggested, Conrad treated “faith in the nation-state as the 
necessary corollary of a belief in the fundamentally egoistic and individualistic character of 
human nature” (104).  The cultivation of national sentiment in this way poses a particular 
opportunity for salvaging the individual agent.   
However, viewed from this angle, Conrad’s negative anthropology (“L'homme est un 
animal méchant”) of a fallen humanity that can only be redeemed through its political 
organization (“Sa mechanceté doit être organisée”) takes on a distinctly theological aspect. 
That Conrad’s political speculations have theological underpinnings is perhaps not 
surprising, given that he was raised on the national messianism of Poland’s romantic 
literature.4  However, this feature of Conrad’s thinking becomes more complex, as I argue in 
the pages that follow, once we take into account his critique of political theology in The Secret 
Agent.  Conrad’s critical evaluation of the various political orientations in the novel, for all 
their putative differences, demonstrates their structural similarities.  For one, they are all 
eschatological.  “The will to use the means”—a central thematic of the novel—implies an 
end, and thus a telos (54).  Even the “sacrosanct fetish” of the middle classes—the faith in 
science—is understood progressively: “They believe that in some mysterious way science is 
at the source of their material prosperity” (27).  Additionally, each also depends on violence.  
Compassion for “humanity,” we find, is either immediately transformed into rage and blind 
violence, as with Stevie or anarchists like Karl Yundt, or violence becomes an instrument 
used to incite compassion and thereby engender more violence, as in the case of Vladimir 
and the Professor.  Karl Yundt, for example, dreams of “no pity for anything on earth, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Lester 4-17.   
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death enlisted for good and all in the service of humanity” (34). That the sentiments of this 
“moribund murderer” are expressed as parody, given the ironic economy of the novel, only 
makes their general applicability all the more telling.  The Secret Agent ultimately demonstrates 
the universal relevance of what Carl Schmitt called modernity’s “secret law,” whereby “the 
most terrible inhumanity [is] pursued only in the name of humanity” (Concept of the Political 
95). 
Though not overtly political in any specific or partisan sense, the absences of 
authority in the novel, including the absence of any centralized narrative authority, have 
distinct political expression.  Much of the difficulty of decoding that marks the novel has its 
origin in those conflicts of signification that are the hallmark of The Secret Agent’s narrative 
approach.  Conrad famously commented on the novel’s composition, writing that “the 
purely artistic purpose, that of applying an ironic method to a subject of that kind, was 
formulated with deliberation and in the earnest belief that ironic treatment alone would 
enable me to say all I felt I would have to say in scorn as well as in pity.”5  Hayden White has 
written of irony’s affinity with “the rhetorical figure of aporia,” which “could be considered 
the favored stylistic device of ironic language” (Metahistory 37).  Irony expresses a self-
conscious skepticism regarding language’s ability to express a thing or an idea other than in 
negative terms, that is, through the systematic negation of that thing or idea.  Paradoxically, 
then, the skepticism intrinsic to the ironic method is precisely what is required of 
representation made, as Conrad said, in “earnest belief.”  The narrator’s constant 
modulations between concepts and their negations makes it difficult to imagine a point from 
which fixed meaning might be created in the novel, and in this way the novel reproduces the 
very epistemological dilemmas that it attempts to illuminate.  It is by way of cognitive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Conrad, “1920 Author’s Note,” The Secret Agent 251 
	  	  
117	  
impasses and aporiae that The Secret Agent seeks to represent the incoherencies and general 
indecisiveness of the liberal democracy with which the novel contends.   
From The Secret Agent’s indeterminate narrative position the crises of political 
liberalism play out in the confusion, fear, and repressed violence that permeates 
democratically, one might say, this novel without a protagonist.  Conrad has said of the 
democratic ideal, that it is a “beautiful phantom,” an “illusion which imposes by its size 
alone” (Jean-Aubry 269).  The problems of imposing scale and formlessness that here are 
characteristic of democracy for Conrad recur as a striking motif of The Secret Agent.  As was 
the case for his near contemporary Carl Schmitt, Conrad understood the democratic ideal as 
intrinsically and inherently opposed to authority; liberal democracy lacks the sovereign center 
from which political identity derives.  Democracy and its early twentieth-century iteration, 
cosmopolitanism, present to their constituency—humanity as a totality—loyalties that are so 
attenuated as to be almost nonexistent.  In this way liberal democracy is associated in the 
novel with the demise of forms of affiliation that produce concrete connections and thus 
stable identities—organizing principles that are obviously lacking in The Secret Agent.  The 
novel is Conrad’s most developed and explicit treatment of the phenomenon that in my last 
chapter on Thomas Hardy I have called the neutralization of affiliation.  Rather than the 
consensual, shared understandings that putatively sustain liberalism, The Secret Agent presents 
a social milieu characterized by private interests, mistrust, and secret conflict, in other words, 
a world commensurate with what Carl Schmitt calls political romanticism, the salient figure 
in which is the “solitary individual, whose absolute stance toward himself gives a world in 
which nothing is connected to anything else.”6  Conrad’s own understanding of the cultural 
crisis facing England at the turn of the twentieth century presages Carl Schmitt’s trenchant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Tracy B. Strong, “Foreword,” The Concept of the Political xv. 
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criticisms of liberalism generated barely fifteen years after the publication of The Secret Agent.  
Yet, The Secret Agent enfolds into its critique of liberal democracy and the liberal legitimation 
crisis it depicts a prescient awareness of the dangers of the national faith that the novel at the 
same time recommends as ameliorative.  Out of Conrad’s negative formal method comes 
not only a parody of the liberal irresolution epitomized in his portrayal of English society, 
nor merely a critique of the generalized but disavowed violence inherent in the democratic 
idea; Conrad’s novel ultimately also delivers a scathing appraisal of the sovereign exception, 
“the will to use the means” that Carl Schmitt understood as the only means by which the 
instabilities and indecision of liberal democracy could be resolved.   
  
 
Neutralization and Disaffiliation 
 
Conrad addresses the failures of liberalism in terms that, prior to Carl Schmitt, are 
frankly Schmittian.  His Heart of Darkness, for example, had illustrated precisely Schmitt’s 
assertion that “the concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of 
imperialist expansion” (Concept of the Political 54).  Similarly Conrad demonstrates in The Secret 
Agent that violence and the cruelty inhere, even flourish, in the sacred egalitarian ideals of 
cosmopolitan humanism.  Conrad understood that the concept of humanity excludes the 
idea of the friend precisely because in its essence the concept of humanity seeks to neutralize 
identity, which it does, according to Schmitt, by excluding “the concept of the enemy” 
(Concept of the Political 54).  For this reason, humanity is not a political concept; its political 
content is neutralized by its essential negation of the friend/enemy antithesis.  Once the 
concept is essentially neutralized, it can be appropriated and used parasitically by whatever 
interest makes claim to it.  In The Secret Agent Conrad is concerned that precisely in the 
absence of concrete affiliations capable of providing political identity, that is, in a world of 
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neutralized affiliations, it is enmity that becomes universalized, and not a beneficent 
cosmopolitan sense of humanity.    
In Conrad’s only London-centered novel, there exists no palpable, shared public 
organization capable of producing meanings that can then be translated into private truths 
and thereby become the impetus for political belief.  When at one point the Assistant 
Commissioner visits an “Italian restaurant,” for instance, he finds that its constituency is 
“unstamped” and “denationalized” (119).  But even very early on in the novel we see this 
absence of sharable meanings reflected in the novel’s setting, which itself seems incapable of 
producing cogent and shareable meaning: 
With a turn to the left Mr. Verloc pursued his way along a narrow street by the side 
of a yellow wall which, for some inscrutable reason, had No. I Chesham written on it 
in black letters.  Chesham Square was at least sixty yards away, and Mr. Verloc, 
cosmopolitan enough not to be deceived by London’s topographical mysteries, held 
on steadily, without a surprise or indignation.  At last, with business like persistency, 
he reached the Square, and made diagonally for number 10.  This belonged to an 
imposing carriage gate in a high, clean wall between two houses, of which one 
rationally enough bore number 9 and the other was numbered 37; but the fact that 
this last belonged to Porthill Street, a street well known in the neighborhood, was 
proclaimed by an inscription placed above the ground floor window by whatever 
highly efficient authority is charged with the duty of keeping track of London’s 
strayed houses. (12) 
 
We see that the world of The Secret Agent exists beyond the limits of consensus, and thus 
irresolution is reflected in the metropolitan landscape itself.  Moreover, indecision is here 
linked explicitly to the failures of bureaucracy and parliamentary procedure.  A rather light-
hearted, Dickensian irony (reminiscent of Dickens’s endless critique of the Circumlocution 
Office in Little Dorrit) recommends that whatever “highly efficient authority” has failed, this 
lapse ought to be remedied “by Parliament,” “(a short act would do)”; just why the failure 
has not been remedied “is one of the mysteries of Municipal administration” (12).  Though 
Conrad will continue to take ironic aim at parliamentary indecisiveness throughout the novel, 
the passage here subtly introduces concerns of a more immediate and, as it were, existential 
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variety.  A surfeit of external markers notwithstanding, public signs generate no viable 
meanings, marking an absence that suggests a central problem of the novel: the challenge of 
deciphering, and thus of inducing order from an array of disjoined signs and actions.7  
However ironically intended, the “cosmopolitan” Verloc is a sort of cipher, the “celebrated 
agent  ∆” (appropriately, “delta” is the mathematical symbol for flux, or change—or 
indecision) (22).  Thus like Verloc himself, who “in his general get-up might have been 
anything from a picture-frame maker to a locksmith,” Conrad’s London exudes a “moral 
nihilism,” a general devaluation or absence of meaning where meaning ought to exist (11).  
In this way the novel’s setting reproduces the ironic operations of the novel itself, which 
proceeds through a logic of negation, continuously gesturing toward not merely the absence 
of authority, but also to the persistence of suffering that characterizes a highly rationalized 
society.  The style of the novel itself suggests the vacillation and indeterminacy that Conrad 
associates with liberal society.  The Secret Agent, like the London it depicts, is a “cruel 
devourer of light”; in its penchant for deferral and persistent irony, the novel reflects the 
fearful indecision of the liberal democracy it depicts.  
Verloc is “cosmopolitan enough,” however, not to be “deceived” by London’s 
confused topography; instead he is forced into a synergy with its irrational organization and 
“inscrutable reasons.”   In doing so Verloc only reproduces the logic of the environment of 
which he is a part, which “could with every propriety be described as private.” And like all 
the characters in The Secret Agent, Verloc devises a cognitive means of navigating the 
“inscrutable” logic of the world around him, one that is not available to the reader: he “did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Charles Jones writes, “much of the novel’s strength and attractiveness lies in the shifting of 
the reader’s viewpoint brought about by his uncertainty of the nature of the linguistic data 
confronting him—i.e., whether it represents the author’s narration, a particular character’s 
direct or reported utterance, or a mixture of all three.” Quoted in Hawthorn, 43.   
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not trouble his head about it” (12).  Verloc is “cosmopolitan enough,” sufficiently 
accustomed to confusions, to disclaim his association with it.  This propensity for privacy 
and disavowal in The Secret Agent is born of forms of fear.  On the one hand, there exists a 
fear of knowing and feeling; there is a tendency to disavow or refute rather than decode the 
data with which one is confronted.  Exemplary here is Winnie’s “philosophy,” which 
“consisted in not taking notice of the inside of facts,” or Sir Ethelred’s mantra, “only no 
details, pray” (123, 109).  On the other hand, fear besets those who are confronted by the 
disorder and absences of meaning that Conrad’s characters seem to share sympathetically 
with their surroundings.  For instance Verloc is “mute and hopelessly inert in his fear of 
darkness” (49).   
He leaned his forehead against the cold window-pane—a fragile film of glass 
stretched between him and the enormity of cold, black, wet, muddy, inhospitable 
accumulation of bricks, slates, and stones, things in themselves unlovely and 
unfriendly to man.  Mr. Verloc felt the latent unfriendliness of all out of doors with a 
force approaching a positive bodily anguish. (45)   
 
Verloc’s lack of inertia is symptomatic of the general torpor and inactivity of the novel, in 
which very little actually happens.  The sublime “accumulation,” characterized here by a 
catalogue of compounded adjectives, disjointed from their nouns, signifies Verloc’s inability 
to formalize “the enormity” of the confusion that confronts him.  The terror induced by 
what exceeds the mind’s organizing capacity is recursive in the novel, for example in the 
existential “nausea” that is Inspector Heat’s visceral response to the “nameless heap of 
fragments” formally known as Stevie or in the Professor’s deep fear of “the immense 
multitude” of mankind” (70; 65). Constellations of fear in The Secret Agent originate from the 
epistemological insecurities notable even in the physical appearances of its constituency.    
In its negative purposiveness, Conrad’s London expresses a hidden knot of forces 
and agencies that exceed the ken of man.  And this incomprehensibility is mirrored in the 
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cultivated anonymity of the populace.  Opacity in The Secret Agent derives from an apparent 
overabundance of external characteristics, a sort of masking mechanism that reflects only 
surface, never offering depth.  Thus the Assistant Commissioner finds that like “little Italian 
restaurant’s” “fraudulent cookery,” “the patrons of the place had [also] lost all of their 
national and private characteristics” (118).  “These people,” the Assistant Commissioner 
observes of the restaurant patrons,  
were as denationalized as the dishes set before them with every circumstance of 
unstamped respectability.  Neither was their personality stamped in any way, 
professionally, socially or racially.  They seemed created for the Italian restaurant, 
unless the Italian restaurant had perchance been created for them.  But the last 
hypothesis was unthinkable, since one could not place them anywhere outside those 
special circumstances. (118-119) 
 
The Assistant Commissioner hardly experiences here “that remarkable confidence in 
anonymity,” which Benedict Anderson has said, “is the hallmark of the modern nation.”8  
Indeed he seems rather frustrated, even repulsed.  The Assistant Commissioner’s 
“considerable gifts for the detection of incriminating truth” notwithstanding, his “peculiar 
instinct,” can make out nothing of the indiscriminate cosmopolitan mass that surrounds him 
(94).  The important scene at the Italian restaurant exposes both the difficulties of 
identification in a postnational milieu, that is, the limitations on the processes of recognition 
and reciprocity on which identity construction depends and the mildly threatening forms of 
liberation that are the result of these limitations:  “It was impossible to form a precise idea of 
what occupations they [the restaurant patrons] followed by day and where they went to bed 
at night.  And he himself had become unplaced.  It would have been impossible for anybody 
to guess his occupation” (119).  Significantly, the Assistant Commissioner’s own cultivated 
anonymity is a product, a reflection, of the anonymity of his surroundings: reciprocity is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Benedict Anderson 36.   
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curtailed, leaving “personality unstamped.”  As in the passage I described at the beginning of 
this section, in which Verloc is seen to operate on the terms of his surroundings, the 
Assistant Commissioner also complies with his environment.  Earlier described as “a square 
peg forced into a round hole,” the Assistant Commissioner too begins to loose his “sharply 
angular shape” (91).  The Assistant Commissioner is subsumed by the denationalized mass: 
because reciprocity is curtailed, identification is short-circuited, and an amorphous 
impersonality propagates like a contagion.  The Assistant Commissioner, catching his 
reflection “on the sheet of glass” is thus himself “struck by his foreign appearance” (118).   
  Described as appearing “foreign” at several points in the novel, the Assistant 
Commissioner is in this way identified with his quarry, the agents of continental 
governments and “foreign embassies.”  On the one hand, this is exemplary of how the novel 
exhibits, as A. Michael Matin has shown, a distinct anxiety about the threat of invasion, 
which is linked overtly with its concerns regarding English denationalization.9  On the other 
hand, this apparent manifestation of Conrad’s negative method in the novel seems to put the 
Assistant Commissioner under a state of erasure, of nonidentity.  Conrad’s destabilization of 
the Assistant Commissioner’s generic position in the novel is exemplary of how The Secret 
Agent resists the formal structure provided by the moral and legal juxtaposition of what is 
lawful and criminal.10  In fact quite the opposite is true; this sort of order escapes the 
egalitarian world that is Conrad’s subject in the novel.  One of the principal structural ironies 
of the novel, what Cedric Watts has called its ruling “covert plot” (34), is that the methods 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 A. Michael Matin, “’We Aren’t German Slaves Here, Thank God’: Conrad’s Transposed 
Nationalism and the British Literature of Espionage and Invasion,” Journal of Modern 
Literature 21. 2 (1998): 251-280. 
10 This is entirely appropriate to what we might understand as Conrad’s homage to the 
Victorian detective story.  Here is no extrarational Holmes, or even an Inspector Bucket, to 
anchor the narrative in the stabilizing Victorian conventionalities of its author. 
	  	  
124	  
of the anarchists who oppose the liberal state, and the authorities that ostensibly work to 
protect the liberal state, are not only “counter moves in the same game,” as the Professor 
elaborates, but “at bottom identical” (56).  The putative opposition of crime and legalism 
represents a synergy of interests that proves the sine qua non of their respective existences.  
Yet by demonstrating them to be structurally the same the novel deconstructs this 
opposition and thus emphasizes that in the neutralized world of The Secret Agent, one cannot 
really tell friend from enemy.   
 
 
(In)decision and the Temporal Demiurge 
 
Conrad’s allegorical London is exemplary of what Carl Schmitt called depoliticized 
society.  For Schmitt, depoliticization is not merely analogous with, but actually a special sort 
of anarchy: a state of internal disorder growing out of the absence left behind as one form of 
political order is displaced by another: “in the dialectic of such a development one creates a 
new domain of struggle precisely through the shifting of the central domain” of conflict and 
struggle (Concept of the Political 50).  In Conrad’s The Nigger of the ‘Narcissus,’ the becalmed 
Narcissus exemplifies depoliticization precisely: in this national allegory, the need to protect 
the Narcissus and combat the sea creates a centripetal energy capable of producing forms of 
heroism among the crew, but once the loyalty-inducing crises fades, the crew becomes 
“over-civilized” and riven by the divergent interests threatening to destroy the ship.  The 
world of The Secret Agent is very much an extension of this concept for Conrad; intriguingly it 
is to the capital of English homeland itself where the national ideal comes to die.  The 
depoliticized space, particularly as it is back-filled by the “so-called politically neutral 
economic domain,” is marked by “possessive individualism” in which the agent “acts as an 
individual against the totality”: “He is a man who finds his compensation for his political 
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nullity in the fruits of freedom and enrichment and above all in the total security of its use.  
Consequently he wants to be spared bravery and exempted from the danger of a violent 
death” (Concept of the Political 63). This gives a fair description, I think, of the bourgeois 
sensibility that is in many ways the subject of Conrad’s novel.  This situation is exemplified 
not only by its amplification of private interests, but also by a generalized propensity toward 
conflict.  For “at the very centre of the Empire on which the Sun never sets,” as Conrad 
describes London in the novel, if human relations have not actually regressed to a “war of all 
against all,” they are nonetheless epitomized by enmity and mistrust.  
Conrad’s vision of the merits of affiliation exists always within the flux of moral 
paradox forced upon his personalities by the novelistic circumstances to which they are 
subjected.  At the end of Lord Jim, for example, Marlow wonders hopefully, “whether at the 
last he [Jim] had confessed to a faith mightier than the laws of order and progress” (201).  
For Avrom Fleischman, Jim’s evidently cowed submission to Doramin is an act of self-
sacrifice that transcends “the particular historical context” allied with “the meliorist ideal of 
Western civilization”; instead the act speaks of a “genuine social community” and shows that 
a “commitment to social progress allows the individual to discover himself in the community 
formed or improved by his efforts” (111).  Fleischman’s reading, however, seems to too 
readily make Conrad’s novel amenable to a scenario in which not only self-sacrifice, but also 
atavistic violence is politically ameliorative.  Though Conrad surely offers this possibility in 
the events of Jim’s death, I am given to approaching Conrad’s indeterminacies always with a 
sense of the negation embedded in his greater ironies.  After all, Marlow’s dictum, “I affirm 
nothing,” can be given either a diffuse or a definitively negative reading.  The Patusani 
community’s demand for Jim’s life is simply too disturbing an event of the novel and the 
ritual scapegoat a far too familiar political theological concept to give in completely to 
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Fleischman’s reading.  Conrad never provides a possible resolution without also offering the 
negation of that possibility, and the end of Lord Jim is exemplary in this sense. Thus I am 
more comfortable with J. Hillis Miller’s claim that Lord Jim, “has no visible thematic or 
structuring principle which will allow the reader to find its secret…untie its knots and 
straighten its threads” (Fiction and Repetition 25).  Miller’s reading is particularly true of the 
novel’s ending, where even the violent decision breeds indecision and is thus unable to 
provide the aesthetic closure that both Marlow and the reader seek.  
Nonetheless, the problem of accountability, of taking responsibility, is a central one 
in Conrad.  Lord Jim, for example, goes well beyond a juridical conceptualization of 
responsibility, which the novel sloughs off with its early, official inquest of Jim.  Geoffrey 
Harpham has written that Conrad’s novels are structured, “in a way essentially repugnant to 
the juridical mind, around a principle of negation that is not simply the other side of a 
positive center, but the center itself” (59).  Certainly this is true of The Secret Agent, a world in 
which the will formation of the populace itself is meant to produce authority, but in which 
instead the centrifugal energies of divergent human interests attest to a vacuous lack of 
central authority.  Decisions, when they do happen in The Secret Agent, never penetrate the 
surface, so to speak; actions in the novel seem only to proceed from individual cognitive and 
conative necessity.  Likewise legality and responsibility are always viewed, in The Secret Agent, 
through the prism of instrumentality and private interests. For all its putative emphasis on 
crime and the detection of crime, in The Secret Agent legalism is approached only marginally, 
and then only through the purposeful confusion created by the novel’s ironic presentation of 
persons and events, and their mutual indecision.  
The outstanding attribute of Conrad’s middle classes is their lack of commitment and 
belief, and thus, for Conrad, their limited character.  The Professor, though a miserable, 
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atrophied human being by any measure, true to the logic of Conrad’s narrative, is 
nonetheless a man of some (albeit insane) character: “In the last instance it is character alone 
that makes for one’s safety…There are few people in the world whose character is as well 
established as my own” (54).  Given the narrator’s merciless treatment of “this obviously 
miserable organism,” we are tempted to think that the power the Professor feels vested in 
his “force of personality” is merely a delusion of grandeur (which it surely is, but that is not 
all it is), yet his encounter with Inspector Heat will nonetheless demonstrate that there is an 
extrinsic, operative authority to the Professor, which derives precisely from the arbitrary 
violence he symbolizes (54).  For the Professor knowledge is power, in that if his enemy is 
aware of his violence, then he has power over that enemy (conversely, this is why he fears 
the masses—because they do not know enough to fear him).  Consequently, when and 
where it counts, he finds “effective” the “belief those people have in my will to use the 
means” (54).   
They depend on life, which, in this connection, is a historical fact surrounded by all 
sorts of restraints and considerations, a complex organized fact open to attack at 
every point; whereas I depend on death, which knows no restraint and cannot be 
attacked.  My superiority is evident. (55) 
 
Because the Professor depends on death, and not on life, he views himself as outside of the 
conventional order; the Professor, like the sovereign exception, is “not subsumable” to the 
norm.  Heat describes “the anarchists” as “no class—no class at all,” but his qualitative slight 
registers also as an inability to classify, or categorize, the anarchists, and most especially the 
Professor.  Nonetheless, though he is extrinsic to the normative order, through a sort of 
negative power, his very existence induces a type of norm.  This is most clear in the 
Professor’s opposition to Inspector Heat, who tells the anarchist: “If I were to lay hands on 
you now, I would be no better than yourself” (76).  In a moment of supreme irony, we find 
that the Professor, the “perfect anarchist,” is the exception.  Thus the one whose existence is 
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dedicated to the destruction of order and is devoted to destroying any centralized authority 
has assumed the role of sovereign for himself.  At least in his mind, it is he, the Professor, 
who decides.  So paradoxically he is precisely what he himself seeks to eradicate.  He has said 
he does not play the “game” (56, 76), but the Professor surely does, and his gambit is that by 
being the exception, he hopes to induce the state of exception. 
The Professor, like the other anarchists the novel parodies, is only a more extreme 
example of the generally deformed humanity that issues from the society Conrad presents in 
the novel, a fact evident in the stunted moral capacity of all the novel’s characters.  Son of a 
“delicate dark enthusiast with a sloping forehead” (thus by Ossipon’s Lambrosian calculus, 
the Professor’s father ranks as yet another of the novels “degenerates”) who had been “an 
itinerant and rousing preacher of some obscure but rigid Christian sect,” “science” had for 
the Professor “replaced thoroughly the faith of conventicles, this moral attitude translated 
itself into a frenzied puritanism of ambition” (64).  The Professor’s “ambition” is “secularly 
holy,” a political theological “creed” (65).  Once “thwarted,” this ambition becomes a 
seething and purposeful ressentiment toward a social order “whose morality was artificial, 
corrupt and blasphemous” (64).  Yet by demonstrating that he depends on the narrative of 
“the weak, whose theology has invented hell for the strong” (meaning, of course, the 
Professor), he shows himself as structurally identical to the middle classes who he despises.  
In his unbending desire to “destroy public faith in legality” and shatter “the framework of an 
established social order” (the very same social order from which he of course is the issue), 
the Professor again demonstrates the eschatology form which he derives meaning. 
At the beginning of Chapter 5 the Professor exits the Silenus ruminating on the 
failure of the Greenwich bomb plot: 
It was vain to pretend to himself he wasn’t disappointed.  But that was a mere 
feeling; the stoicism of his thought could not be disturbed by this or any other 
	  	  
129	  
failure.  Next time, or the time after next, a telling stroke would be delivered—
something really startling—a blow fit to open the first crack in the imposing front of 
the great edifice of legal conceptions sheltering the atrocious injustice of society. (64)  
 
Like Mr. Vladimir, who is attempting through violence to induce a “cure” for England’s 
“sentimental regard for individual liberty” (20-21), the professor waits for that one decisive 
action.  So, too, does the reader: the passage is exemplary of the manner in which the 
narrator’s perspective integrates with those consciousnesses it observes, presenting the 
reader with an often challenging interpretive situation—with interpretive indecision, as it 
were.  Jeremy Hawthorn, however, dissents: “at the same time we think and experience with 
the Professor, we also inspect his beliefs with disdain and contempt”; the novel combines 
“extreme flexibility and mobility of perspective with consistency of moral, ideological, and 
political viewpoint”; thus “we are never confused by the shifts in narrative” (43).  For 
Hawthorn, apparently, Conrad’s narrative method is bent on producing consensus though a 
centralized authority, just like the liberal ideology it parodies.  Still, given the passage in 
question, and the procedures of the novel more generally, I find Hawthorn’s assessment 
unconvincing.  While not exhibiting the radical inconsistencies of person the reader 
experiences, for example, in The Nigger of the Narcissus, the narrator of The Secret Agent does 
exhibit enough inconsistency of personality, as Jakob Lothe has shown, that the reader must 
consider his viewpoint as always suspect, as subject to the same fluctuations of psychology 
and perception as those characters the narrator himself presents to the reader.11  So while on 
the one hand it is clear that we are meant to find laughable the Professor’s faith in 
anarchism’s ability to affect the “edifice of legal conceptions,” and certainly deride his 
means, it is far from a ridiculous notion that legal conceptions shelter “the atrocious injustice 
of society.”  In fact, the synergy of putatively opposed concepts like justice and injustice is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Loethe 253-259 
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one of many unresolvable contradictions from which the novel derives its ironic energy.    
Appropriate to the commitment to individualism that is the essence of liberal society, 
Conrad’s middle classes do not fear for anything; they lack, unlike the Professor for example, 
any idea of “transcendental” significance, a commitment to which, along with “force of 
personality,” provides “character” (54-55).  Along with its “absurd” and “sentimental regard 
for individual liberty,” Vladimir had characterized England as above all secular: its 
“sacrosanct fetish is science.”  However, Vladimir’s phrasing paradoxically portrays science 
in terms of religious devotion; a sort of faith in the absence of faith.  This new secular 
religion, however, clearly does more harm than good in the novel—and the Professor’s 
fanaticism is exemplary of religious fervor transformed by science.  The Professor is typified 
by his deep faith in a sort of insane, anarchic messianism; however, the “coming,” as it were, 
of a new historical moment “of madness and despair” (244) hinges on the violent decision, a 
“telling stroke” that the Professor ironically cannot seem to make for himself.  He consoles 
himself in precisely the same manner as those whom he despises and awaits the “next time, 
or the time after next.”  For though the Professor dismisses Ossipon and the other 
“revolutionists” as mere “slaves of the social condition,” and thus of one piece with the 
society they ostensibly wish to destroy, we see that the Professor is also a slave.  Within the 
ironic economy of Conrad’s novel, the progressive logic of the Professor’s madness is 
organized by a sort of corrupt rationality, clearly also a product of the “madness and 
despair” that is the here and now of liberal society.  Thus the Professor’s eschatological bent 
parodies both the rational teleology of an earlier Victorian historical self-understanding (such 
as the one epitomized by Inspector Heat) as well as those loosely Marxist revolutionaries 
who, like Karl Yundt and Michaelis, are not men “of action,” but instead also wait for 
“something conclusive” (55).  As with the Professor, the theological character of their 
	  	  
131	  
politics is clear: Michaelis, “made again the confession of his faith, mastering him irresistible 
and complete like an act of grace: the secret of fate discovered in the material side of life; the 
economic condition of the world responsible for the past and shaping the future; the source 
of all history, of all ideas” (36).     
Conrad extends his critique of political theological eschatology and the historical 
self-understanding that undergirds it to the function of time in several specific instances of 
indecision and temporal deferral.  For example, told of the explosives the Professor always 
carries on his person, Comrade Ossipon seeks assurance that the detonator is 
“instantaneous, of course?” 
“Far from it,” confessed the other, with a reluctance which seemed to twist his 
mouth dolorously.  “A full twenty seconds must elapse from the moment I press the 
ball till the explosion takes place.” 
“Phew!” Whistled Ossipon, completely appalled.  “Twenty seconds!  Horrors!  You 
mean to say you could face that?  I should go crazy—” (53) 
 
Bemused by his response, the Professor criticizes Ossipon for his evident allergy to 
resolution: “You see, you can’t even bear the mention of something conclusive” (55).  Yet 
from the dolorous “twist” of the Professor’s expression, it is quite clear that he too 
recognizes that irresolution is “the weak point of this special system” (53).  The detonator, 
the symbolic instrument of exceptional violence, is itself marred by indecision.  Even at the 
most minute level, the anarchist is subject to the mechanical order of the device, and the 
organizing principles of what the narrator will a few moments later refer to as “the vulgar 
conception” of time (70).  Having rejected religion, we see that the Professor is still waiting 
for science to deliver on its promise.  In his efforts to solve this problem, the “perfect 
anarchist” falls more deeply into an eschatological orientation, which in the Professor’s 
speech takes the shape of a twisted perfectionist teleology: the Professor seeks relief in the 
“perfect detonator,” a “variable and yet perfectly precise mechanism…a really intelligent 
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detonator” (54-55).  Paradoxically, in his desire to overcome the ordering principle of time, 
the Professor, like everyone else in the novel, is left needing more time: “But the time! The 
Time! Give me time!” (240).  
 
Insight and (In)decision 
 
Within the complex symbolic economy of Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent, the loss 
of identity is associated with either a sense of freedom, as in the case of the Assistant 
Commissioner, or more generally with the terror of death.  The novel dramatizes the erasure 
of identity as the (often violent) interpenetration of materials animate and inanimate, the 
most stirring example of which is Inspector Heat’s postmortem inspection of Stevie’s 
remains.  Viewing the “heap of nameless fragments,” which had just been cleaned from the 
street, Inspector Heat notes: “’You used a shovel,’ observing a sprinkling of small gravel, tiny 
brown bits of bark, and particles of splintered wood as fine as needles (70).  Heat’s detached 
reflection demonstrates the Inspector’s rationalism and professional powers of induction; 
however, the gruesome evidence of physical obliteration nonetheless elicits a profound 
horror that threatens Heat’s practiced decorum: 
The Chief Inspector, stooping guardedly over the table, fought down the unpleasant 
sensation in his throat.  The shattering violence of destruction which had made of 
that body a heap of nameless fragments affected his feelings with a sense of ruthless 
cruelty, though his reason told him the effect must have been as swift as a flash of 
lightning.  The man, whoever he was, had died instantaneously; and yet it seemed 
impossible to believe that a human body could have reached that state of 
disintegration without passing though pangs of inconceivable agony.  No 
physiologist, and still less of a metaphysician, Chief Inspector Heat rose by the force 
of sympathy, which is a form of fear, above the vulgar conception of time.  
Instantaneous! (70) 
 
Because of Conrad’s penchant for what Ian Watt has called “delayed decoding,” neither 
Heat nor the reader (though we may suspect it) yet knows the identity of the ill-fated 
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bomber: he is in fact a “heap of nameless fragments.”12  The nausea and horror that 
overwhelms Heat is a product of sympathy, a “form of fear” in Conrad because, as in Adam 
Smith’s classic writings on the moral sentiments, one’s sense of the other is inextricably tied 
to one’s sense of self and the human impetus toward self-preservation.13  Sympathy in 
Conrad is a distinct form of vanity, a concept that has complex and contradictory 
implications for the modes of moral agency he presents in his fiction.  Sympathy is the 
product of an imaginative recourse to our own experience made possible through processes 
of identification, i.e., sympathy is a feeling dependent on what we know of joy or pain; 
consequently sympathy has always a second-order relation to the suffering of the other. 
“Though our brother is upon the rack,” Smith writes famously, “our sense will never inform 
us of what he suffers.”14  Ironically, however, Heat finds himself entered into the processes 
of identification with the heap of human remains before him, which reflects the unwonted 
knowledge of his own fragility.  The sublimity with which “the shattering violence of 
destruction” confronts Heat’s imagination, though briefly muted by his professional 
detachment, is nonetheless quite enough to affect “his feelings with a sense of ruthless 
cruelty.”   
However, if Heat’s sympathetic response begins as a reaction to the immediate and 
very particular instance of death by which he is confronted here, his sense of its significance 
rapidly becomes abstract and universalized: “The shattering violence of destruction which 
had made of that body a heap of nameless fragments affected his feelings with a sense of 
ruthless cruelty, though his reason told him the effect must have been as swift as a flash of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For Watt on delayed decoding, see Conrad in the Nineteenth Century 169. 
13 “It is from this very illusion of our imagination, that the foresight of our own dissolution is 
so terrible to us, which can undoubtedly give us no pain when we are dead, makes us 
miserable when we are alive.”  Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 18. 
14 Ibid 13. 
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lightning.”  This transition toward the general significance of the event is aided by the 
absence of a particular identity; the “heap of nameless fragments,” mingling with the 
inanimate material as it does, indicates something more universal about human susceptibility 
to pain and suffering.  Like the immediate object of “destruction” lying before Heat, the 
source of “ruthlessness and cruelty” is also unknown.  The first clause of the sentence is 
grammatically unclear (“ruthlessness and cruelty” modifies Heat’s “feelings”—his “sense” of 
the equally vague and autonomous “shattering violence” that ultimately acts as the agent of 
the sentence) and leaves no definite sense of the origin of such violence.  Moreover, the 
gerund “shattering,” though primarily adjectival, nonetheless lends a progressive, ineluctable 
feel to the violence that has thrust itself upon Heat’s consciousness.  
Heat intimates a systemic or cosmological sense of terror and violence.  For while in 
point of fact the “destruction,” as we know, is the product of the Professor’s violent 
alchemy, Stevie’s misstep suggests humanity’s vulnerability to, rather than its control of, the 
destructive element in nature.  Inspector Heat’s aesthetic revulsion registers this universal 
sense even as he views the particular, immediate evidence of a violent and diremptive loss of 
identity that, ostensibly, has no significance.  Indeed the “stolid” constable’s eyewitness 
account of the explosion, “like a heavy flash of lightning in the fog,” recalls another moment 
in Conrad, namely Marlow’s description in Heart of Darkness of the nearly two thousand years 
of British history: “like a flash of lightning in the clouds.  We live in the flicker.” (3).  To 
Inspector Heat, whose “mind was inaccessible to ideas of revolt,” this intimation of the 
disorder existing beyond the assumed progressive order that an historical consciousness 
impresses on the natural world would be nothing short of vertiginous.  Yet countering the 
dizzying sense of what Ian Watt called Conrad’s “astrophysical pessimism,” reason comes to 
Heat’s aid: “reason told him [Inspector Heat] the effect must have been as swift as a flash of 
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lightning” (153).  Heat conceptualizes the event in the same manner as the constable, but 
here to obviate the need for sympathy by encasing apparent “agony” in divisions of time so 
infinitesimal that they escape the human mind’s power to register that agony: 
“Instantaneous!”  This is the second clause of the sentence, the first describing Heat’s 
horror.  The proximity of the two clauses, and their sequencing, gestures grammatically to 
the dialectical immediacy with which reason, as a cognitive response to what exceeds the 
mind’s powers of comprehension, attempts to give form to the unformed—to preempt 
chaos by inducing order.  Heat is confronted by an overwhelming sense of what exceeds the 
mind’s categorical impulses; he is faced with that problem of scale, which as we have seen, 
recurs throughout the novel.  Sympathy and its near relation fear momentarily threaten the 
rational coping mechanisms that work to quell the terror of violent death.  Significantly, 
“reason” and “the vulgar conception of time” are precisely the concepts symbolically yoked 
together by Conrad in core intrigue of the novel, the plot to blow up the Greenwich 
Observatory.  After all, the point of the bombing, in the words of Mr. Vladimir, has been 
“having a go at astronomy” (27).  Time throughout the novel is understood as an extension 
of reason and its categorizing impulse, and here again time is the means by which Heat’s 
mind seeks to structure and overcome his overwhelming sense of suffering and extant 
“agony.”   
But reason seems insufficient to the task at hand: A self-reflexive scoff accompanies 
Heat’s exclamatory “Instantaneous!”  Not the narrator’s, but rather Heat’s description, the 
irony here registers the inadequacy of the characterization, the self-conscious negation of the 
expression’s usefulness.  The negation is followed immediately, filled in, as it were, by 
terrifying reflection; Heat “remembered all he had ever read in popular publications of long 
terrifying dreams dreamed in the instant of waking; of the whole past lived with frightful 
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intensity by a drowning man as his doomed head bobs up, streaming, for the last time” (70).  
Heat exhibits the terror that The Secret Agent repeatedly associates with the decision, that is, 
the fear of anything final or “conclusive.”  For the introduction of the adjective, 
“instantaneous” recalls the earlier interchange between Ossipon and the Professor at the 
Silenus.  Like Ossipon and even the Professor, Heat is forced to acknowledge both the 
mind’s palliative impulse and the horror masked by that impulse.  No “vulgar” sense of time 
can allay the affect of what Heat’s senses divulge to his consciousness as an immediate form 
of truth.  So while the expression “Instantaneous!” is Heat’s narrated thought, the 
description of the emotional impetus for that expression, “Chief Inspector Heat rose by the 
force of sympathy, which is a form of fear, above the vulgar conception of time,” are the 
narrator’s words describing Heat’s feelings of fear and sympathy.  By “vulgar” the narrative 
voice surely intends “common,” meaning shared time, as well as “low” in the sense that the 
common conception of time contends inadequately with the metaphysical horrors that 
confront him.  Conrad acknowledges both the categorizing function of shared, even national 
time, as well as that categorizing function’s inability to stand up against the fragmentary 
inertias of individual doubt.  Heat is overcome by his sense of an alternative truth: “The 
inexplicable mysteries of conscious existence beset Chief Inspector Heat till he evolved a 
horrible notion that ages of atrocious pain and mental torture could be contained between 
two successive winks of an eye” (70).  Inspector Heat has finally “too much insight” (75).   
Just a few pages into Chapter 5, and with this “insight” fresh in his mind, Heat 
encounters the Professor.  Heat’s middling position in this important section of narrative 
situates him perfectly within the social context of the novel: avatar of the middle classes, he 
is “conscious of having an authorized mission on this earth and the moral support of his 
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kind (77).15  Heat’s imagined sense of community is critically threatened by the events of his 
day.  His intellectual need for order prohibits him from grasping, from looking too deeply 
into, what the Assistant Commissioner describes as the “episodic” (112) and seemingly 
arbitrary “complexion of the case,” which had “forced upon him the general absurdity of 
things human” (73).  Heat lacks the “true wisdom, which is not certain of anything in this 
world of contradictions” (73, 67).  He thinks in certainties and with a penchant for 
orderliness; he is oxymoronically deigned “principal expert in anarchist procedure” (68).  
Thus Heat’s “unphilosophical temperament” is in many ways inadequate to the task of 
understanding much of what the plot of The Secret Agent puts before him, and his encounter 
with the Professor only makes this the more evident to the reader.  The world of normal 
criminal activity, so to speak, he is able to categorize and fit into a sort of Manichean 
construction of the world.  But, alas, the “exceptional” Professor is not commensurate “with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 It is worth noting that the majority of Chapters 5 and 6 consist of a series of interpolations 
that originate in, or are associated with, the conscious reflection of Inspector Heat upon 
meeting the Professor just a few pages into Chapter 5.  From here the reader is led through 
an array of no fewer than five narrative segments over two chapters, beginning with the 
Inspector’s shock at meeting the Professor: after Heat runs into the Professor, we flashback 
first to Heat’s initial meeting with the Assistant Commissioner, then to Stevie’s postmortem, 
by which Heat is affected, and which we then understand deeply inflects his meeting with 
the Professor, to which we return before Heat then continues his journey to meet the 
Assistant Commissioner for the second time.  Thus Heat is a sort of middleman who links 
the Professor and the Assistant Commissioner.  Given that the series of interpolations 
begins firmly in the memorial reflections of Heat, it is a testament to Conrad’s virtuosity that 
it seems natural rather than jarring for the reader to end up at several points, indeed for 
nearly all of Chapter 6, experiencing a narrative point of view dominated by the Assistant 
Commissioner’s consciousness, rather than Inspector Heat’s, with whom the narrative 
sequences began.  However, the reader does, perhaps, find the jumps in time more startling.  
In these chapters narrative consciousness seemingly operates through physical association, 
something like in Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, where physical proximity and 
convergence, association rather than sequence, rules the narrative logic of the novel.  In 
other words, though major reorientations of the narrative also demand major reorientations 
in time and place (such as between Chapters 3 and 4, 7 and 8, and 8 and 9), generally 
physical presence rather than sequence conjures thought, which prompts shifts in points of 
consciousness; from these points, through memorial reflection, occur physical jumps in both 
space and time. 
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his idea of the fitness of things” (68). For Heat, the Professor is the physical instantiation of 
the cosmological disorder he had intimated at the hospital while looking over Stevie’s 
remains. 
Avrom Fleishman provides a fascinating reading of the standoff between Heat and 
the Professor: their “functional arrangement,” he writes, is evidence that “on the political 
level, knowledge is a system of mutual expectations that stabilizes conduct, which might 
otherwise be precipitate and self-destructive” (192).  Perhaps reflecting the cold-war 
mentality of the time in which he was writing (and that seems to be rapidly returning in our 
own day), Fleishman describes precisely Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political: a state not of 
peace, but of the perpetual suspension of hostilities between friend and enemy that provide 
an order and confidence that comes with a shared political understanding: there is “us” and 
there is “them.”  The problem with Fleishman’s intriguing reading, however, is that for such 
an “arrangement” to be “functional,” it must be both public and avowed.  It must be 
political.  In the case of Heat and the Professor, their antipathy is distinctly private and 
disavowed and thus has no public, political effect.  Were it to be brought into the open, it 
seems, it would only be with a bang.  Thus the arrangement bespeaks not stability, but latent 
violence and an antinomy that is generalized to the most local, individual levels.  No 
community or political significance springs from this arrangement.  In this sense, the uneasy 
detente epitomizes the triumph of private interests that Schmitt and, I think, Conrad both 
see as the hallmark of possessive individualism and the democratic idea.   
Heat’s response to the Professor is exemplary of the sort of individualism that 
develops within an economy of private interests.  Heat fears the Professor, who fills him 
with a desire to live—an aversion to the ultimate abnegation of self-sacrifice—so strong that 
he becomes physically ill.  For this reason, Heat flees the Professor with  
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a purposeful briskness of a man disregarding the inclemencies of the weather, but 
conscious of having an authorized mission on this earth and the moral support of his 
kind.  All the inhabitants of the immense town, the population of the whole country, 
and even the teeming millions struggling in the planet, were with him—down to the 
very thieves and mendicant.  Yes, the thieves themselves were sure to be with him in 
his present work.  The consciousness of universal support in his general activity 
heartened him to grapple with the particular problem. (77) 
 
While on a cursory reading one might be tempted to understand Heat’s sense of “moral 
support” here as a form of national identification, instead the “authority” Heat feels lies in 
the universally recognized draw of individual self-preservation.  Heat can thus claim not only 
the occupants of the town or Island, which could possibly be construed as a national or local 
feeling, but finally the entirety of the “struggling” planet.  Heat imagines the “universal” 
accord of an environment in which nothing is worth dying for, exhibiting “an 
individualism,” Schmitt writes, “in which [if] any one other than the free individual himself 
were to decide upon the substance and dimension of his freedom [individualism itself] would 
be an empty phrase.  For the individual as such there is no enemy with whom he must enter 
into a life and death struggle if he personally does not want to do so.”16    
Thus we see that the Professor’s earlier boasts are (in this case) absolutely true; 
because he “depends on death,” his “superiority is evident.”   Fear besets Heat when faced 
with the unsubsumable threat of arbitrary violence epitomized by the Professor: “Life had 
such a strong hold upon him that a fresh wave of nausea broke out in slight perspiration 
upon his brow” (75).  The Professor can thus goad Heat with impunity, mocking the 
Inspector that “for a man of real convictions this is a fine opportunity for self-sacrifice” (75).  
The Professor knows he is secure in such an environment because, as he asserts with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 “An individualism in which any one other than the free individual himself were to decide 
upon the substance and dimension of his freedom would be an empty phrase.  For the 
individual as such there is no enemy with whom he must enter into a life and death struggle 
if he personally does not want to do so.” Schmitt, The Concept of the Political 71. 
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hubris that comes with certain knowledge, “to deal with a man like me you require sheer, 
naked, inglorious heroism” (53).  However Heat is no hero, nor does heroism exist within 
the pages of The Secret Agent.  Yet neither is the Professor capable of a decisive act; he is not 
willing to be the instrument of the change he desires, but like everyone else in the world of 
The Secret Agent, prefers deferral and discussion to action. Instead, the reader gets the parody 
of a decision that is Stevie’s ill-fated “humanitarian enterprise,” an effort, if it can be called 
that, destined to end in negation, in “an enormous hole in the ground under a tree filled with 
smashed roots and broken branches” (56). Yet, though the Professor regrets that “the sound 
of exploding bombs was lost in their immensity of passive grains without an echo,” the 
explosion—which is the result not of a decision, but of Stevie tripping over a root—does 




Disavowal, or Violence 
 
If society is “essentially criminal,” as Conrad described it, then The Secret Agent 
presents a society that is no more criminal than it is instrumental, or perhaps more precisely, 
a society that is criminally instrumental.  The Secret Agent is, after all, a novel about a world 
activated by “the will to use the means” (54).  One of the principal means, we see, is 
disavowal, which lubricates, so to speak, all social operations.  By denying themselves the 
sorts of moral feeling and reflection that could only prove debilitating, Conrad’s secret 
agents secure the material and psychological means to operate in a depraved world in which 
the commodification of elemental human need creates perverse expressions of value.  Thus 
does Winnie find the fortitude to adhere to her “bargain” with Verloc.  Likewise, we are told 
apologetically that the “poor” cab driver who beats his emaciated horse so ruthlessly does so 
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“not because his soul was cruel and his heart evil, but because he had to earn his fare” (125).  
In this sense Conrad’s novel conjures a most extreme and indeed cultivated form of that 
“moral stupidity” that George Eliot famously denigrates in Middlemarch.17  For characters like 
the cab driver, like Winnie Verloc, and like Winnie’s mother are all well aware of the means 
that allow them to seek their ends: they simply choose not to acknowledge the moral 
significance of the world of which their actions form a part.  Thus we are told repeatedly 
something to the effect that, Winnie “felt profoundly that things didn’t stand much looking 
into” (141).   
However disavowal functions not merely as a way around moral compunction in The 
Secret Agent, but also as a crucial means of avoiding the violence latent within the human 
animal itself.  For to register feelings sympathetically, to be susceptible to compassion, is 
ultimately to risk the fate of Stevie, who “felt with great completeness and some profundity” 
the suffering of those around him (136).  Appropriate to the moral economy of the novel, 
Stevie’s moral sensibility, rather than being redemptive, instead proves destructive.  
Disavowal is the cognitive means by which the agent refutes the pathos and pressing 
violence of the environment; in a world where sympathy equates to hatred and violence, this 
refusal to feel prevents the agent from turning destructive—as both Stevie and Winnie 
ultimately do.  There is simply no room for moral sensitivity in the violently instrumentalized 
world of The Secret Agent.  Disavowal does not merely produce a false equanimity in The Secret 
Agent, but rather induces and secures the only attainable order for both person and polity.  
Conrad shows that disavowal as a defense mechanism has evolved, as it were, and given rise 
to a human sensibility that is negatively adapted in its capacity for fellowship and affiliation.  
Conrad’s vision of liberal society is not a vision of human relations that have regressed back 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Eliot, Middlemarch 211.   
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into a state of nature, as the Professor would hope; it is not “might” that is of chief 
importance in the world of The Secret Agent (of course neither is “right,” by any stretch of the 
imagination, of principal significance).  What matters most is will, the psychological strength 
to commit oneself to an alternate epistemology, an epistemology of secrecy and disavowal, 
and by doing so negate the pathetic world Stevie describes so eloquently as “Bad! Bad!” 
(133).  
After the somewhat dizzying narrative leap forward in Chapters 5-7, Chapter 8 
unexpectedly returns the reader to the period prior to the failed bombing, and Stevie’s 
unfortunate demise.18  The chapter is crucial in a number of ways and accounts for some of 
Conrad’s most pointed commentary on English society, but also provides the most overt 
examples of disavowal in the novel.  The chapter begins by divulging Winnie’s mother’s 
private motivations for orchestrating her move to an almshouse “founded by a wealthy 
innkeeper for the destitute widows” of “victuallers,” which she has managed only after 
“persistent importunities” (120).  These importunities depend on the lie that she has been 
forced out of Verloc’s home by her own daughter; “in this case she was sacrificing 
Winnie…to the opinion of people that she  [Winnie] would never see and who would never 
see her” (128).  We see that her efforts are driven by a selfless, if perforce deformed, desire 
to do what is best for her children; she leaves Brett Street in order to ensure that room 
remains in Verloc’s abode for the “destitute” and “peculiar” Stevie (123).  Again, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 As Jakob Lothe describes in his excellent breakdown of narrative method in The Secret 
Agent in Conrad’s Narrative Method, the effect of the novel’s narrative shifts on the reader is 
impossible to recreate upon secondary readings.  Indeed, one finds it difficult to remember 
that, as of Chapter 8 in the novel, and after three chapters specifically treating the aftermath 
of the bomb blast, the narrative has still not divulged the identity of the exploded bomber.  
Conversely, as Lothe also notes correctly, The Secret Agent is a book, as we find only upon 
rereading, which is crammed with proleptic markers that are impossible to make sense of on 
first reading the novel. 
	  	  
143	  
commensurate with the moral economy of The Secret Agent, and the narrator’s ironic 
ambivalences, the reader senses a certain earnestness in the narrator’s appraisal of Mrs. 
Verloc’s mother’s “heroism and unscrupulousness” (128).  There is no end in The Secret 
Agent, however noble, that in its pursuit does not seem to require some ignoble action, and 
the “will to use the means”; thus her “end, conceived in the astuteness of an uneasy heart, 
the old woman had pursued with secrecy and determination” (121).  For we find that 
Winnie’s mother’s “heroic” act has ultimately necessitated the “sacrifice” of her daughter to 
public opinion on the one hand and the “abandonment” of her son Stevie on the other. 
Her “object attained in astute secrecy, the heroic old woman” then makes “a clean 
breast of it to Mrs. Verloc” (121).  But in fact she does no such thing; Mrs. Verloc’s mother 
only relates to her daughter what is unavoidably and publicly apparent: the fact that she is 
moving.  What she has done to secure the move, and why she has done it, she does not say.  
Nor “does she allow her inward apprehensions to rob her of the advantage of the venerable 
placidity of her outward person” (121).  Nonetheless, the surprise of her sudden move is 
such that Winnie cannot help but inquire about it: 
  ‘Whatever did you want to do that for?’ she exclaimed, in scandalized astonishment.  
The shock must have been severe to make her depart from that distant and 
uninquiring acceptance of facts which was her force and her safeguard in life. 
  ‘Weren’t you made comfortable enough here?’ 
She had lapsed into these inquiries, but next moment she saved the consistency of 
her conduct by resuming her dusting, whlie the old woman sat scared and dumb 
under her dingy white cap and lusterless dark wig. 
  ‘How in the world did you manage it, mother?’ 
As not affecting the inwardness of things, which it was Mrs. Verloc’s principle to 
ignore, this curiosity was excusable.  It bore merely on the methods.  The old woman 
welcomed it eagerly as bringing forward something that could be talked about with 
much sincerity. (121-122) 
 
Mrs. Verloc welcomes the opportunity to speak with “sincerity,” precisely because in doing 
so she can refuse to divulge anything substantive to Winnie.  This clearly suits Winnie, who 
meets her mother’s “exhaustive answer” with a “mansuetude” much appreciated by her 
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mother.  It is worth noting here, how with “mansuetude” (a word which without question 
escapes the idiom of Winnie’s mother) Conrad alerts the reader to the ever-present 
consciousness of the novel’s narrative voice.  The narrator’s ambivalent—and indecisive—
appraisal of Winnie’s mother’s “heroism and unscrupulousness” is exemplary of just how 
complex the moral judgments are in the world of the novel, and also how sincere, for once, 
was Conrad’s description of his artistic approach in the 1920 “Author’s Note” to the novel 
as always oscillating between “pity and scorn.”   
 The opening of Chapter 8 gives the reader a renewed sense of not only the 
insincerity that presides over human intercourse in The Secret Agent, but also the sorts of 
strain that accompany the hollowness of discourse (having seven years experience at such 
surreptitious dealings, Winnie seems more accustomed to, and secure in, the disingenuous 
life in which she engages).  As the chapter moves out into the public (and for once in the 
novel not deserted) streets of London, the difficulty of maintaining the divide between order 
and truth becomes acute, and we see that even as disavowal creates and maintains divisions 
in the novel (between private and public, and truth and order, for example), this sort of 
secrecy also joins and preserves: at moments the defense mechanism of disavowal seems to 
be the only thing holding things together in The Secret Agent.  The difficulty of maintaining 
divisions is communicated as a sense of strain and discord permeating the narrative, 
inflecting both the tone and rhetoric of the chapter.  Chapter 8 is famous for its presentation 
of the carriage ride through the streets of London as Stevie and Mrs. Verloc escort their 
mother to the almshouse, in particular for how the cabman’s violently instrumental 
treatment of his horse emblematizes the “moral nihilism” of The Secret Agent.  Winnie’s 
unsympathetic manner (she flatly observes “This isn’t a very good horse” at the same 
moment that Stevie veritably writhes in his growing discomfort) allies her with the cabman.  
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Conversely Mrs. Verloc’s mother, like Stevie, slowly becomes overwhelmed as the cab 
moves painfully toward its end.  The cab ride is a horribly comedic parody of human 
relations.  Reproducing the difficulty of producing shared meaning—one of the novel’s 
central concerns—the women compete with the deafening din of the carriage, screaming 
ridiculously at one another their sentiments regarding parting and the care of Winnie’s 
charge, Stevie.   
With a sympathetic faculty raw and congenitally unprotected, Stevie cannot 
withstand his exposure to the brutality he witnesses in the public world, “and the horror of 
one sort of wretchedness having to feed upon the anguish of the other—at the poor cabman 
beating the poor horse in the name, as it were, of his poor kids at home” (136).  As his habit 
of drawing “innumerable circles”—“a confusion of intersecting lines suggest[ing] a rendering 
of cosmic chaos”—indicates, Stevie’s inability to internally contend with confusion and 
disorder results in its more or less immediate external manifestation (36).  Consequently we 
see that the “violence and pathos” associated with the “dramas of fallen horses” “induced 
him to sometimes shriek piercingly in the crowd, which disliked to be disturbed by sounds of 
distress in its quiet enjoyment of the national spectacle” (7).  Though the violence of his 
upbringing (like the Professor, Stevie too is a product of the novel’s “inorganic nature”) 
apparently renders Stevie acutely sympathetic to anybody or anything that cannot protect 
itself, he evidently also lacks the cognitive ability to ignore or disavow what should be 
painful to him only at a remove.  Stevie has no defense mechanism, and thus cannot handle 
the open secrets to which he is made privy by Winnie.  Stevie’s extreme sensitivity translates 
immediately into violence: “In the face of anything which affected directly or indirectly his 
morbid dread of pain, Stevie ended by turning vicious” (134). 
The tenderness of his universal charity had two phases as indissolubly joined and 
connected as the reverse and obverse sides of a medal.  The anguish of immoderate 
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compassion was succeeded by the pain of an innocent but pitiless rage.  Those two 
states expressing themselves outwardly by the same signs of futile bodily agitation, 
his sister Winnie soothed his excitement without ever fathoming its twofold 
character.  Mrs. Verloc wasted no portion of this transient life in seeking for 
fundamental information.  This is a sort of economy having all the appearances and 
some of the advantages of prudence.  Obviously it may be good for one not to know 
too much.  And such a view accords very well with constitutional indolence. (135) 
 
The explicit link made here between compassionate feeling and violent outrage is an essential 
one in the novel.  Stevie epitomizes the latent violence of “humanitarian enterprise” (211), 
that is, of “two states expressing themselves outwardly by the same signs.”  Everywhere the 
reader turns, the novel reproduces structurally Schmitt’s chilling words concerning the 
political appropriation of concept of humanity: “To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke 
and monopolize such a term has incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality 
of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be 
driven by the most extreme inhumanity” (Concept of the Political 54).  By this point in his 
career, in works like Heart of Darkness, Conrad had shown his understanding of this concept’s 
application concerning the practices of imperialism.  Yet, in The Secret Agent he demonstrates 
the relevance of these unsettling ideas to European political culture and the “universal 
charity” of the cosmopolitan impulse.     
The central impetus behind both the Professor’s philosophy and Vladimir’s plotting 
in The Secret Agent is the instrumental application of violence to incite compassion, national 
sentiment, and then retribution—to break through the stolid indolence of the middle classes 
and by doing so render violence a justifiable response based on compassion—so that 
England will no longer lag.  Both men epitomize Schmitt’s dictum, which holds that 
“whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat.” (Concept of the Political 54).  The Professor hopes 
to “make people believe” that he “ought to be shot at sight like a dog.”  He wishes to induce 
a state of emergency in which a portion of humanity—himself—is deprived of the “quality 
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of being human.”  Mr. Vladimir, on the other hand, seeks a final resolution for what he 
describes as England’s parliamentary emphasis on “prevention” (21).  “There is no end to 
prevention,” Vladimir tells Verloc, and thus no end to deferral and discussion.  Because 
“they dislike finality in this country,” Vladimir desires a “cure”; through the execution of an 
“outrage,” he seeks to influence public opinion precisely in order to shift the social and 
political inertia towards inducing decisive action (21).  He attempts to do so by creating, 
through violent provocation, a state of emergency, and thus of political reaction, because 
“deliberations”—that catch phrase of liberal procedure—“deliberations upon international 
action for the suppression of political don’t seem to get anywhere” (23).  Vladimir identifies, 
and tries to correct through nefarious means, a central dilemma of liberalism, that is, that 
deliberation tends merely to engender indecisiveness and inevitably results in that general 
torpor that is a central theme of the novel.  He locates the source of that dilemma England’s 
“sentimental regard for individual liberty” (23).  For this reason, “England lags” (23).19   
  But as Vladimir knows, provoking the state of exception will indeed require 
something exceptional, an “outrage” that is itself inexplicable, to penetrate the ersatz 
equanimity of the masses.  Paradoxically, by having “a go at astronomy,” Vladimir—whose 
ultimate aim is to induce a more strict, less liberal order—seeks to reduce social organization 
to degree zero, so to speak, by symbolically annihilating modernity’s fundamental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19 Given Conrad’s own feelings regarding liberal democracy, Vladimir is an intriguing 
character. For one finally wonders, despite the novel’s obvious aversion to Mr. Vladimir, if 
Conrad does not in the end essentially agree with Vladimir’s appraisal of England’s 
deleterious “individualism.”  The novel seems to sanction Vladimir’s criticisms, yet deride 
Vladimir’s solutions.  Intriguingly, like Vladimir, Conrad was of course also “descended from 
generations victimized by the instruments of an arbitrary power.”  One cannot help but 
wonder about this statement’s paradoxical significance—for it seems Vladimir wishes to 
repeat the sins of his oppressors—and whether this is in some way a self-reflexive statement 




convention: time.  The Foreign Ambassador wants to universalize that cosmic sense of 
anarchy, that “sympathy as a form of fear,” which Inspector Heat had felt so acutely 
standing before the fragments of Stevie’s annihilated body.  For Vladimir such an attack 
alone would be truly decisive: The “absurd ferocity” of blowing up the meridian “will affect 
[the masses] more profoundly than the mangling of a whole street—or theatre—full of their 
own kind” (27).  Thus Vladimir’s plotting once again mirrors the grim desires of the 
Professor, who “dreamt of a world like a shambles” (240).  “Exterminate! Exterminate!” 
proclaims the anarchist, “that is the only way to progress” (240).  Yet it is finally the negative 
force of The Secret Agent itself that produces a degree zero as its plots and characters cancel 
themselves out, so to speak, by their irresolution and indecision.   
That is, except for Winnie, who will finally negate herself as well as Verloc in a 
decisive act of violence.  For though the Greenwich bombing makes not a scratch on the 
veneer of public opinion, it echoes with savage violence through Verloc’s private “domestic 
happiness.”  Verloc’s desperation combines with Stevie’s “immoderate compassion” and 
“pitiless rage” to begin a chain of events that culminates—hardly decisively—in Stevie being 
“blown to fragments in a state of innocence and in the conviction of being engaged in a 
humanitarian enterprise” (211). The bombing does indeed fail to register among the 
cosmopolitan population, a fact due precisely to the phenomenal scale of the democratic 
“illusion which imposes due to its size alone.”  Though the violent echoes are diffused and 
made unrecognizable among the passive immensity of humanity, they ultimately have a 
seismic impact on Winnie Verloc. 
This creature, whose moral nature had been subjected to a shock of which, in the 
physical order, the most violent earthquake of history could only be a faint and 
languid rendering, was at the mercy of trifles, of casual contacts. (202) 
 
Winnie, whose philosophy of disavowal had maintained a surface composure impenetrable 
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to all stimuli, is made by the truth of her brother’s murder psychologically and emotionally 
raw, at the “mercy of trifles.”  True to the calculus of Conrad’s novel, the equation of 
compassion and violence repeats itself once again.  Vladimir’s plotting has in fact induced a 
state of emergency, but one silently confined to the Verloc household.  Significantly, 
Winnie’s decisive move, prior to actually killing Verloc, is to refashion his identity as an 
abstraction, remote from affiliation, and then ultimately to dehumanize him entirely.  Verloc 
becomes “the man who had taken Stevie out from under her eyes to murder him in a locality 
whose name was at the moment not present to her memory” (203).  He is then seen as “a 
monster,” a “reflective beast, not very dangerous—a slow beast with a sleek head, gloomier 
than a seal, and with a husky voice” (204).  And it is this “famous” “husky voice” that 
undoes Verloc (19).  By emitting the verbal echo of “Greenwich Park,” he triggers the 
metonymic detonation that fills “the empty place in [Winnie’s] memory” with violent images 
expanding “pictorially” in her mind: “A park—smashed branches, torn leaves, gravel, bits of 
brotherly flesh and bone, all spouting up together in the manner of a firework” (206).  These 
violently visual echoes produce a psychological state of exception that engenders yet more 
violence in Winnie’s murder of Verloc.   
Commensurate with the logic of the novel, the significance of this one decisive act is 
hollowed out by the vagaries of time.  Time’s relativizing power (another problem of scale) 
seems capable of rendering any act meaningless (except, for Mr. Verloc of course, who, 
finally seeing the writing on the wall, so to speak, registers the full significance of the 
moment as it pertains to directly him).  The plodding temporal progression of the chapter 
that contains the murder scene, and the slow motion process of Verloc’s murder itself, are 
both “leisurely enough” for many things, but “not leisurely enough to allow Mr. Verloc to 
move either hand or foot” (208).  Like at all points in the novel, there is time to think, even 
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plan, but somehow never time for thinking or planning to issue as action.  This is another 
version of Heat’s earlier intimation that “ages of atrocious pain and mental torture could be 
contained between two successive winks of an eye” (70).  For there is nothing “swift as a 
flash of lightning” about the way Verloc registers the imminence of his death.  Indeed, as a 
blind act of revenge, the act is conclusive.  Yet Verloc’s death concludes nothing, and 
certainly provides no resolution for either Winnie or the novel more generally.  The death 
resists the novel’s own eschatology, delivering Winnie into a “freedom” that is in fact a state 
of profound indeterminacy, one which she resolves, after a manner, by contracting yet 
another bargain—this time with Ossipon. 
For in fact, Winnie hardly seems agent to the act of murder: “The knife was already 
planted in his breast.  It met no resistance on its way.  Hazard has such accuracies” (208).  
We have always know that this knife was going to find its way into Verloc sooner or later, 
and the “leisurely” manner in which it does so only serves to parody the final act of 
resolution that put it there; Winnie is merely instrument, not agent.  For it is history, or 
nature—or Conrad, for in the novel there is surely no difference—that acts finally as the 
agent of death, wherein “the ultimate design surpasses and even perverts the planning of 
man.”20  The act itself is enveloped and muted by the expanse of time that surrounds it: as an 
echo, it becomes less and less audible, not subsumed but replaced by the sound of Verloc’s 
running blood, which impacts the floor “with a sound of ticking growing fast and furious 
like the pulse of an insane clock” (210).  In the end, time seems to be the one democratically 
applicable truth of The Secret Agent, not a “vulgar conception of time,” but rather a violent 
expanse that is precisely antithetical to order.  For Carl Schmitt the purpose of the exception 
is to produce both order and meaning—the two are essentially inextricable for Schmitt—and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Löwith, Meaning in History 56.   
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in doing so, to orientate a negative anthropology toward its possible redemption in the 
concept of the political.  However, as we see in The Secret Agent, Conrad is deeply ambivalent 
about this type of theological narrative.  Still, Conrad’s novel demonstrates that, like the 
imperceptible rend left in the unfathomable waters of the Channel as Winnie’s body passes 
through it, whatever significance may inhere in the diffuse actions of a liberal society, 
meaning is “destined” to remain “impenetrable,” like those “acts of madness and despair” 
that characterize The Secret Agent, as they too are swallowed up by the “damned hole [of] 








Hayden White has suggested that “historicality as a distinct mode of human 
existence is unthinkable without the presupposition of a system of law in relation to which a 
specifically legal subject could be constituted,” and thus that “historical self-consciousness, 
the kind of consciousness capable of imagining the need to represent reality as a history, is 
conceivable only in terms of its interest in law, legality, and legitimacy” (Content of the Form 
14).  The “intimate relationship between law, historicality, and narrativity,” continues White, 
“raises the suspicion that narrative in general, from the folktale to the novel, from the annals 
to the fully realized ‘history,’ has to do with the topics of law, legality, legitimacy, or, more 
generally, authority” (The Content of the Form 13).  This strikes me as certainly being true of the 
novel.  For although the novel is about many other things than legality, it does indeed 
assume a dialectical relationship between a system of law or legitimacy and a subject that 
cannot act independently of that regime of authority.  In the broadest sense, the paradigm of 
legitimacy that organizes the self-consciousness of the subject in the nineteenth century can 
only be described as liberal or, in other words, as a legal and ethical regime concerned chiefly 
with the rights of the individual as opposed to the controls of a centralized state power.  The 
world of the nineteenth-century novel is the world of the individual subject and of a civil 
society composed by individual subjects. 
Hence the nineteenth-century novel is the domain not of heroes, but rather of 
normal people, so to speak, who take the place of heroes.  In this respect White is correct to 
name Hegel as “the historical conscience of the age that followed him” (Metahistory 135).  
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For after Hegel there is no person or action that is insignificant to history; each person or 
action may be merely instrumental in Hegel’s vision of historical progression, but each also 
gains world-historical significance.  It is for this reason that in Adam Bede Eliot lingers over 
“Dutch paintings” with a “delicious sympathy”; the “old woman” in her “mob cap” with her 
“monotonous homely existence” is no less important to her account of history than are the 
“world-stirring” actions of Napoleon or Theresa (Adam Bede 195).  This new importance of 
the subject is also why the individual’s internal needs and longings suddenly become the 
appropriate content of the novel.  The subject’s dissatisfaction with what is, which derives 
from his sense of longing for what ought to be, emerges as energy able to activate the novel 
as a form.  Thus there exists always, according to Lukács, the dissonance of 
incommensurability in the novel, which is produced, “by the refusal of the immanence of 
being to enter into empirical life” (Theory 71).  
For this reason Middlemarch is the story of Dorothea and not St. Theresa.  Theresa 
had found her “epos in the founding of a religious order”; she was able to apply to an 
unimpeachable and given metaphysical ordering of the world, which was adequate to her 
needs as an individual being.  Yet, sadly, the “medium in which [Theresa’s] ardent deeds 
took shape is gone for ever” (Middlemarch 838).  Unfortunately for Dorothea, Middlemarch’s 
contemporary “medium” was “helped by no coherent social faith and order which could 
perform the function of knowledge for the ardently willing soul” (3).  For Eliot “faith,” 
“order,” and “knowledge” are the essentially related elements capable of producing 
meanings that bond the individual with something other than itself; understanding that 
“performs the function of knowledge” is as important as knowledge itself (if in the end there 
is any difference at all).  In the case of Theresa, all these elements had been supplied by 
religious understanding, but for Dorothea they are not supplied at all and must instead be 
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produced by the self—which is finally inadequate to the task.  In a similar manner, the 
novels of Thomas Hardy give evidence of a neutralized social and political environment, in 
which epistemological insecurities, and the absence of the given in the world, lead to error 
and human suffering.  In the same way that Dorothea and Tess are interstitial figures, these 
novels present interstitial worlds, domains that have lost one organizing “faith” and thus 
seek another, which is found, problematically, in the ambiguous abstraction of humanity 
itself.  In the individual’s ambivalent stance toward authority (in White’s sense of the term), 
which results from her conflicting desires for both freedom and order, we can see precisely 
the reflection of the liberal paradigm that provides order to the world of the novel.   
The longing that is the consequence of what Lukács calls the “refusal of the 
immanence of being” propels the novel forward; this “refusal” is also what makes the novel 
essentially romantic.  Subjected by his own delusions of absolute autonomy, according to 
Carl Schmitt, the “romantic could not find the reality he sought in himself, the community, 
the development of world history, or—as long as he remained romantic—in the God of 
traditional metaphysics [nonetheless] the longing for reality demanded fulfillment.  With the 
help of irony he could protect himself against the sole reality” (Political Romanticism 73).  (By 
“sole reality,” Schmitt intends here what is present, immediately, to the subject.)  As the 
rhetorical figure of doubt, irony deflects the romantic subject’s disappointment in what is 
apparent so that “every historical moment is an elastic point in the vast philosophy with 
which we dispose over peoples and eons” (74).  The romantic subject can always begin 
again, so to speak, and thus there is a temporal function to his ironic deflection: “reality is 
punctuated, and every point becomes the beginning point of a novel” (74).  
We recognize this individual from the English novel, where the romantic figure 
presents for the reader certain ontological and epistemological ambivalences.  Exemplary 
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here would be Dickens’s Steerforth, Eliot’s Will Ladislaw, Hardy’s Angel Clare, or Conrad’s 
Martin Decoud, whose “first moral sentiment” of his life is forced upon him by a “solitude 
so severe that it left him doubting “his own individuality” (Nostromo 393).  Decoud’s first 
(and last!) moral feeling is, significantly, negative, just one more bout of questioning and 
doubt.  Decoud’s nihilism is an extreme example of the romantic sensibility, perhaps, but the 
moral anarchy of Decoud’s position points to the total absence of meaning that is precisely 
Schmitt’s complaint.  And this is the point: from the absolute standpoint of the romantic 
individual, nothing is connected in its meaning (except to the individual himself), and thus 
from Schmitt’s position any “legal or moral judgment would be incongruous” with the 
romantic standpoint” because “every norm would seem to be an anti-romantic tyranny” 
(Political Romanticism 124).  A decentralized civil society composed of romantic individuals 
necessarily means a society shot through with divergent interests and burgeoning antipathies.  
When this romantic sensibility permeates the realm of the political, the result is the sort of 
parliamentary indecisiveness that, for Schmitt, characterizes liberalism.  For Schmitt, 
romanticism and liberalism are concomitant, and political romanticism is the fulfillment of 
liberalism.  The romantic individual, which is a sort of mythic instantiation of liberal 
bourgeois individualism, is both symptom and cause of the types of modern intransigence 
Schmitt believed was intrinsic to the depoliticized world of liberal society, and which a novel 
like Conrad’s The Secret Agent, as we have seen, makes its subject.   
From this perspective the novel of the individual personality is also necessarily the 
novel of the depoliticized world, a world of deferrals and endless discussions, and in which 
indecision constitutes a political ethos.  I have tried to trace in the preceding pages some of 
the ways this sort of indecision manifests itself as a salient feature of Victorian narrative.  I 
have also demonstrated that indecision and incommensurability demand violence as a means 
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of resolution.  Because the problem of authority is, well, a problem of the novel, the political 
and legal thought of Carl Schmitt has, I believe, provided an appropriate and also a new (at 
least to the discussion of the novel) idiom in which to ground my examination of Victorian 
novels.  Schmitt is particularly relevant, I believe, because those nontrivial insecurities and 
conflicts regarding meaning and authority, as the novel presents them, seem to always 
already prefigure the need for a decision.  So even if we value Schmitt’s trenchant critiques 
of liberal democracy, we likely revile his solutions to the problems he exposes; but if we 
revile his solutions, we ought to perhaps evaluate in a more reflexive fashion those 
procedures in which we put our faith.  And this, I believe, is what the novels I have 
examined in this study ask us to do. As we saw in Adam Bede, the jury can “deliberate” all 
they want, but finally a “decision” must be made.  Not only is that decision apt to be 
exclusionary or violent, but it can also only be legitimized through recourse to the sacred, a 
sort of purity that exists at a completely unsubsumable remove from the legal sphere.  In this 
case, liberal procedure, Eliot seems to argue, cannot escape its theological underpinnings.  
Moreover, legitimacy is determined from outside of the domain in which legitimacy exists as 
a feature of normative life.  In other words, the rule requires the exception. Or, yet another 
way of putting this paradox is to say that rule requires another, alternate set of rules.   
If this sounds extraordinary, well, that is the point.  We need only think of two 
examples from our contemporary world to illustrate again the function of the exception in 
political procedure.  First, the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, which exists and functions 
outside of the Geneva Conventions and also (at least until quite recently) entirely outside of 
United Stated legal jurisdiction: here is a paradigmatic example of inhumanities perpetrated 
in the name of humanity, a central contradiction of liberalism that has been a core concern 
of the novelists examined in this study.  By simply applying a term like “terrorist,” or “illegal 
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combatant,” to a human being, we are able to deprive him of his humanity, and in doing so, 
in one stroke authorize the most inhumane of treatments.  And second, the Foreign 
Intelligence Security Acts Court, or FISA Court, which exists ex parte and is thus excepted 
from the procedures established by public and judicial oversight.  Here is an instance par 
excellence of crypto-decisionism; the arbitrary decision is the norm, which stands behind the 
norms of liberal proceduralism and the “force of the best argument.”  The ethical 
implications of these practices are officially disavowed yet the way that these hardly veiled 
states of exception (exceptions that have become the rule) exist in our own lives is exemplary 
of disavowal in only a weak, purely formal way (a fact that is at once interesting and 
disturbing).  However, for the liberal mind of the nineteenth century, or so I have argued, 
the failure of the very authority in relation to which the subject and his agency are 
constituted produces profound cognitive disturbances.  Even more disturbing would be the 
open acknowledgement of these failures.  Thus, troubling truths must be disavowed and 
open secrets maintained.  Yet, as this study has shown, these disturbances are nonetheless 
registered mimetically in Victorian narrative. 
To return to Hayden White, he writes that “where there is an ambiguity or 
ambivalence regarding the status of the legal system, which is the form in which the subject 
encounters most immediately the social system in which he is enjoined to achieve full 
humanity, the ground on which any closure of a story one might wish to tell about a past is 
lacking” (The Content of the Form 14).  For this reason, according to White, historical 
representation in the nineteenth century forced the formal coherencies of narrative, as a sort 
of cultural wish fulfillment, on the events it re-presented.  The demand for closure and 
forced order became an answer to the demand for moral meaning in historical narrative 
(Content of the Form 21).  White argues that, increasingly, historical representation became 
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susceptible to the “progressive demotion of the sublime in favor of the beautiful as a 
solution to the problems of taste and imagination” (The Content of the Form 68).  Historical 
narrative then becomes aestheticized, according to White, and is as such committed to the 
suppression, or negation, of what Schiller called “the uncertain anarchy of the moral world,” 
which White equates to the historical sublime (The Content of the Form 67-70).  For White, 
Hegel’s philosophy of history is exemplary of this phenomenon of aestheticization.1  From 
White’s perspective, Hegel’s historical narrative “is a prime example of a certain kind of 
‘politics of interpretation’ that produces an ‘interpretation of politics with ideological 
implications” (The Content of the Form 70).  “The sublimity of the spectacle of history had to 
be transcended if it was to serve as an object of knowledge and deprived of the terror it 
induced as ‘a panorama of sin and suffering’” (The Content of the Form 70).  This sort of 
philosophy of history is dangerous precisely because it “imputes a meaning to history that 
renders its manifest confusion comprehensible…and in doing so, deprive[s] history of the 
kind of meaninglessness that alone can goad living human beings to make their lives 
different for themselves and their children” (The Content of the Form 72).   
It is worth noting that the process White describes here corresponds almost precisely 
to the function of what Carl Schmitt called the “historical demiurge,” or the process by 
which historical narrative enfolds into its progressive order the violent discontinuities of 
history that would otherwise appear chaotic.  For Schmitt, this is comparable to the function 
of irony as a means of deflecting the immediate truth of reality for the romantic; in this case, 
narativizing becomes a means of forgetting, or deflecting, the truth of the historical past.  
Schmitt does not mention Hegel by name, but, like White, he obviously sees Hegel as 
exemplary here: “What exists is rational because it is the work of the world spirit that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See White, The Content of the Form 59-74; see also, White, Metahistory 100-112. 
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produces itself historically.  What history has done is done well” (Political Romanticism 62).  
According to Schmitt, Hegel, it would seem, does not make a decision, but by the 
perspectival slight of hand open to narrative, accommodates both truth and order, or rather 
obscures truth by the imposition of the coherent emplottments made available by narrative.  
Hegel syncretizes precisely those conflicting energies of narrative that, as I have argued 
above, novelists like Eliot, Hardy, and Conrad strive to pull back apart in their novels.  In a 
novel like Nostromo, for example, Conrad will indict precisely historical narrative’s tendency 
to exclude or subsume competing histories.  And though White postulates that historical 
narrative’s raison d’être is to “moralize reality,” I have tried to show in all the novels examined 
in this dissertation that they have a stake in “de-sublimating” the novel as a from of 
historical, and thus, political narrative (The Content as Form 14).  Victorian narrative works 
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